1). Supreme Court Ruling on Section 45 Evidence Act: Handwriting Expert Opinions Must Be Treated With Caution

Case Background

The case involved an appellant who was convicted under:

• Section 120B of IPC (criminal conspiracy),
• Section 468 of IPC (forgery for the purpose of cheating), and
• Section 471 of IPC (using a forged document as genuine).

The conviction was based on the claim that the appellant had fabricated a mark sheet to gain admission to an MBBS course.

The prosecution relied on the opinion of a handwriting expert, who stated that the handwriting on a postal cover(which allegedly contained the forged mark sheet) matched that of the appellant. However, the original postal cover was never submitted as evidence, and its existence was never proven.

The appellant challenged his conviction, arguing that:

1. The handwriting expert's opinion alone was not enough to convict him.
2. Since the original postal cover was never exhibited as evidence, the expert's report held no value.

Issues in the Case

1. Can a handwriting expert's opinion be relied upon in the absence of the original document?
2. Does expert evidence always require corroboration?
3. Was the prosecution able to prove the existence of the disputed postal cover?

Court Observations

The case was heard by a bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta in the Supreme Court of India.

1. Caution Required While Relying on Handwriting Expert's Opinion

• The Court noted that expert evidence is not always unreliable, but it should be carefully examined before being accepted as proof.
• It cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Murari Lal v. State of M.P. (1980) 1 SCC 704, which established that:
  • Expert opinions do not always require corroboration, but courts should examine them with caution.
  • Courts should probe the reasons behind an expert's conclusion before deciding to accept or reject it.
  • Handwriting analysis is an imperfect science, and therefore, expert opinions in such cases should be approached carefully.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule of law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystallized into a rule of law, that opinion evidence of a handwriting expert must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated.”

2. Failure to Exhibit the Original Postal Cover

• The Court criticized the prosecution for failing to submit the original postal cover as evidence.
• Since the disputed document was never exhibited or proven in court, the expert's opinion on the handwriting in the postal cover became irrelevant.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “Non-exhibiting of the original document would lead to the only possible inference that the questioned document i.e., the postal cover was never proved as per law and as a consequence, the evidentiary value of the handwriting expert's report concluding that the postal cover bore the handwriting of the accused appellant is rendered redundant.”

3. Prosecution Failed to Prove the Case

• The Court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the disputed postal cover.
• Since the prosecution could not establish that the postal cover even existed, the Court held that the entire case against the appellant collapsed.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “We have no hesitation in holding that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the existence of the disputed postal cover in which the forged marksheet was purportedly posted. Since the postal cover itself was not exhibited and proved in evidence, there is no question of accepting the prosecution theory that the same bore the handwriting of the accused appellant.”

Court Rulings and Decision

1. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted.
2. The Court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the disputed postal cover, which was the key piece of evidence.
3. The Court held that the expert’s opinion could not be relied upon without supporting evidence.

Legal Provisions 

1. Section 120B of IPC – Criminal conspiracy. (Section 61(2) of BNS)
2. Section 468 of IPC – Forgery for the purpose of cheating. (Section 336 (3) of BNS)
3. Section 471 of IPC – Using a forged document as genuine. (Section 340(2) of BNS)
4. Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Allows expert testimony but requires courts to scrutinise it carefully. (Section 39(1) of BSA)

Judicial Precedents:

• Murari Lal v. State of M.P. (1980) 1 SCC 704 – Laid down principles for assessing expert evidence.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Strengthens the Standard of Proof in Criminal Cases
   • The ruling emphasizes that prosecution must prove key evidence before relying on expert testimony.
   • If a document is not exhibited, any expert opinion related to it becomes meaningless.
2. Clarifies the Role of Expert Testimony
   • The Court reaffirmed that while handwriting expert opinions can be considered, they should not be blindly accepted without scrutiny.
3. Prevents Misuse of Expert Testimony
   • The ruling ensures that expert opinions are not misused to convict individuals without proper evidence.

The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the key evidence (postal cover). The Court emphasized that expert testimony must be carefully scrutinized, especially in handwriting analysis cases. This judgment strengthens the requirement for proper evidentiary proof before convicting an accused based on expert opinion.

Case Title: C. KAMALAKKANNAN VERSUS STATE OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE C.B.C.I.D., CHENNAI

2). Supreme Court: Supreme Court Ruling: Non-Executive & Independent Directors Not Liable for Cheque Dishonour Under Section 141 NI Act Unless Their Direct Involvement Shown

Case Background

The case involved non-executive and independent directors of a company who were facing criminal proceedings under:

• Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) – Dishonor of cheque for insufficiency of funds.
• Section 141 of the NI Act – Vicarious liability of company directors for offenses committed by the company.

The complaint alleged that the company had issued dishonored cheques, and since the appellants were directors, they should also be held liable.

The appellants challenged the criminal proceedings, arguing that they were non-executive directors and had no role in financial transactions or the issuance of the dishonored cheques.

Issues in the Case

1. Can non-executive and independent directors be held vicariously liable under Section 138 and 141 of the NI Act?
2. Is merely holding the position of a director enough to establish liability?
3. Does attending board meetings automatically make a director responsible for financial transactions?

Court Observations

The case was heard by a bench comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and S.C. Sharma in the Supreme Court of India.

1. No Automatic Liability for Non-Executive and Independent Directors

• The Court reiterated that non-executive and independent directors cannot be held vicariously liable unless their direct involvement in the company’s financial transactions is proved.
• Holding a director’s position alone is not enough to make a person liable for the dishonor of cheques.
• The Court clarified that only directors responsible for day-to-day business operations can be made liable under the NI Act.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “This Court has consistently held that non-executive and independent director(s) cannot be held liable under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act unless specific allegations demonstrate their direct involvement in affairs of the company at the relevant time.”

2. No Evidence of Involvement in Issuance of Cheques

• The Court found that the appellants had not issued, signed, or played any role in the dishonored cheques.
• Their role in the company was limited to governance oversight, and they had no involvement in financial decision-making or day-to-day operations.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “There is no material on record to suggest that they were responsible for the issuance of the cheques in question. Their involvement in the company's affairs was purely non-executive, confined to governance oversight, and did not extend to financial decision-making or operational management.”

3. Attending Board Meetings Does Not Create Financial Liability

• The Respondent argued that since the Appellants attended board meetings, they should be liable.
• However, the Court rejected this argument, ruling that merely attending meetings does not mean the director controls financial transactions.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “Mere attendance at board meetings does not suffice to impose financial liability on the Appellant(s), as such attendance does not automatically translate into control over financial operations.”

4. Precedents Supporting the Ruling

The Court referred to key Supreme Court precedents that emphasize strict interpretation of vicarious liability under Section 141 of the NI Act:

• Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 1 – Held that a non-executive director cannot be held liable unless active participation in company affairs is proved.
• National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal (2010) 3 SCC 330 – Emphasized that a director must be directly responsible for the conduct of business to be held liable.
• S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89 – Established that specific allegations are necessary to prove a director's role in business operations.

Court Rulings and Decision

1. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the pending criminal proceedings against the appellants (non-executive directors).
2. The Court ruled that the prosecution failed to establish their direct involvement in financial transactions.
3. It reaffirmed that non-executive and independent directors cannot be made liable for dishonored cheques unless there is clear evidence of their participation in the financial affairs of the company.

Legal Provisions 

1. Section 138 of the NI Act – Punishment for dishonor of cheques due to insufficient funds.
2. Section 141 of the NI Act – Establishes vicarious liability for company directors in cheque dishonor cases.

Judicial Precedents:

• Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 1
• National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal (2010) 3 SCC 330
• S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89

Significance of the Judgment

1. Protects Non-Executive Directors from Unwarranted Criminal Liability
   • The ruling ensures that independent and non-executive directors are not wrongly implicated in financial offenses when they are not actively involved in the company’s financial decisions.
2. Clarifies the Scope of Vicarious Liability Under Section 141 of NI Act
   • The Court reinforced that vicarious liability must be strictly interpreted, and only those responsible for financial decisions can be held accountable.
3. Prevents Misuse of Criminal Proceedings
   • The ruling helps prevent harassment of non-executive directors by ensuring that specific allegations must be made before holding them liable.

The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the non-executive directors, ruling that they were not responsible for issuing or signing the dishonored cheques. It reaffirmed that directors cannot be held vicariously liable under the NI Act unless their active involvement in financial matters is proved. This judgment strengthens legal protections for non-executive and independent directors against wrongful prosecution in cheque dishonour cases.

Case Title: K. S. MEHTA VERSUS M/S MORGAN SECURITIES AND CREDITS PVT. LTD.

3). Telangana High Court: Section 17 of Arbitration Act Puts Heavy Burden on Party to Retain Section 9 (3) Proceedings After Tribunal Formation"

Case Background

The case arose from a Company Court Appeal challenging an order of the Commercial Court. The dispute involved an application filed by the appellant to suspend the bank accounts of the respondents on an ex-parte basis in September.

• The Company Court dismissed the appellant’s application.
• The appellant then filed a revision petition in the High Court, which granted temporary interim suspension.
• Meanwhile, in November 2024, an Arbitrator was appointed in the matter.
• Despite this, the appellant again approached the Commercial Court, seeking an extension of the interim protection granted in September.
• The Commercial Court dismissed the application, leading to the present Commercial Court Appeal before the Telangana High Court.

Legal Issues in the Case

1. Does Section 9(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (as amended in 2015) bar courts from granting interim relief once an arbitral tribunal has been constituted?
2. What does "entertain" mean under Section 9(3)?
3. What is the burden of proof on a party seeking to invoke court jurisdiction under Section 9 after the arbitral tribunal has been formed?

Court Observations

The case was heard by a Division Bench comprising Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Rao in the Telangana High Court.

1. Section 9(3) Restricts Court’s Role After Arbitral Tribunal is Constituted

• The Court clarified that after the arbitral tribunal is formed, a party seeking interim relief must apply to the tribunal under Section 17, not the court.
• The only exception is when the court has already entertained a Section 9(1) application on merits before the tribunal was constituted.
• This prevents multiple levels of adjudication for the same relief and ensures arbitration moves forward smoothly.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “Section 9(3) aims to prevent multiple levels of adjudication for the same relief and encourages a forward-looking momentum for dispute-resolution after constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.”

2. Meaning of "Entertain" Under Section 9(3)

• The Court referred to the precedents in Lakshmi Rattan Engg. Works Ltd. v. CST and Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punnu Sahu to define “entertain.”
• It held that "entertain" does not merely mean admitting a case, but includes considering the matter on merits and making a decision.
• The burden was on the appellant to prove that the trial court had entertained the case on merits before the arbitral tribunal was constituted.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “The word 'entertain' does not mean only admitting the matter, but it should be read to mean 'considering the matter on merits' or to 'proceed on merits’.”

3. Burden of Proof on the Applicant

• The Court emphasized that a party resisting arbitration (i.e., seeking to keep the case in court under Section 9) must prove that Section 17 relief before the tribunal would be inadequate or ineffective.
• In this case, the appellant failed to submit any evidence showing that the Commercial Court had entertained the petition on merits.
• Even the trial court’s own order stated that it had not entertained the matter on merits.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “The burden of making out a case for the Court to hear the matter, even after constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, rests on the party who resists being relegated to arbitration.”

4. Appellant Failed to Prove His Case

• The High Court noted that it lacked sufficient evidence to determine whether the Commercial Court had entertained the petition.
• The Commercial Court's orders clearly stated that it had not entertained the case on merits.
• Even if the High Court assumed an error in the Commercial Court’s recording, there was no documentary proof to contradict its orders.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “The High Court in the present Appeal is not competent or armed with the necessary facts to arrive at an opinion on whether the Commercial Court has entertained the C.O.P. or not.”

Court Rulings and Decision

1. The High Court dismissed the Commercial Court Appeal and upheld the order of the Commercial Court.
2. It ruled that once the arbitral tribunal was constituted, the appellant should have sought relief under Section 17 instead of returning to court under Section 9.
3. The Court held that the appellant failed to provide evidence that the Commercial Court had entertained the case on merits.

Legal Provisions 

1. Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Allows courts to grant interim measures before or during arbitral proceedings.
2. Section 9(3) of the 2015 Amendment – Restricts court intervention once an arbitral tribunal has been constituted, except where the court has already entertained the case on merits.
3. Section 17 of the Arbitration Act – Allows parties to seek interim relief from the arbitral tribunal instead of the court.

Judicial Precedents:

• Lakshmi Rattan Engg. Works Ltd. v. CST – Defined “entertain” as considering a case on merits.
• Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punnu Sahu – Further clarified the meaning of "entertain" under legal provisions.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Upholds the 2015 Arbitration Amendment’s Objective
   • The ruling strengthens Section 9(3), ensuring that arbitration remains the primary dispute resolution mechanism once a tribunal is formed.
2. Prevents Forum Shopping & Parallel Litigation
   • The judgment discourages parties from seeking multiple adjudications in both courts and tribunals.
3. Clarifies Burden of Proof on Parties Seeking Court Intervention
   • The ruling establishes that the burden lies on the applicant to prove that court intervention is necessary despite the availability of arbitral remedies under Section 17.

The Telangana High Court dismissed the Commercial Court Appeal, ruling that once an arbitral tribunal is constituted, courts cannot entertain Section 9 applications unless they had already been entertained on merits. The appellant failed to prove that the Commercial Court had entertained the case on merits, leading to the dismissal of the revision petition. This ruling reinforces the limited role of courts in arbitration and promotes the efficiency of arbitral proceedings.

Case Title: M/s. Corvine Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Private Limited vs. Srinivasulu Kanday

4). Delhi High Court:  Time Spent Before 'Wrong' Court Excluded Under Section 14 of Limitation Act for Arbitration Act's Section 34(1)

Case Background

The case involved an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging an order of the Tis Hazari Court, Delhi. The dispute arose over the limitation period for filing an application under Section 34(1) of the Act to challenge an arbitral award.

Facts of the Case

• The appellant challenged an arbitral award before the Delhi High Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
• Later, the appellant was informed that the Delhi High Court did not have jurisdiction, and the correct forum was the District Judge.
• The appellant then withdrew the application from the High Court and refiled it before the District Judge.
• The respondent argued that the application was time-barred under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, which sets a three-month limitation period.
• The District Judge dismissed the application, ruling that it was filed beyond the limitation period.
• Aggrieved by this, the appellant filed an appeal under Section 37 before the Delhi High Court.

Issues in the Case

1. Can the time spent by a party in a wrong court be excluded while calculating the three-month limitation period under Section 34(1) of the Arbitration Act?
2. Does Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, apply to arbitration proceedings under Section 34(1) of the Arbitration Act?

Court Observations

The case was heard by Justice Dharmesh Sharma of the Delhi High Court.

1. Time Spent in the Wrong Court Should Be Excluded

• The Court held that while calculating the three-month limitation period for filing an application under Section 34(1) of the Arbitration Act, the time spent by the applicant in the wrong court should be excluded.
• However, this exclusion applies only if the application was filed in the wrong court bona fide (in good faith) and with due diligence.
• The District Judge failed to consider this aspect, leading to an incorrect dismissal of the appellant’s application.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “While computing the limitation period of three months for the application under Section 34(1) of the Act, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting such application before the wrong court is excluded, provided the proceeding in the wrong court was prosecuted bona fide, with due diligence.”

2. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, Applies to Arbitration Cases

• The Court ruled that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for the exclusion of time spent in a wrong forum, applies to arbitration cases.
• The District Judge wrongly ignored this legal principle, leading to the rejection of the appellant’s application.
• Judicial Precedents Cited:
  • Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal Secy. Irrigation Deptt. – The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act and upheld the applicability of Section 14 in arbitration proceedings.
  • Kirpal Singh v. Government of India – Reiterated that even if Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act bars an appeal, relief can still be granted under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

3. The Appellant Acted in Good Faith

• The Court noted that the appellant initially filed the application before the High Court, believing it had jurisdiction.
• Upon realizing the jurisdictional error, the appellant promptly withdrew the case and refiled it before the District Judge.
• This conduct demonstrated bona fide intent and due diligence, satisfying the conditions for relief under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Court Rulings and Decision

1. The impugned order of the District Judge was set aside.
2. The High Court ruled that the appellant's application under Section 34(1) of the Arbitration Act was not time-barred, as the time spent before the wrong court should be excluded.
3. The matter was remanded to the District Judge for reconsideration on merits.

Legal Provisions 

1. Section 34(1) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 – Provides a three-month limitation period for challenging an arbitral award.
2. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act – States that an application to set aside an arbitral award must be made within three months, with a possible 30-day extension for sufficient cause.
3. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Allows the exclusion of time spent in a wrong forum, provided the proceedings were initiated bona fide and with due diligence.

Judicial Precedents:

• Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal Secy. Irrigation Deptt. – Established that Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to arbitration cases.
• Kirpal Singh v. Government of India – Confirmed that relief under Section 14 can be claimed even when Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act bars an appeal.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Clarifies the Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to Arbitration Proceedings
   • The ruling strengthens the rights of parties who, due to a jurisdictional mistake, initially approach the wrong court.
2. Prevents Injustice Due to Procedural Errors
   • The judgment protects parties acting in good faith from being unfairly penalized for filing in an incorrect forum.
3. Ensures Fair Adjudication of Arbitration Cases
   • By excluding time spent in the wrong court, the ruling ensures that arbitration challenges are decided on merits rather than dismissed on technical grounds.

The Delhi High Court set aside the order of the District Judge and ruled that time spent in a wrong court should be excluded when calculating the limitation period under Section 34(1) of the Arbitration Act, provided the case was pursued bona fide and with due diligence. This judgment reinforces the fair application of limitation laws in arbitration proceedings and prevents unfair dismissal of legitimate claims due to procedural errors.

Case Title: INCITE HOMECARE PRODUCTS PVT LTD versus R K SWAMY PVT LTD ERSTWHILE RK SWAMY BBDO PVT LTD

Case Number: FAO 46/2025, CM APPL. 11874/2025 & CM APPL. 11875/2025

5). Allahabad High Court Questions DGP Over Caste Mention in FIR, Cites Risk of Prejudicial Treatment to Marginalised Communities

Case Background

The case involves a petition filed by Praveen Chetri, seeking to quash an FIR registered against him under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471, along with Sections 60/63 of the Excise Act.

Facts of the Case

• The case relates to an alleged liquor smuggling operation in Etawah district, Uttar Pradesh.
• The prosecution claims that the applicant was the leader of a gang involved in illegally transporting liquor from Haryana to Bihar, selling it at higher prices for profit.
• The accused frequently changed the number plates of their vehicles to evade detection.
• The police arrested the accused on the spot and registered an FIR.
• The FIR mentioned the caste of all the accused persons.
• The applicant challenged the FIR, raising concerns over the mention of caste, arguing that it reinforces stereotypes and could lead to discrimination.

Issues in the Case

1. Is it legally necessary to mention the caste of an accused in an FIR?
2. Does the inclusion of caste details promote systemic discrimination and institutional bias?
3. Does mentioning caste in an FIR contradict constitutional principles and judicial precedents?

Court Observations

The case was heard by a single-judge bench of Justice Vinod Diwakar of the Allahabad High Court.

1. Concerns Over Institutional Bias and Prejudicial Treatment

• The Court observed that mentioning caste in an FIR could lead to bias and reinforce social stereotypes.
• It acknowledged that India is a caste-sensitive society, where social divisions influence law enforcement and public perception.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “The Director General of Police is directed to file a personal affidavit, before the next date of hearing, justifying the requirement and relevance of mentioning the caste of a suspect or a group of persons in an FIR or during a police investigation in a caste-ridden society.”

2. Constitutional and Judicial Precedents Against Caste-Based Discrimination

• The Court emphasized that the Indian Constitution prohibits caste-based discrimination and promotes social justice.
• The Supreme Court has also disapproved of the mention of caste and religion in legal pleadings, stating that it is unnecessary and can perpetuate discrimination.

3. DGP Ordered to Justify the Mention of Caste in FIR

• The Court directed the Director General of Police (DGP), Uttar Pradesh, to submit a personal affidavitexplaining:
  • Why the caste of accused persons is mentioned in FIRs?
  • Whether this practice serves any legal purpose or simply reinforces discrimination?
• The DGP's response must also clarify whether such references violate constitutional values and Supreme Court judgments.

Court Rulings and Decisions

1. The Court did not quash the FIR at this stage but raised concerns over the mention of caste.
2. The Uttar Pradesh DGP must file a personal affidavit before the next hearing, explaining the legal necessity of mentioning caste in an FIR.
3. The matter will be heard again on March 12, 2025.

Legal Provisions 

1. Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC – Related to cheating, forgery, and fraudulent use of documents. (Section 318(4), Section 338, Section 336(3), Section 340(2) Resspectively)
2. Sections 60/63 of the Excise Act – Related to illegal trade and transportation of liquor.
3. Constitution of India –
   • Article 15 – Prohibits discrimination based on caste, religion, race, sex, or place of birth.
   • Article 14 – Guarantees equality before the law.
4. Supreme Court Precedents – Established that mentioning caste in legal documents is unnecessary and discriminatory.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Raises Questions on Police Practices
   • This ruling challenges a common police practice and seeks justification for mentioning caste in FIRs.
   • If found unnecessary, it could lead to a change in police procedures.
2. Prevents Caste-Based Discrimination in Law Enforcement
   • Ensures that accused persons are treated fairly, without bias based on caste.
   • Strengthens constitutional values of equality and justice.
3. Could Set a Precedent for Future Cases
   • If the Court rules against mentioning caste in FIRs, it could become a binding precedent for all police departments in India.

The Allahabad High Court has raised serious concerns about the mention of caste in FIRs, questioning its legal necessity and potential for discrimination. The UP DGP has been directed to justify this practice, and the case will be reviewed on March 12, 2025. This ruling could have a major impact on police procedures and efforts to eliminate caste-based discrimination in India.

Case title - Praveen Chetri vs. State of U.P. and Another