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31st January, 2025

1). Misapplication of Dowry Death Law by Trial Court: Supreme Court Urges Judicial Academics to Intervene

Case Background

The case involved allegations against the appellant (accused) of committing dowry death and cruelty towards his wife, who died by suicide. As a result, the Trial Court convicted him under Section 304-B IPC (Dowry Death) and sentenced him to eight years of rigorous imprisonment. The High Court upheld this conviction. The accused then challenged these judgments before the Supreme Court.

Issues in the Case

  1. Whether the prosecution proved the essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC against the accused.
  2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to invoke Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which allows a presumption of dowry death.
  3. Whether the allegations of dowry demand and cruelty were supported by reliable evidence.

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by a Supreme Court bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan.

Key Observations

  • Essential Ingredients of Section 304-B IPC:
    The Court highlighted that to convict a person under Section 304-B IPC, the prosecution must prove:
    1. The death of the woman was caused by burns, bodily injury, or unnatural circumstances.
    2. The death must have occurred within seven years of marriage.
    3. The woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry demands soon before her death.
  • Presumption Under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act:
    • The Court stated that for this presumption to apply, the prosecution must prove that the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death.
    • If this key requirement is not proved, the presumption under Section 113-B cannot be invoked against the accused.
  • Analysis of the Evidence:
    • The statement of the deceased’s mother (PW-6) was examined. The Court found significant omissions in her statements recorded by the police. She did not mention specific incidents of cruelty or dowry demandin her earlier statements.
    • The brother’s statement also failed to mention any mistreatment due to insufficient dowry, making it contradictory.
    • A demand for a refrigerator, motorcycle, and mixi was only mentioned in a third statement recorded two and a half months after the incident, which the Court considered an afterthought.
    • The allegation that the accused beat the deceased was found to be vague and unrelated to the time immediately before her death.

Court Ruling & Decision

  • The Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC.
  • The Court held that not a single incident of cruelty was proved against the accused.
  • Since the legal requirements for dowry death and presumption under Section 113-B were not fulfilled, the Court allowed the appeal and quashed the convictions imposed by the Trial Court and High Court.

Legal Provisions Discussed

  1. Section 304-B IPC (Dowry Death): Defines dowry death and sets the conditions for conviction. (Section 80 of BNS)
  2. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act: Creates a presumption of dowry death if the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death in connection with dowry. (Section 118 of BSA)

Significance & Conclusion

  • The Supreme Court criticized Trial Courts for repeatedly making errors in applying Section 304-B IPC, despite clear guidelines from the Supreme Court.
  • It urged State Judicial Academies to train judges properly to prevent wrongful convictions in dowry death cases.
  • The ruling reinforces the importance of strong and direct evidence to convict a person under Section 304-B IPC.
  • The Court observed that this was a case of "moral conviction" rather than a legally justified conviction, highlighting the need for courts to base decisions strictly on evidence.

This judgment strengthens due process and ensures that convictions under dowry death laws are based on proper legal proof, not assumptions or moral beliefs.

Case Name: KARAN SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA., CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1076 OF 2014

2). No Conviction Under Section 34 IPC Without Establishing Prior Meeting of Minds: Supreme Court

Case Background

This case involved an appeal by police constables against their conviction for murder. The main issue was whether all the accused could be convicted under Section 34 IPC (common intention).

The case arose when a Head Constable (Accused No. 1) and three other constables attempted to stop a car carrying illegal liquor. When the car did not stop, Accused No. 1 fired a single shot, which led to the death of a passenger. The deceased’s husband later filed a complaint against all four accused.

  • The Trial Court convicted only Accused No. 1 (the person who fired the shot) and sentenced him to life imprisonment, while acquitting the other three accused due to lack of evidence of common intention.
  • However, the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted all four accused under Section 34 IPC (common intention).
  • The accused then approached the Supreme Court to challenge the High Court’s decision.

Issues in the Case

  1. Whether the conviction of all accused under Section 34 IPC was justified.
  2. Whether the High Court was correct in overturning the Trial Court’s acquittal of the three constables.
  3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that all accused had a "common intention" to commit the crime.

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by a Supreme Court bench comprising Justices B.R. Gavai and Augustine George Masih.

Key Observations

  • Principles for Conviction Under Section 34 IPC:
    • The Court reiterated that to convict under Section 34 IPC (common intention), the prosecution must prove:
      1. There was a prior meeting of minds between the accused.
      2. All the accused preplanned and shared a common intention with the person who actually committed the crime.
      3. The criminal act was done in furtherance of this common intention.
    • The Court relied on its recent judgment in Madhusudan & Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh to reaffirm these principles.
  • High Court’s Limited Power to Overturn Acquittals:
    • The Court stated that a High Court can only interfere with an acquittal if:
      1. The Trial Court’s decision was perverse (completely against evidence).
      2. There was a misreading or omission of material evidence.
      3. The only possible conclusion from the evidence was the guilt of the accused.
    • It relied on Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar & Others v. State of Karnataka, where similar principles were laid down.
  • Analysis of Evidence:
    • The Trial Court had acquitted the three other constables because:
      • They were acting under the command of Accused No. 1.
      • There was no evidence that they planned or intended the shooting.
      • Only one witness identified one of the accused, which was insufficient to establish common intention.
    • However, the High Court convicted them solely because they were in the same vehicle as Accused No. 1.
    • The Supreme Court disagreed with this reasoning, stating that mere presence is not enough to establish common intention under Section 34 IPC.

Court Ruling & Decision

  • The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision and reinstated the acquittal of the three constables.
  • It held that the Trial Court’s judgment was well-reasoned and should not have been overturned.
  • The Court affirmed that Section 34 IPC cannot be applied without clear evidence of a shared intention to commit the crime.

Legal Provisions Discussed

  1. Section 34 IPC (Common Intention): Holds multiple accused liable for a criminal act if they acted in furtherance of a shared intention. (Section 3(5) of BNS)
  2. Principles on High Court’s power to overturn acquittals: The High Court must show that the Trial Court’s decision was perverse or lacked material evidence before interfering.

Significance & Conclusion

  • The judgment clarifies the scope of Section 34 IPC, ensuring that mere presence at the crime scene is not enough to prove common intention.
  • It also reinforces that Trial Court acquittals should not be overturned lightly unless the judgment is completely unreasonable or lacks crucial evidence.
  • The case upholds the principle that convictions must be based on clear evidence, not assumptions.

This ruling protects individuals from wrongful conviction under common intention laws and ensures that courts follow strict legal standards when applying Section 34 IPC.

Case Name: CONSTABLE 907 SURENDRA SINGH & ANR. VERSUS STATE OF UTTARAKHAND., CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 355 OF 2013

3). Karnataka HC: Pre-Amendment of Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act Birth Bars Daughter from Claiming Father’s Ancestral Property Share 

Case Background

The case involved a dispute over ancestral property after the 2005 amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The plaintiffs, daughters of Mahadev, challenged a partition that took place in 1994 between their father and their two brothers. They claimed equal rights in the property and also challenged a gift deed executed by their father in favor of his second wife.

The daughters argued that since Section 6 was retroactive, they should be considered coparceners from birth, making the 1994 partition invalid. The defendants, however, contended that partitions made before 20th December 2004 were protected under the amendment and could not be reopened.

Issues in the Case

  1. Can daughters born before a partition (which took place before 20th December 2004) claim a share in the property after the 2005 amendment?
  2. Does the 2005 amendment apply retroactively to reopen partitions done before 20th December 2004?
  3. Is the gift deed executed by Mahadev in favor of his second wife valid?

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde of the Karnataka High Court.

Key Observations

  1. Daughters' Coparcenary Rights Under Amended Section 6:
    • The 2005 amendment granted daughters the same rights as sons in ancestral property.
    • However, sub-section (5) of Section 6 protects partitions made before 20th December 2004.
    • This means that a daughter born before the partition cannot claim coparcenary rights in the father's share if the partition happened before 20th December 2004.
    • The Court stated:

      “The Parliament intended to save the partitions made before 20.12.2004.”

  2. Partition Made in 1994 is Protected:
    • The 1994 partition between Mahadev and his sons was legally valid and could not be challenged.
    • The property that Mahadev received in the partition became his separate property, and the daughters could not claim a share in it.
  3. Validity of the Gift Deed:
    • The daughters challenged the gift deed, alleging fraud and that their father was unwell at the time.
    • However, the Court noted that Mahadev had been looked after by his second wife, and his sons and married daughters were living separately.
    • The Court ruled that Mahadev had the right to gift his property, and the gift deed was valid.
  4. Need for Harmonization of Section 6(1)(b) and 6(5):
    • The Court observed that sons born after partition are granted coparcenary rights, but daughters born after partition are not.
    • This creates inconsistencies with Shastric Hindu law, which allows sons to reclaim shares in the father’s property after partition.

Court Ruling & Decision

  • The daughters' claim for a share in the property was dismissed.
  • The 1994 partition was upheld.
  • The gift deed executed in favor of the second wife was declared valid.

Legal Provisions Discussed

  1. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005): Grants daughters equal rights in ancestral property as sons.
  2. Sub-section (5) of Section 6: Protects partitions made before 20th December 2004 from being reopened.
  3. Shastric Hindu Law: Recognizes sons born after partition as coparceners but does not extend this benefit to daughters.

Significance & Conclusion

  • Daughters born before a partition (done before 20th December 2004) cannot claim coparcenary rights in the father’s share.
  • Partitions made before 20th December 2004 are legally valid and cannot be reopened.
  • Fathers have the right to gift their separate property, and such gifts cannot be challenged based on the 2005 amendment.
  • There is a legal inconsistency between daughters' and sons' rights after partition, which may need further judicial or legislative clarification.

This ruling clarifies the limited retroactive effect of the 2005 amendment and provides certainty in property transactions done before 20th December 2004.

Case Name: Prafula M Bhat & Others AND Saraswati Shahstri & Others. 

Case No: RFA NO.100103 OF 2014

4). Gauhati HC: Section 417 IPC Not Attracted Unless Section 90 IPC Conditions Are Met

Case Background

This case involved a dispute over an alleged case of cheating under Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The complainant, a woman, alleged that she was in a love relationship with the accused-petitioner since 2004-05. She claimed that he promised to marry her, and based on that promise, they engaged in a physical relationship. In 2007, she became pregnant, but the accused allegedly persuaded her to abort the child, assuring that he would marry her later. However, on January 30, 2008, the accused refused to marry her and asked her to marry someone else.

The victim filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Morigaon, leading to the accused’s conviction under Section 417 IPC. He was sentenced to one year of imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The accused then appealed to the Sessions Court, which upheld the conviction. Finally, the case was challenged before the Gauhati High Court through a Criminal Revision Petition under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). (Section 438 & 442 of BNSS)

Issues in the Case

  1. Does a mere refusal to marry constitute an offence under Section 417 IPC (cheating)?
  2. Was the complainant’s consent for a physical relationship obtained under a misconception of fact (as required under Section 90 IPC)?
  3. Did the prosecution provide sufficient evidence to establish the charge of cheating?

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by Justice Arun Dev Choudhury of the Gauhati High Court.

Key Observations

  1. Long-Term Love Relationship
    • The Court noted that the victim and the accused were in a love relationship for 3-4 years.
    • The victim admitted that they first had a physical relationship in 2004, and she became pregnant in 2007.
    • The Court pointed out that their relationship was not based on any immediate deception but developed over time.
  2. Lack of Evidence of Fraud or Misconception of Fact
    • For a case of cheating under Section 417 IPC to be made out, the prosecution must prove that the accused fraudulently induced the victim into a relationship with no intention to marry her from the beginning.
    • The Court found no evidence that the accused had dishonest intent from the beginning of the relationship.
    • There was no indication that the victim consented to the relationship solely due to a fraudulent promise of marriage.
  3. Legal Principle: Mere Refusal to Marry is Not Cheating
    • The Court emphasized that mere refusal to marry, after being in a long-term relationship, does not constitute cheating under Section 417 IPC unless the prosecution proves that the consent was obtained through deception as per Section 90 IPC.
    • The prosecution failed to establish that the accused never intended to marry her from the start.
  4. Breakdown of Relationship is Not a Criminal Offense
    • The Court observed that the relationship broke down over time, which cannot be equated with cheating.
    • It ruled that a broken promise to marry does not automatically mean fraud or deception.

Court Ruling & Decision

  • The conviction of the accused under Section 417 IPC was set aside.
  • The judgment of the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Morigaon, and the order of the Sessions Court were both overturned.
  • The accused was acquitted of all charges.

Legal Provisions Discussed

  1. Section 417 IPC (Punishment for Cheating): Punishes a person for cheating if they dishonestly induce someone to do or omit something they wouldn’t have otherwise done. (Section 318(2) of BNS)
  2. Section 90 IPC (Consent under Misconception of Fact): Defines when consent is invalid due to fraud, deception, or misconception of fact. (Section 28 of BNS)

Significance & Conclusion

  • Mere refusal to marry after a long relationship does not amount to cheating.
  • For a conviction under Section 417 IPC, the prosecution must prove that the accused had no intention of marrying from the start.
  • Consent for a physical relationship must be proven to have been obtained through deception for it to be considered cheating.
  • The ruling protects individuals from being unfairly criminalized for relationship breakdowns and reinforces that not every broken promise amounts to a crime.

This judgment clarifies an important aspect of cheating under the IPC and ensures that criminal law is not misused to settle personal disputes in relationships.

Case Name: Guluk Kathar v. State of Assam 

Case No.: Crl.Rev.P./265/2012

5. Allahabad High Court: Rape Survivor’s Statement Under Section 164 CrPC Holds Greater Evidentiary Value Than Section 161 CrPC Statement of IO

Case Background

The Allahabad High Court recently ruled that a rape survivor’s statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC before a Magistrate holds greater legal value than her earlier statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC by the Investigating Officer.

The case arose from a criminal revision plea challenging an order by the Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur. The order dismissed the protest petition filed by the victim against the police’s final report, which had given a clean chit to the accused. The Magistrate accepted the police’s conclusion based on the victim’s Section 164 statement, in which she denied the allegations of rape.

Issues in the Case

  1. Whether the victim’s Section 164 CrPC statement before a Magistrate holds more legal weight than her Section 161 CrPC statement given to the police?
  2. Whether the Magistrate was correct in accepting the final police report and dismissing the victim’s protest petition?
  3. Can the victim still pursue legal action against the accused despite the dismissal of her protest petition?

Court Observations

Bench and Legal Precedents

The case was heard by a Single Judge Bench of Justice Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra. The Court relied on a previous Allahabad High Court judgment in Pakhandu v. State of UP (2001), which held that a Magistrate has the discretion to accept or reject a police closure report based on the evidence available.

Analysis of the Victim’s Statements

  • In her Section 161 CrPC statement (given to the police), the victim accused the defendant of kidnapping and raping her.
  • However, in her Section 164 CrPC statement (recorded before a Magistrate), she retracted her allegations, saying that no offence was committed, and that her father had filed a false case due to enmity.
  • The police relied on her Section 164 statement to close the case, and the Magistrate accepted their final report.

The victim later filed a protest petition before the Magistrate, arguing that she was pressured into changing her statement. However, the Magistrate dismissed her plea, citing the sanctity of statements made before a Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC.

Court Rulings and Decisions

The High Court upheld the Magistrate’s decision and ruled that:

  1. A Section 164 CrPC statement before a Magistrate carries more legal significance than a Section 161 CrPC statement given to the police.
  2. Since the victim gave contradictory statements, her 164 CrPC statement—where she denied the allegations—was rightly given precedence.
  3. The Magistrate committed no illegality in accepting the final police report and dismissing the protest petition.

However, the Court clarified that the victim is still free to file a private criminal complaint against the accused if she wishes, as there is no legal bar preventing her from doing so.

Legal Provisions Involved

  • Section 161 CrPC – Statement recorded by the police during investigation. (Section 180 of BNSS)
  • Section 164 CrPC – Statement recorded by a Magistrate during investigation, carrying greater evidentiary value. (Section 183 of BNSS)

Significance of the Judgment

  1. Clarifies the importance of Section 164 CrPC statements – Courts give more weight to a victim’s statement before a Magistrate than to a statement given to the police.
  2. Strengthens judicial scrutiny in rape cases – Helps in assessing false cases and ensuring fair trials.
  3. Provides remedy for victims – Even if a case is closed by police, victims can still file private complaints before a court.

Conclusion

The Allahabad High Court upheld the Magistrate’s acceptance of the police’s final report and confirmed that Section 164 CrPC statements hold greater evidentiary value. However, it left the option open for the victim to pursue a private complaint if she desired. This judgment reinforces the legal principle that statements made before a Magistrate hold greater credibility than those made before the police.

Case Name - Abbas And Another vs. State of U.P. and Another 2025

6). Arbitration Clause in Agreement Does Not Exclude Civil Court’s Jurisdiction by Default: Gauhati HC

Case Background

In this case, the plaintiffs had entered into an agreement with the defendants for the construction of flats. When the flats were not handed over as promised, the plaintiffs sent a legal notice to the defendants, asking them to deliver the flats within three months. The defendants assured delivery within this period but failed to fulfill their promise.

As a result, the plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of contract in a civil court, requesting that the court direct the defendants to complete and deliver the flats. They also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for an interim injunction, which the court allowed, directing the defendants to complete and hand over the flats within three months.

In response, the defendants filed a petition under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC and Sections 5 and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking to refer the matter to arbitration based on the arbitration clause in the agreement.

The plaintiffs opposed this petition, arguing that the arbitration clause in the agreement did not meet the legal requirements of a valid arbitration agreement and that the civil court still had jurisdiction to hear the case.

The trial court rejected the defendants' request to refer the matter to arbitration. The defendants then appealed before the Gauhati High Court.

Issues in the Case

  1. Does the presence of an arbitration clause in an agreement automatically exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court?
  2. Can a matter still be tried in a civil court despite the existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement?
  3. What are the conditions under which a dispute must be referred to arbitration as per Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1996?

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by Justice Malasri Nandi of the Gauhati High Court.

Key Observations

  1. Civil Courts Have General Jurisdiction Unless Specifically Barred
    • The court referred to the Supreme Court's ruling in S. Vanathan Muthuraja v. Ramalingam (1997), which held that civil courts have jurisdiction over all civil matters unless explicitly barred by law.
    • It was observed that even if an arbitration clause exists, the jurisdiction of the civil court is not automatically excluded.
  2. Supreme Court Precedent on Arbitration and Civil Court Jurisdiction
    • The court relied on ITI Ltd. v. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd. (2002), where the Supreme Court held that civil courts can hear cases unless a statute specifically prohibits them from doing so.
    • The Supreme Court in that case recognized the strong presumption in favor of civil court jurisdiction and emphasized that an arbitration clause alone is not enough to bar civil courts from hearing a case.
  3. Rajasthan High Court Ruling on Arbitration Clauses
    • The court also referred to Mahesh Kumar v. RSRTC (2006), where the Rajasthan High Court ruled that just because a contract contains an arbitration clause, it does not automatically bar a civil court from hearing the dispute.
  4. Validity of the Arbitration Clause in This Case
    • The arbitration clause in the agreement was not mandatory, as it only suggested arbitration in "exceptional cases".
    • The court observed that for Section 8 of the Arbitration Act to apply, the arbitration clause must be clear and binding, which was not the case here.
    • Mere reference to arbitration in a contract does not automatically exclude civil court jurisdiction.

Court Ruling & Decision

  • The appeal was dismissed, and the civil court's jurisdiction was upheld.
  • The court ruled that merely having an arbitration clause does not mean a case must always go to arbitration.
  • The civil court has the power to decide cases unless there is a clear and binding arbitration agreement that meets the requirements of Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

Legal Provisions Discussed

  1. Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
    • Requires courts to refer a dispute to arbitration only if there is a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.
    • If the arbitration clause is unclear or optional, the court is not bound to refer the case to arbitration.
  2. Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC:
    • Allows a court to reject a plaint (lawsuit) if it does not disclose a valid cause of action or if jurisdiction is barred by law.
    • The defendants in this case argued that the civil court had no jurisdiction due to the arbitration clause.
  3. Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of CPC:
    • Provides for temporary injunctions to prevent injustice during the trial.
    • The civil court granted an interim order directing the defendants to complete and hand over the flats.

Significance & Conclusion

  • The ruling confirms that arbitration clauses do not automatically take away civil court jurisdiction.
  • For arbitration to be mandatory, the agreement must clearly state that disputes shall be resolved only through arbitration.
  • If the arbitration clause is vague or optional, civil courts can still hear the case.
  • The judgment ensures that parties cannot misuse arbitration clauses to avoid their contractual obligations in cases like real estate disputes.

This case reinforces the legal principle that civil courts retain jurisdiction unless a statute explicitly removes their authority, ensuring a fair and just legal process.

Case Name: M/S J.M.B. CONSTRUCTION AND 2 ORS. VERSUS DR. SOMESH DHAR AND 3 ORS. 

Case Number:Arb.A./8/2024

30th January, 2025