1). CrPC 156(3) vs BNSS 175(3): SC Highlights Key Differences in Magistrate’s Role

Case Background

The case involved an appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court's Nagpur Bench, which had refused to set aside a magistrate's order directing the registration of an FIR against a police official under Sections 323, 294, 500, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The complainant, an advocate, alleged that the police official had assaulted and humiliated him. When the police refused to register an FIR, he approached the Judicial Magistrate First Class under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), requesting an order for the police to investigate the case. The magistrate allowed the request, and the High Court upheld the decision. The police official then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues in the Case

1. Whether the magistrate was justified in ordering a police investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. when the allegations were simple and could be directly tried by the court.
2. Whether the magistrate properly applied judicial discretion or merely acted mechanically in directing the FIR registration.
3. Whether the allegations made by the complainant fulfilled the legal requirements of the alleged offenses under the IPC.

Court Observations

Bench Comprising Justices

The Supreme Court bench consisted of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan.

Findings of the Court

• The Court emphasized that a magistrate must not mechanically order a police investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. without first examining whether such an investigation is truly necessary.
• It clarified that a magistrate should only order an investigation when the case is complex and requires police expertise. If the allegations are simple, the magistrate should record evidence and proceed with the trial directly instead of sending the case to the police.
• The Court held that magistrates should apply judicial discretion rather than act as a "post office" that merely forwards cases to the police.
• Upon reviewing the allegations, the Court found that even if the complainant’s claims were true, they did not satisfy the essential legal requirements of the alleged offenses.
• The Court also noted that the allegations were not serious enough to require a police investigation, as the case could be directly handled by the magistrate.

Court Ruling and Decision

• The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and quashed the magistrate’s order directing the registration of an FIR.
• The Court ruled that ordering a police investigation in this case was unnecessary because the allegations did not constitute serious offenses and could be directly tried in court.

Legal Provisions Discussed

1. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Allows a magistrate to direct the police to investigate a case when necessary. However, the magistrate must first determine whether a police investigation is required. (Section 175(3) of BNSS)
2. Sections 323(115(2)of BNS), 294(296 of BNS), 500(356(2) of BNS), 504(352 of BNS), 506(351(1)/(2) of BNS)IPC – The alleged offenses related to causing hurt, using obscene language, defamation, intentional insult, and criminal intimidation. The Court found that the allegations did not meet the essential legal ingredients for these offenses.

Changes Introduced by BNSS

The Court also discussed how the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) has introduced safeguards in cases involving public servants before an FIR can be registered against them.

New Provisions Under BNSS

1. Section 174(4) BNSS – Introduces additional safeguards for public servants, requiring a report from their superior officer before an FIR can be registered.
2. Section 175(3) BNSS (Replaces Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.) – Introduces three key safeguards:
   • The complainant must first apply to the Superintendent of Police (SP) before approaching the magistrate.
   • The magistrate has the power to conduct an inquiry before ordering an FIR.
   • The magistrate must consider the reasons given by the police for refusing to register an FIR before making a decision.

These changes ensure greater accountability for both magistrates and police officers, preventing misuse of magisterial powers.

Significance 

• The judgment reinforces that magistrates should not blindly order FIR registration under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.but must apply their mind judicially.
• It highlights that simple cases should be directly tried without unnecessary police intervention.
• The changes introduced by BNSS ensure stricter safeguards for public servants, preventing false or frivolous complaints.
• This ruling strengthens judicial accountability and ensures that police resources are used efficiently for serious cases requiring investigation.

This case serves as an important precedent, guiding magistrates to exercise discretion carefully while considering applications for police investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

Case Name: OM PRAKASH AMBADKAR VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

2). Supreme Court: Forfeiture of Earnest Money Allowed If Not Excessive Under Section 74 of Contract Act

Case Background

The case involved a dispute between a builder (Appellant) and flat purchasers (Respondents) over the forfeiture of earnest money after the buyers canceled their flat booking.

• The builder forfeited 20% of the Basic Sale Price (BSP) as earnest money, as per the terms of the Apartment Buyer Agreement (ABA).
• The flat purchasers objected, calling the 20% forfeiture unfair and excessive, arguing that it should be limited to 10%.
• The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) ruled in favor of the flat purchasers, allowing the builder to forfeit only 10% of the BSP and directing a refund of the remaining amount with 6% interest per annum.
• The builder challenged the NCDRC's decision in the Supreme Court, arguing that the contract explicitly allowed forfeiture of 20% of the BSP as earnest money.

Issues in the Case

1. Does forfeiting earnest money constitute a penalty under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872?
2. Was the forfeiture of 20% of the BSP reasonable, or was it excessive and unfair?
3. Should interest be granted on the refund amount?

Court Observations

Bench Comprising Justices

The Supreme Court bench consisted of Justices B.R. Gavai and S.V.N. Bhatti.

Findings of the Court

• The Court ruled that forfeiting earnest money is valid if the amount is reasonable and not excessive.
• It clarified that if earnest money forfeiture is reasonable, it does not amount to a penalty under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
• However, if the forfeiture amount is too high, it can be considered a penalty, and the Court has the power to reduce it.
• The Court agreed with the NCDRC that forfeiting 20% of the BSP was excessive and arbitrary.
• The Court referred to Maula Bux v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 554 and Satish Batra v. Sudhir Rawal (2013) 1 SCC 345, holding that a reasonable amount of earnest money can be forfeited, but an excessive amount becomes a penalty.

Court Ruling and Decision

1. The builder was allowed to forfeit only 10% of the BSP, as ruled by the NCDRC.
2. The Court removed the 6% interest on the refunded amount, stating that interest was not justified in this case.
3. The appeal was partly allowed—the forfeiture was reduced to 10%, but the interest on the refund was set aside.

Legal Provisions Discussed

1. Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Deals with the consequences of a breach of contract and limits the amount of compensation or penalty that can be claimed. The Court clarified that reasonable earnest money forfeiture is not a penalty, but an excessive amount can be reduced.
2. Consumer Protection Law – The case was initially heard by the NCDRC, which deals with unfair trade practices and consumer disputes.

Significance 

• This judgment reinforces the principle that earnest money can be forfeited, but only to a reasonable extent.
• It protects homebuyers from excessive and unfair forfeitures while respecting contractual terms.
• The ruling clarifies the scope of Section 74 of the Contract Act, ensuring that forfeitures should not be punitive.
• It sets an important precedent for real estate contracts, ensuring fair treatment of buyers and sellers.

This case highlights the balance courts maintain between contractual obligations and fairness in financial transactions.

Case Name: GODREJ PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT LIMITED VERSUS ANIL KARLEKAR & ORS.

3). Supreme Court Warns Against Misuse of Anti-Dowry & Cruelty Laws for Personal Grudges

Case Background

This case involved allegations of cruelty and dowry harassment under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)and the Dowry Prohibition Act (DP Act).

• The complainant (wife) filed a criminal case against her husband and in-laws, accusing them of cruelty and dowry-related harassment.
• The husband and in-laws (appellants) approached the High Court seeking quashing of the case, arguing that the allegations were false and baseless.
• However, the High Court refused to quash the proceedings, stating that a prima facie case was made out against them.
• The appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking relief from the criminal charges.

Issues in the Case

1. Whether the criminal case against the husband and in-laws should be quashed due to lack of specific allegations and evidence.
2. Whether the criminal law was being misused to harass the husband and his family.
3. Whether vague and general allegations without supporting evidence can justify a criminal trial.

Court Observations

Bench Comprising Justices

The Supreme Court bench consisted of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta.

Findings of the Court

• The Court emphasized that criminal law should not be misused as a tool for harassment or personal vendetta.
• It observed that Section 498A IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act were meant to protect women from cruelty and dowry harassment, but should not be used for settling personal scores.
• The Court noted that the family court had already granted divorce to the husband and had recorded that the wife made baseless and false allegations, treating the husband with cruelty.

Findings on the In-Laws

• The allegations against the in-laws were general, vague, and lacked specific details.
• The complainant did not provide concrete evidence of dowry demands or acts of cruelty against them.
• The in-laws lived separately, further weakening the complainant’s case.
• Due to lack of prima facie evidence, the Court quashed the proceedings against the father-in-law and mother-in-law.

Findings on the Husband

• The allegations against the husband were vague and unsubstantiated.
• The complainant failed to provide specific instances or supporting material to prove cruelty or dowry harassment.
• Since there was no prima facie evidence, the Court held that criminal proceedings against the husband could not continue.

Court Ruling and Decision

• The Supreme Court ruled that the criminal case was frivolous and failed to disclose a prima facie offense.
• It held that continuing such criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of legal process and miscarriage of justice.
• The Court quashed the criminal proceedings against all appellants (husband and in-laws).

Legal Provisions Discussed

1. Section 498A IPC – Addresses cruelty against a woman by her husband or his relatives. The Court emphasized that allegations must be specific and supported by evidence to proceed with prosecution. (Section 86 of BNS)
2. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – Prohibits giving or taking of dowry. The Court noted that general allegationswithout clear proof cannot be the basis for criminal charges.
3. Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – The Court reaffirmed that criminal cases can be quashed if they are manifestly frivolous and filed with ulterior motives.

Significance

• This judgment reinforces that criminal laws meant for protecting women should not be misused for harassment or personal revenge.
• It sets an important precedent for quashing false dowry and cruelty cases, preventing innocent people from suffering wrongful prosecution.
• The ruling strengthens safeguards against misuse of Section 498A IPC, ensuring that only genuine casesproceed to trial.
• The judgment upholds fairness and judicial caution in dealing with matrimonial disputes in criminal law.

This case serves as a reminder that courts must scrutinize allegations carefully to ensure that criminal law is not used as a weapon of harassment.

Case Name: P.V. KRISHNABHAT vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA., Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 1754/2024

4). Supreme Court: No Benchmark Disability Needed for Disabled Candidates to Use Scribe in Exams

Case Background

A candidate suffering from Focal Hand Dystonia, a neurological condition affecting hand movement, filed a writ petition seeking the right to avail a scribe while writing competitive examinations.

• He was denied a scribe by various examination authorities, including the Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, State Bank of India, Staff Selection Commission, Bihar Staff Selection Commission, and the Union of India.
• The authorities refused his request, citing that only candidates with “benchmark disabilities” (40% disability or more) were eligible for the facility.
• The petitioner argued that this exclusion was discriminatory and violated the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act, 2016).
• He also challenged an Office Memorandum (OM) dated August 10, 2022, issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, which restricted the availability of scribes.
• Relying on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021), he contended that benchmark disability should not be a condition for obtaining a scribe.

Issues in the Case

1. Whether the benefit of a scribe should be available only to candidates with benchmark disabilities (40% or more disability) or to all candidates with disabilities who face difficulty in writing.
2. Whether the Office Memorandum (OM) dated August 10, 2022, restricting scribe eligibility, was unconstitutional and contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021).
3. Whether denying a scribe amounts to discrimination under the RPwD Act, 2016.

Court Observations

Bench Comprising Justices

The case was heard by a Supreme Court bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan.

Key Findings of the Court

• The Court reaffirmed its ruling in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) and emphasized that a benchmark disability (40% or more) is not a precondition for availing a scribe.
• The principle of reasonable accommodation must be upheld to ensure equality for all persons with disabilities.
• Denying the facility of a scribe or compensatory time amounts to discrimination under the RPwD Act, 2016.
• There should be no artificial distinction between candidates with benchmark disabilities and those with less than 40% disability, as both categories require reasonable accommodations to compete on an equal footing.
• Examination authorities must ensure that examination centers are accessible and properly equipped to support candidates with disabilities.

Court Rulings and Decisions

• The Supreme Court quashed the restrictive Office Memorandum (OM) dated August 10, 2022, directing the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment to revise it within two months.
• The revised guidelines should ensure uniform application of scribe benefits to all disabled candidates who need assistance.
• The Court directed various examination bodies to comply with the revised guidelines and make examinations fully accessible for disabled candidates.

Legal Provisions Discussed

1. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) – Ensures equal opportunities, accessibility, and reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities.
2. Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) – Established that benchmark disability is not required to obtain a scribe.
3. Avni Prakash v. NTA – Reaffirmed that denying scribe facilities violates the fundamental rights of persons with disabilities.

Significance

• This ruling expands the rights of persons with disabilities, ensuring they receive reasonable accommodations in examinations.
• The judgment eliminates the discriminatory distinction between benchmark-disabled and other disabled candidates, promoting inclusive education.
• It strengthens enforcement of the RPwD Act, 2016, directing the government and exam authorities to strictly implement accessibility guidelines.
• The ruling serves as a landmark precedent in preventing discrimination against disabled candidates and ensuring their equal participation in education and employment opportunities.

This case reinforces that equal access to education and employment is a fundamental right for all persons with disabilities. The Supreme Court’s decision ensures that no candidate is unfairly denied reasonable accommodations in examinations.

Case Name:  GULSHAN KUMAR Vs INSTITUTE OF BANKING PERSONNEL SELECTION|W.P.(C) No. 1018/2022

5). Gujarat High Court: State’s Power to Regulate Teacher Recruitment in Minority Schools Doesn’t Violate Article 30

Case Background

• In March 2021, the Gujarat State Legislature amended the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Act, 1972 to extend certain regulatory provisions to linguistic and religious minority schools.
• The amendments made Sections 17(26), 34(2), and 35 applicable to minority schools, which meant the State could regulate the recruitment of teachers and principals in these institutions.
• Before the amendment, these minority schools were exempt from these provisions.
• Various linguistic and religious minority institutions challenged these amendments in the Gujarat High Court, arguing that the State’s power to regulate infringed upon their fundamental rights under Article 30(1) of the Constitution.

Issues in the Case

1. Did the 2021 amendments violate Article 30(1) of the Constitution, which grants minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions?
2. Could the State regulate minority institutions without interfering with their autonomy?
3. Did the amendments violate the right to equality (Article 14) or other constitutional provisions?
4. Did making minority schools follow the same teacher recruitment rules as majority-run institutions violate their special constitutional status?

Court Observations

Bench Comprising Justices

• The case was heard by a division bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice Pranav Trivedi.
• The 260-page judgment analyzed constitutional provisions, previous Supreme Court rulings, and the impact of the amendments.

Key Findings of the Court

1. State’s Regulatory Power is Not Unfettered
   • The Court clarified that the Gujarat government does not have unlimited or absolute power to regulate minority institutions.
   • However, mere conferment of regulatory power does not automatically infringe on the rights of minority institutions under Article 30(1).
   • The State and Education Board must act within constitutional limits while framing regulations.
2. State Can Regulate Minority Institutions If It Does Not Violate Article 30(1)
   • The Court relied on TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) and Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College v. State of Gujarat (1974) to reaffirm that minority institutions cannot claim complete immunity from State regulations.
   • Regulations are permissible if they help maintain educational standards without interfering in the administration of the institutions.
   • Recruitment rules for teachers and principals do not violate Article 30(1) as long as minority institutions retain the final decision-making power.
3. Regulations Ensure Quality Education Without Undermining Minority Rights
   • The Court emphasized that the object of the Act is to ensure excellence in education.
   • The 2021 amendments only empower the State to set qualifications, selection methods, and service conditions for teachers but do not take away the right of minority schools to select their own candidates.
4. Grant-in-Aid Does Not Mean Absolute Autonomy
   • The Court noted that Article 30 does not guarantee a right to government aid.
   • However, if the State chooses to grant aid, it cannot discriminate against minority institutions.
   • If a condition for receiving aid does not require surrendering the right to administer the institution, it is not unconstitutional.
5. Selection of Teachers and Principals Follows Fair Process
   • The recruitment process still allows the Minority School Selection Committee to make the final choice.
   • The Committee, led by a nominee of the minority institution, can select candidates best suited to the school's ideology.
   • Since minority schools retain control over hiring decisions, Article 30(1) is not violated.

Court Rulings and Decisions

• The Gujarat High Court dismissed the petitions challenging the 2021 amendments.
• The Court ruled that the State’s regulations were valid as they balanced educational standards with minority rights.
• The amendments were not unconstitutional because they did not unreasonably interfere with the administration of minority institutions.
• The Court rejected the argument that the same law governing majority-run institutions cannot apply to minority institutions, as long as it respects their constitutional protections.

Legal Provisions Discussed

1. Article 30(1) of the Constitution – Grants minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
2. Article 14 (Right to Equality) – The Court ruled that applying the same educational standards to all schools does not violate Article 14.
3. TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) – Held that reasonable regulations by the State are permissible, provided they do not interfere with minority rights.
4. Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat (1974) – Confirmed that State regulations must balance educational excellence and minority rights.

Significance

• This ruling clarifies the extent to which the State can regulate minority institutions without violating Article 30.
• The judgment reinforces the principle that minority institutions must meet certain educational standards if they seek recognition or aid from the State.
• The decision ensures fair recruitment processes while preserving the autonomy of minority institutions in hiring their teachers and principals.
• The ruling sets a precedent for other states that may want to introduce similar regulations for minority schools.

In conclusion, minority institutions cannot claim absolute immunity from State regulations, but any such regulations must respect their constitutional rights and allow them reasonable autonomy in administration.

Case Name: MOUNT CARMEL HIGH SCHOOL & ANR. v/s STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS and Batch

6). Infant’s Custody Restored to Mother Accused of Kidnapping, Orissa HC Cites ‘Tender Years Doctrine’

Case Background

The Orissa High Court was faced with a case where a biological mother sought the custody of her infant daughter, whom she had allegedly abandoned while kidnapping a male child from a hospital. The mother and her husband were facing criminal charges for kidnapping the baby boy. Meanwhile, their abandoned daughter was placed in the custody of a child welfare agency.

The parents later approached the trial court seeking custody of their daughter, but their request was denied due to lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved by this decision, they filed a petition before the Orissa High Court.

Issues of the Case

1. Whether the biological mother, who is facing criminal charges, is entitled to custody of her infant daughter.
2. Whether denying custody to the mother violates the child's and parents' rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.
3. Whether the ‘doctrine of tender years’ applies in this case.
4. Whether the alleged wrongful conduct of the mother should affect her right to custody.

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by Justice Sibo Sankar Mishra of the Orissa High Court.

Key Observations of the Court

• The Court recognized the deep-rooted societal bias that often prioritizes male children over female children, which likely influenced the mother’s actions.
• The Court highlighted that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right of a child to be cared for, nurtured, and raised in a safe and loving environment.
• There was no evidence to suggest that the biological parents were incapable of providing a safe and nurturing home for the child.
• The Court referred to Section 40 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which gives biological parents a superior right of custody over their child.
• The Court emphasized that the welfare of the child is of paramount importance and should take precedence over any criminal allegations against the parents.
• The doctrine of tender years was applied, which states that during a child's early years, the mother is best suited to provide care and emotional support.

Court Rulings and Decisions

• The Court ruled that custody of the infant girl should be restored to her biological mother despite the ongoing criminal case.
• The Court acknowledged the seriousness of the mother’s alleged actions but held that the child’s welfare must take priority.
• The Court imposed strict monitoring conditions to ensure the child’s safety:
  • Regular inspections by the Child Welfare Committee (CWC).
  • Continuous health and well-being evaluations of the child.
  • Parental behavior assessments based on their past conduct.
  • Counseling and therapy for the parents to address underlying issues.
  • If at any point the child’s safety is found to be compromised, the CWC can approach the trial court to recall the custody order.

Legal Provisions Referred

1. Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Right to life, which includes the right of a child to be nurtured and cared for.
2. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
   • Section 40 – Gives biological parents a superior right of custody.
   • Section 3(ix) – Best interests of the child must be the primary consideration.
3. Doctrine of Tender Years – Presumes that the mother is the best caretaker for a young child.

Significance 

• The judgment reinforces the fundamental rights of children and parents under Article 21.
• It acknowledges and condemns societal biases that lead to gender-based discrimination in parenting decisions.
• The ruling balances the welfare of the child with concerns over the mother’s conduct, ensuring close monitoring by child welfare authorities.
• The case highlights the importance of rehabilitative justice, considering the psychological and social factors influencing a parent’s actions rather than solely punishing them.

Conclusion

The Orissa High Court’s decision to restore custody of the infant girl to her biological mother demonstrates a child-centric approach to justice. While the mother’s alleged wrongdoing was acknowledged, the Court prioritized the child’s right to a nurturing environment over punitive action against the parents. By invoking the doctrine of tender years, the Court reaffirmed the principle that a mother is best suited to care for an infant, while also ensuring protective measures for the child's well-being.

Case Name: Sumatimani Sau & Anr. v. State of Odisha & Ors.

Case No: CRLMC No. 4792 of 2024