1). Supreme Court Commutes Death Sentence of Father Who Killed Children to Life Imprisonment

Case Background

The appellant, a Bank Manager at Punjab National Bank (PNB), was convicted for killing his two minor children. He was also separately tried for murdering his sister-in-law (Savita) and mother-in-law (Saraswati).

The appellant was unhappy with his sister-in-law’s relationship with a co-worker. He frequently asked his wife (Sundari) to intervene, but she did not support him.

In anger, the appellant:

1. Murdered Savita and Saraswati to "teach them a lesson."
2. Decided to kill his children and commit suicide.
3. Drowned his two children, aged 10 years and 3.5 years, in a water tank.

For the murder of his children, the Trial Court sentenced him to death, which was later confirmed by the High Court. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the lower courts did not consider mitigating factors while awarding the death sentence.

Issues in the Case

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:

• Whether the death penalty was appropriate in this case, or
• Whether it should be commuted to life imprisonment based on mitigating factors such as:
  • Absence of prior criminal record
  • Good behavior in jail
  • Possibility of reformation

The case also raised important legal principles under the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), and constitutional provisions.

Court Observations

The case was heard by a bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol, and Sandeep Mehta.

1. "Rarest of Rare" Doctrine (Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 SCC 684)

• The Supreme Court referred to the "rarest of rare" principle, laid down in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980), which holds that death penalty should be awarded only when alternative punishments are unquestionably foreclosed.
• Justice Karol, who authored the judgment, acknowledged the barbarity of the crime and the helplessness of the victims.
• However, the Court reaffirmed that the death sentence should be imposed only after a careful balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

2. Mitigating Factors Considered (Section 354(3), CrPC)

Under Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), a court must provide "special reasons" when awarding the death penalty.

The Supreme Court considered the following mitigating factors:

• The appellant had no prior criminal record.
• He had good behavior while in custody.
• There was a possibility of his reformation.

The Court relied on Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 and Deen Dayal Tiwari v. State of U.P, where the Supreme Court had previously commuted death sentences to life imprisonment based on reformation prospects.

Since the High Court had not properly considered these factors, the Supreme Court intervened to modify the punishment.

Court’s Ruling & Legal Provisions Applied

• The Court partly allowed the appeal and modified the sentence from death penalty to life imprisonment without remission.
• This means the appellant will not be hanged, but he will remain in jail for the rest of his life without any possibility of release.

The Supreme Court’s ruling was based on:

1. Section 302, IPC – Punishment for murder (either death penalty or life imprisonment).
2. Section 354(3), CrPC – Special reasons required for awarding the death penalty.
3. Article 21, Constitution of India – Right to life and personal liberty, emphasizing that the death penalty should be used only when absolutely necessary.

The Court quashed the death sentence and observed:

“We direct that the hangman’s noose be taken off the appellant-convict’s neck, and instead that he remains in prison till the end of his days given by God Almighty.”

3. Principle of "Live and Let Live"

The Supreme Court criticized the appellant’s murder spree, which was triggered by his disapproval of his sister-in-law’s relationship. The Court stressed the importance of individual freedoms and the principle of "live and let live."

It quoted:

“Live and let live – meaning people should accept how others live and behave, even if their choices are different from one’s own.”

Legal Provisions 

1. Section 302, IPC – Punishment for murder (either death penalty or life imprisonment). (Section 103(1) of BNS)
2. Section 354(3), CrPC – Special reasons required for awarding the death penalty. (Section 393(3) of BNSS)
3. Article 21, Constitution of India – Right to life and personal liberty, emphasizing that the death penalty should be used only when absolutely necessary.

The Supreme Court’s ruling ensures that the punishment is proportionate and aligns with constitutional values and sentencing principles.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Reaffirms the "rarest of rare" doctrine: The judgment reinforces that death penalty should not be the default punishment for murder and must be imposed only when no other option is viable.
2. Clarifies the role of mitigating factors: Courts must consider an accused’s background, criminal history, and potential for reform before awarding the death penalty.
3. Balances justice and humanity: The decision highlights that punishment should be firm yet just, ensuring that justice is not driven by retribution alone.
4. Ensures compliance with Section 354(3), CrPC: The ruling strengthens the requirement of special reasons for awarding the death penalty and promotes a more structured approach to sentencing.

The Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment without remission, ensuring that the appellant will spend the rest of his life in jail.

This judgment emphasizes that even the most serious offenders deserve a fair chance at reformation unless they pose an irreversible danger to society. It upholds the constitutional principle of justice, fairness, and proportionality in sentencing.

Case Title: RAMESH A. NAIKA VERSUS THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA ETC.

2). Supreme Court Rules Appellate Court Must Set Time for Deposit of Sale Consideration in Specific Performance Cases

Case Background

The case involved a dispute regarding the execution of a specific performance decree related to the sale of immovable property.

• The trial court had ruled in favor of the appellant, ordering the seller (judgment debtor) to execute the sale deedand directing the appellant (buyer) to deposit the balance sale consideration within two months from the date of the decree.
• The First Appellate Court (2015) upheld the trial court’s decision but did not specify a time limit for the deposit of the balance sale consideration.
• The appellant deposited the amount in 2019, four years after the First Appellate Court's order.
• The High Court ruled that due to the delay in depositing the balance amount, the decree could not be executed.

The appellant then challenged the High Court’s decision in the Supreme Court, arguing that the delay should not make the decree inoperative since the First Appellate Court had not specified any time limit.

Issues in the Case

The main issue before the Supreme Court was:

• Whether the delay in depositing the balance sale consideration could be a ground to deny execution of the First Appellate Court’s decree.

The case also involved the application of key legal principles such as:

1. Doctrine of Merger – Whether the trial court’s time limit merged with the Appellate Court’s order.
2. Order XX Rule 12A, CPC – Requirement for courts to specify a time limit for deposit.
3. Section 28, Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA) – Discretion of courts to allow deposit even after a delay.

Court Observations

The case was heard by a bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan.

1. Doctrine of Merger and Its Effect

• The Supreme Court explained that under the Doctrine of Merger, the trial court’s decree merges with the Appellate Court’s order.
• This means that once the Appellate Court affirms or modifies the trial court’s order, only the Appellate Court’s decree is enforceable.
• Since the First Appellate Court did not specify any time limit, the trial court’s original two-month deadline no longer applied.

2. Appellate Courts Must Specify a Time Limit (Order XX Rule 12A, CPC)

• The Court highlighted that Order XX Rule 12A of the CPC requires courts to specify a period within which a decree holder must deposit the balance sale consideration.
• Since the First Appellate Court failed to do this, it created confusion and led to unnecessary litigation.

3. Delay in Deposit and Judicial Discretion (Section 28, SRA)

• The Supreme Court ruled that a delay in depositing the balance sale consideration does not automatically make the decree inoperative.
• Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, gives courts the discretion to grant additional time, provided there is no willful negligence or abandonment of the contract.
• The Court emphasized that delay alone is not a valid reason to deny execution, especially when no time limit was set by the Appellate Court.

4. Reasonable Time for Deposit

• The Court clarified that in cases where the Appellate Court fails to specify a time limit, the decree holder must deposit the amount within a "reasonable time".
• However, "reasonable time" does not mean unlimited time. A decree holder cannot deposit the amount at his own convenience.
• The Court noted that while the appellant took four years to deposit the amount, he did not act in bad faith, and the seller did not suffer any loss.

Court Decision

• The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and overturned the High Court’s decision.
• It held that the delay in depositing the balance sale consideration did not make the decree inoperative.
• The Court directed that the seller (respondent) be paid 9% simple interest on the balance sale consideration for the period of delay.
• The Court also reminded appellate courts of their duty to specify time limits under Order XX Rule 12A, CPC, to avoid such disputes in the future.

Legal Provisions

1. Order XX Rule 12A, CPC – Requires courts to specify a time limit for depositing the balance sale consideration in specific performance decrees.
2. Doctrine of Merger – Once an appeal is decided, the Appellate Court’s order takes precedence over the trial court’s order.
3. Section 28, Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA) – Gives courts the power to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration if there is no willful default.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Clarifies the impact of the Doctrine of Merger – Trial court’s decree merges with the Appellate Court’s decision, and only the Appellate Court’s decree is enforceable.
2. Mandates Appellate Courts to specify time limits – This judgment reminds appellate courts to follow Order XX Rule 12A, CPC, preventing future disputes.
3. Recognizes judicial discretion in case of delay – Delay in deposit does not automatically make a decree inoperative; courts have the power to grant additional time if the delay was not intentional.
4. Provides clarity on “reasonable time” – The decision establishes that if the Appellate Court does not set a time limit, the decree holder must deposit the amount within a reasonable time, but not at their own convenience.

The Supreme Court’s ruling ensures that specific performance decrees remain enforceable despite procedural delays. It also reaffirms the duty of appellate courts to specify a clear time limit for depositing balance sale consideration to avoid unnecessary litigation.

This judgment strikes a balance between protecting the rights of decree holders and preventing misuse of the legal process, ensuring justice is served in a fair and structured manner.

Case Title: RAM LAL VERSUS JARNAIL SINGH (NOW DECEASED) THROUGH ITS LRS & ORS.

3). Supreme Court Says Granting Bail in Dowry Death Cases Despite Evidence of Direct Involvement Undermines Public Confidence in Judiciary 

Case Background

The case involves the alleged dowry death of a woman, Ms. Shahida Bano, who died within two years of marriageunder suspicious circumstances at her matrimonial home in January 2024.

• She was found hanging from a ceiling fan with a dupatta tied around her neck.
• The post-mortem report suggested forced strangulation before death, indicating a possible case of murder disguised as suicide.
• A case was filed against her husband and in-laws under:
  • Section 304B, IPC – Dowry death.
  • Section 498A, IPC – Cruelty by husband or relatives.
  • Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – Illegal demand for dowry.

The Allahabad High Court granted bail to the father-in-law, mother-in-law, and two sisters-in-law, citing their lack of criminal antecedents. However, the father of the deceased challenged this order in the Supreme Court.

Issues in the Case

The Supreme Court had to decide:

1. Whether the bail granted to the father-in-law and mother-in-law was justified despite prima facie evidence of dowry harassment and domestic violence.
2. Whether courts should adopt stricter scrutiny in dowry death cases to prevent misuse of bail provisions.

Court Observations

The case was heard by a bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta.

1. Need for Stricter Judicial Scrutiny in Dowry Death Cases

• The Court criticized the High Court’s casual approach in granting bail.
• It emphasized that when a young woman dies under suspicious circumstances within two years of marriage, courts must show heightened vigilance and seriousness.

Quote from the Judgment:

"Stricter judicial scrutiny is necessary in matters where a young woman loses her life in her matrimonial home so soon after marriage, particularly where the record points to persistent harassment over unmet dowry demands."

2. Impact on Public Confidence in Judiciary

• The Court warned that granting bail in serious dowry death cases could undermine public trust in the judiciary.
• Dowry-related crimes strike at the root of social justice and gender equality, and courts must consider the broader societal impact.

Quote from the Judgment:

"Allowing alleged prime perpetrators of such heinous acts to remain on bail could undermine not only the fairness of the trial but also public confidence in the criminal justice system."

3. Direct Involvement of the In-Laws

• The father-in-law and mother-in-law were found to be directly involved in harassing the deceased for dowry.
• The Court ruled that allowing them to remain out on bail would be against the ends of justice.

Quote from the Judgment:

"Where the facts clearly indicate direct involvement in the fatal events, courts must act with an abundance of caution."

4. Importance of Social Message in Judicial Orders

• The Court highlighted the social responsibility of the judiciary in cases involving violence against women.
• It stated that bail decisions in dowry death cases send a strong social message, and courts must ensure that such crimes are taken seriously.

Quote from the Judgment:

"The social message emanating from judicial orders in such cases cannot be overstated: when a young bride dies under suspicious circumstances within barely two years of marriage, the judiciary must reflect heightened vigilance and seriousness."

Court Decision

• The Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the father-in-law and mother-in-law due to prima facie evidence of their involvement in dowry harassment and cruelty.
• However, the Court did not interfere with the bail granted to the sisters-in-law, as there was no clear evidence linking them to the victim’s death.

Legal Provisions 

1. Section 304B, IPC – Deals with dowry death. If a woman dies under unnatural circumstances within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that she was subjected to cruelty for dowry, it is presumed to be a dowry death. (Section 80 of BNS)
2. Section 498A, IPC – Punishes cruelty by the husband or his relatives towards a married woman. (Section 85 of BNS)
3. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – Prohibits giving and taking of dowry and penalizes those who demand dowry.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Sets a Strong Precedent for Dowry Death Cases
   • Reinforces that bail should not be granted casually in dowry death cases, especially when there is evidence of cruelty and dowry demands.
2. Protects Victims of Domestic Violence
   • Ensures that judicial scrutiny is strict in cases involving unnatural deaths of married women.
3. Strengthens Public Confidence in the Judiciary
   • Prevents courts from taking a mechanical approach in granting bail, which could weaken the justice system.
4. Recognizes the Social Impact of Judicial Decisions
   • Emphasizes that courts must consider the broader societal message their rulings send in gender-related crimes.

The Supreme Court’s decision sends a strong message against dowry deaths and domestic violence. It highlights the need for stricter judicial scrutiny in cases where young brides die under suspicious circumstances.

By cancelling the bail of the father-in-law and mother-in-law, the Court has reinforced that those responsible for dowry harassment and violence must face serious consequences.

Case : Shabeen Ahmed v State of UP

4). Breastfeeding in Public and Workplaces Must Not Be Stigmatised, Says Supreme Court

Case Background

A petition was filed in the Supreme Court of India seeking directions to construct feeding rooms, childcare spaces, and creches in public places and buildings to support nursing mothers. The case raised concerns about the stigma surrounding breastfeeding in public and workplaces and the State’s responsibility to provide proper facilities for nursing mothers.

In response, the Union Government, through the Ministry of Women and Child Development and the Ministry of Labour and Employment, issued an advisory on February 27, 2024, instructing States and Union Territories (UTs) to allocate space for feeding rooms and set up creches in public buildings.

The Supreme Court examined whether breastfeeding should be recognized as a legal right and if the government has a duty to provide suitable facilities.

Legal Issues in the Case

1. Should breastfeeding in public and workplaces be legally protected?
2. Does the State have an obligation to provide facilities for nursing mothers?
3. Is the government advisory directing the creation of feeding rooms and creches in line with constitutional principles?

Court Observations

The case was heard by a bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice P.B. Varale.

1. Right to Breastfeed as a Fundamental Right

• The Supreme Court stated that breastfeeding is essential for the survival and health of infants.
• It ruled that the right of a child to be breastfed is closely linked to a mother's right to breastfeed, making it a fundamental right under Article 21 (Right to Life) of the Indian Constitution.
• The Court emphasized that breastfeeding is part of a woman's reproductive process and should be protected by the State.

Quote from the Judgment:

"Breastfeeding is an integral component of a child's right to life, survival, and development to the highest attainable standard of health."

2. Public Breastfeeding Should Not Be Stigmatized

• The Court highlighted that breastfeeding in public spaces and workplaces is often stigmatized, creating stress and discomfort for nursing mothers.
• It referred to Article 51A(e) of the Constitution, which imposes a duty on citizens to renounce practices that are derogatory to the dignity of women.
• The Court supported the United Nations Special Rapporteur's statement, which criticized the stigma around public breastfeeding, stating that it causes unnecessary stress, pressure, and intimidation for mothers.

Quote from the Judgment:

"Citizens must ensure that the practice of breastfeeding in public places and at workplaces is not stigmatized."

3. State’s Duty to Provide Facilities for Nursing Mothers

• The Supreme Court ruled that since the right to breastfeed is protected under Article 21, the State has a duty to create a safe and supportive environment for nursing mothers.
• This duty also arises from:
  • Article 21 (Right to Life) – Protecting the health and well-being of both the mother and child.
  • The Principle of "Best Interest of the Child" – A key principle under international law and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
• The Court remarked that infant health is closely connected to the status and well-being of women.

Quote from the Judgment:

"As the right of a child to be breastfed is inextricably linked with the mother, she also has the right to breastfeed her child. The State must ensure an adequate environment for this purpose."

4. Government Advisory is Constitutionally Valid

• The Supreme Court reviewed the advisory issued by the Union Government, which directed States and UTs to allocate spaces for feeding rooms and creches in public buildings.
• The Court ruled that the advisory was consistent with fundamental rights under Article 14 (Right to Equality) and Article 15(3) (Special Provisions for Women and Children).

Quote from the Judgment:

"The advisory is intended to ensure privacy and comfort for nursing mothers and is aligned with the fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 15(3) of the Constitution."

Court Rulings and Directions

1. States and Union Territories Must Implement the Advisory
   • The Supreme Court directed the Union Government to issue a reminder to all States and UTs to ensure the establishment of feeding rooms and childcare spaces in public places.
2. Existing Public Spaces Must Accommodate Nursing Mothers
   • The Court ordered State Governments and UTs to take immediate action to provide feeding rooms and childcare spaces in existing public buildings.
3. Future Public Buildings Must Have Dedicated Childcare and Nursing Rooms
   • The Court ruled that all new public buildings must include provisions for feeding rooms and childcare facilities.
4. Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) Must Provide Childcare and Feeding Spaces
   • The Court instructed the Government to issue advisories to all PSUs, ensuring that separate rooms are set aside for childcare and nursing mothers.

Legal Provisions Applied

1. Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Right to Life and Personal Liberty
   • Protects the right of a mother to breastfeed and the child’s right to survival and development.
2. Article 51A(e) of the Constitution of India – Fundamental Duties
   • Imposes a duty on citizens to renounce practices that degrade women's dignity, including the stigma around public breastfeeding.
3. Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Right to Equality
   • Ensures equal treatment of nursing mothers in public spaces and workplaces.
4. Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India – Special Provisions for Women and Children
   • Empowers the State to make laws and policies for the welfare of women and children, including providing facilities for breastfeeding.
5. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
   • Recognizes the "Best Interest of the Child", which includes ensuring the right to adequate nutrition through breastfeeding.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Affirms Breastfeeding as a Legal Right
   • The judgment recognizes breastfeeding as part of the fundamental rights of both mother and child.
2. Strengthens Women's Rights in Public Spaces
   • The ruling protects mothers from discrimination when breastfeeding in public places and workplaces.
3. Directs the State to Provide Public Facilities
   • The Court’s directives ensure that governments must establish feeding rooms and creches in public buildings.
4. Encourages a Social Shift Against Stigma
   • The Supreme Court’s observations send a strong message to society that breastfeeding is natural, necessary, and should not be stigmatized.

Conclusion

This landmark judgment ensures that breastfeeding mothers are protected from discrimination and provided with proper facilities in public places. The Supreme Court reinforced the duty of the State and society to support nursing mothers, recognizing that breastfeeding is a fundamental right linked to the health and dignity of both mother and child.

By directing the implementation of feeding rooms and childcare facilities, the Court has taken a progressive step toward gender equality and child welfare in India.

Case Details: MAATR SPARSH AN INITIATIVE BY AVYAAN FOUNDATION v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS|WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.950/2022

5). Kerala High Court: Protesting and Shouting Slogans Don’t Violate Article 19 Restrictions

Case Background

A woman challenged an order issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) that required her to explain why she should not be asked to execute a bond of ₹50,000 with sureties to maintain peace for one year under Section 130 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha  Sanhita (BNSS).

The SDM's order was based on a police report alleging that she was repeatedly engaging in illegal activities that could disturb public peace and tranquillity.

Three criminal cases were registered against her for:

1. Holding a procession to commemorate the death anniversary of a person associated with a Maoist group.
2. Organizing a demonstration and shouting slogans— “In the land of Babari, justice is only Masjid.”
3. Protesting against an NIA raid.

The petitioner argued that she was only exercising her fundamental right to protest and express dissent, which is protected under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. The State opposed her plea, arguing that she was a repeated offender who disrupted public peace and traffic.

Issues in the Case

1. Can participation in public demonstrations and protests be considered a threat to public order?
2. Did the Sub-Divisional Magistrate have valid reasons to issue the order under Section 130 of BNSS?
3. Are protests and demonstrations protected under Article 19 of the Constitution?

Court Observations

The case was heard by a single-judge bench of Justice V.G. Arun in the Kerala High Court.

1. Freedom of Speech and Assembly is a Fundamental Right

• The Court stated that Article 19 of the Constitution grants every citizen the right to free speech, peaceful assembly, and association, subject to reasonable restrictions.
• It observed that merely participating in demonstrations, holding banners, or shouting slogans does not amount to an illegal activity.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “Mere participation in demonstrations, holding of banners, or shouting slogans cannot be perceived as activities in violation of the reasonable restrictions mentioned in Article 19.”

2. No Evidence of Imminent Threat to Public Order

• The Court noted that under Section 130 of BNSS, an action can only be taken if there is a clear and immediate threat to public peace and tranquillity.
• The Court found that the police report did not establish any imminent threat, and the SDM had not formed an independent opinion before issuing the order.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “Threat apprehension to breach of peace and public tranquillity must be imminent.”

3. Magistrate’s Order Lacked Proper Justification

• The Court found that the SDM's order was based entirely on the police report and did not include any independent reasoning.
• It stated that just mentioning pending criminal cases does not justify restricting a person's liberty.
• Quote from the Judgment:
  “The impugned order does not even indicate the factors that had prompted the Magistrate to form an opinion that, unless prevented, activities of the petitioner will result in breach of peace and disturb public tranquillity.”

4. Reliance on Supreme Court Precedents

• The Court relied on the Supreme Court rulings in:
  • Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr (1970) – Held that preventive actions restricting personal liberty require a valid reason and cannot be based solely on police reports.
  • Santhosh M.V. & Others v. State of Kerala (2024) – Reaffirmed the importance of a reasoned order before imposing restrictions on an individual’s liberty.
• The Kerala High Court emphasized that any restriction on personal liberty must be backed by clear reasoning and imminent danger.

Court Rulings and Decision

1. The petition was allowed, and the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was quashed.
2. The Court ruled that mere participation in protests and demonstrations cannot be grounds for preventive action unless there is an immediate threat to public order.
3. The Court reiterated that any restriction on fundamental rights must be reasonable and backed by strong evidence.

Legal Provisions 

1. Article 19 of the Indian Constitution – Guarantees the right to freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, and association, subject to reasonable restrictions.
2. Section 130 of the BNSS – Allows preventive action against individuals likely to cause a breach of peace and public tranquillity. (Section 111 of Cr.P.C.)
3. Judicial Precedents:
   • Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr (1970) – Held that restricting personal liberty requires proper reasoning.
   • Santhosh M.V. & Others v. State of Kerala (2024) – Reaffirmed that a valid reason is necessary before imposing preventive restrictions.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Protects Citizens' Right to Protest
   • The ruling upholds the fundamental right to dissent and participate in peaceful demonstrations.
   • Prevents the misuse of preventive laws to suppress free speech and protests.
2. Prevents Arbitrary Orders by Authorities
   • The Court reaffirmed that magistrates must provide clear reasoning before issuing restrictive orders.
3. Sets a Precedent for Future Cases
   • The judgment clarifies that participation in protests, without acts of violence or public harm, cannot be criminalized.

The Kerala High Court protected the fundamental right to free speech and peaceful protest, ruling that mere participation in demonstrations does not amount to an imminent threat to public order. The judgment prevents arbitrary use of preventive laws to curb dissent, ensuring that restrictions on personal liberty must be reasonable, justified, and backed by strong evidence.

Case Title: Sharmina S v Sub Divisional Magistrate 

Case No: CRL.MC NO. 10742 OF 2024