30th January, 2025

1). SC Rules: Pendente Lite Transferees Cannot Demand Impleadment as a Matter of Right

Case Background

The case involved a dispute over a property that was sold while a suit for specific performance (compelling the completion of a property sale) was still pending. During the litigation, Respondents No. 1 and 2 purchased the suit property. However, their request to be added as parties to the case was rejected by the trial court, and they did not appeal this decision.

When the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the execution of the sale deed in their favor, Respondents No. 1 and 2, as pendente lite transferees (buyers of a property under litigation), appealed to the Karnataka High Court. The High Court granted them leave to appeal despite them not being part of the original suit. The plaintiff then challenged this decision in the Supreme Court.

Issue of the Case

The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether a pendente lite transferee (someone who buys a property while litigation is ongoing) has an automatic right to appeal if they were not impleaded in the suit. Specifically, the Court examined whether the Karnataka High Court was correct in granting leave to appeal to Respondents No. 1 and 2, despite their earlier plea for impleadment being rejected.

Court Observations

A bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan ruled that a pendente lite transferee does not have an automatic right to be added to a case or to appeal a decision unless exceptional circumstances exist. The Court summarized the principles governing impleadment and appeals by such transferees as follows:

1. A court can allow a transferee pendente lite to be added as a party under Order I Rule 10 CPC or Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, but it depends on the case's facts.
2. A transferee pendente lite does not have a right to be impleaded automatically.
3. There is no absolute rule that they should always be impleaded.
4. Whether they are allowed to join the case depends on the suit's nature and available evidence.
5. If they do not seek impleadment, they risk being bound by the case's outcome without representation.
6. Even if they are not impleaded, they will still be bound by the final judgment.
7. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA) applies, meaning that any transfer during litigation is subject to the final court decision.
8. A transferee pendente lite can seek permission to be impleaded on their own or through another party to the suit.

The Court noted that Respondents No. 1 and 2 had purchased the property while an injunction was in place against the original owner. Since their request for impleadment was already rejected, their only option was to file a separate case for recovery of the sale amount if they felt cheated.

Court Ruling

The Supreme Court set aside the Karnataka High Court's decision, ruling that:

• The High Court was wrong in granting leave to appeal to Respondents No. 1 and 2 since they were not parties to the suit.
• A third party cannot file an appeal unless they prove they are an "aggrieved person," meaning their rights were directly affected.
• The sale of the property during litigation was subject to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, meaning that the buyers accepted the risk of the case’s outcome.
• Since the trial court ruled against them, they could not claim to be "adversely affected" and had no automatic right to appeal.
• If Respondents No. 1 and 2 believed they were cheated, they could seek a legal remedy separately but could not intervene in the specific performance case.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and reversed the High Court’s decision.

Legal Provisions Discussed

• Order I Rule 10 CPC – Deals with adding or removing parties in a suit.
• Order XXII Rule 10 CPC – Allows the court to add a transferee pendente lite to a case.
• Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – States that any property transfer during litigation is subject to the final court decision.

Significance of the Judgment

This ruling clarifies the rights of pendente lite transferees, making it clear that:

• Buying a property during litigation is risky since the buyer must accept the outcome of the case.
• Simply purchasing a disputed property does not grant an automatic right to join the case or appeal a decision.
• Buyers must ensure proper due diligence before purchasing a property under litigation.
• If a buyer is misled or cheated, their legal remedy is separate litigation, not intervention in the original case.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that pendente lite transferees are bound by the case outcome but do not automatically have the right to join or appeal the case. The ruling upholds the principle that litigation should not be complicated by third-party buyers unless they can prove exceptional circumstances. This judgment serves as a crucial precedent for future property disputes involving pendente lite transfers. 

Case Name: H. ANJANAPPA & ORS. VERSUS A. PRABHAKAR & ORS. 

2). SC Rules: NBFC’s Banking Operations Do Not Qualify as Public Function for Writ Jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 

Case Background

The case involved an appeal against a Karnataka High Court ruling that dismissed a writ petition against Muthoot Finance Ltd., a non-banking financial company (NBFC). The High Court held that Muthoot Finance is not a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore, it is not subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

The appellant challenged this decision, arguing that even though Muthoot Finance is a private company, it is regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Since it must follow RBI guidelines, any violation of these regulations should make it subject to writ jurisdiction.

Issue of the Case

The key question before the Supreme Court was:

• Can a private company, merely because it is regulated by a statute (like RBI guidelines), be subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226?
• Or does the company need to be performing a public duty or function to be amenable to writ jurisdiction?

Court Observations

A bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan ruled that simply being regulated by a statute does notautomatically make an entity subject to writ jurisdiction. Instead, the function test must be applied, meaning that an entity must be performing a public function or duty for a writ petition to be maintainable.

The Court outlined key principles regarding when a writ petition can be filed:

1. A writ petition can be filed against entities that are:
   • An instrumentality or agency of the State, or
   • Performing public functions fundamental to people’s lives.
2. Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 applies to:
   • The State Government, authorities, and statutory bodies.
   • Companies owned or financed by the government.
   • Private bodies that receive substantial state funding or perform public duties.
3. Muthoot Finance Ltd., though regulated by RBI, is a private company and not performing public functions. The RBI’s regulations are merely to ensure proper business conduct and do not give the government direct control over its operations.
4. A private company, even if engaged in banking, does not automatically become a public authority.
5. Mandamus (a writ to compel performance of a duty) is usually issued against public bodies. In rare cases, it can be issued against private bodies, but only if they are performing a public duty under a statute.
6. Being regulated by a statute does not make a company a statutory body.
7. If a private body is performing a public function, a writ petition may be maintainable, but only if the case involves a public law element and not just private disputes.
8. Referring to Halsbury’s Laws of England, the Court reiterated that a public authority must perform statutory duties for public benefit, not for private profit.

Court Ruling

Applying the function test, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Karnataka High Court's ruling. The key points of the ruling were:

• Muthoot Finance is not a public body because its duties are only towards its account holders and borrowers, not the general public.
• The company has no power to take actions affecting public rights, and its decisions only bind its customers and employees.
• Mere regulatory oversight by RBI does not make it a public authority.
• Since there was no public function or duty involved, Muthoot Finance cannot be subjected to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Legal Provisions Discussed

• Article 12 of the Constitution – Defines "State" for the purpose of fundamental rights enforcement.
• Article 226 of the Constitution – Allows High Courts to issue writs against State or private bodies performing public duties.
• Halsbury’s Laws of England – Defines what constitutes a public authority.

Significance of the Judgment

This ruling is important because it:

• Clarifies that private companies are not automatically subject to writ jurisdiction just because they are regulated by a statute.
• Emphasizes the “function test”—only entities performing public functions can be subjected to writ jurisdiction.
• Ensures that writ petitions are not misused against private businesses in purely contractual or commercial matters.
• Strengthens the distinction between private business operations and public duties.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that only entities performing public duties or functions can be subjected to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Merely being subject to regulatory guidelines (like RBI regulations) does not make a private entity a public body. Since Muthoot Finance Ltd. was not performing any public duty, it was not subject to writ jurisdiction, and the appellant’s case was rightly dismissed.

Case Name: S SHOBHA VERSUS MUTHOOT FINANCE LTD. 

3). Supreme Court: Disclosure Statements Under Section 27 of Evidence Act Alone Cannot Secure Conviction Without Corroborating Evidence 

Case Background

The case involved an appeal against a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The prosecution alleged that on December 31, 2010, at around 11:45 AM, the appellant stabbed Ramakrishnan (the deceased) with a knife, causing fatal injuries.

The motive for the crime, according to the prosecution, was previous enmity—the deceased was allegedly involved in the murder of the appellant’s elder brother.

The trial court convicted the appellant, primarily relying on:

1. Eyewitness testimonies
2. The disclosure statement of the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which led to the recovery of the knife.

The appellant challenged this conviction before the Supreme Court, arguing that:

• There were major discrepancies in the prosecution witnesses' statements.
• The number of stab wounds and the distance from which the witnesses observed the crime were unclear.
• The prosecution failed to examine other key eyewitnesses.
• The witnesses did not report the crime to the police immediately, which raised doubts about their credibility.

The State argued that these were only minor omissions and that the eyewitnesses consistently identified the accused. The prosecution further claimed that the recovery of the weapon based on the accused's disclosure statement strengthened their case.

Issue of the Case

The Supreme Court had to decide:

• Can a disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, without supporting evidence, be sufficient to convict an accused?

Court Observations

A bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan examined the case and found serious flaws in the prosecution’s evidence.

1. Eyewitness Testimonies Were Unreliable
   • The witnesses gave inconsistent accounts regarding the number of stab wounds and how far they were from the crime scene.
   • The witnesses did not immediately report the crime to the police or attempt to take the deceased to the hospital, raising doubts about their credibility.
2. A Disclosure Statement Alone Is Not Enough for Conviction
   • The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is a weak form of evidence.
   • It cannot, on its own, prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt unless there is other supporting evidence.
3. Relying on Previous Precedents
   • The Court referred to Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P (2023), where it was held that a disclosure statement alone, without additional evidence, is not strong enough to convict someone.
   • The Court reiterated:

     “Although disclosure statements hold significance as a contributing factor in solving a case, they are not strong enough on their own to prove charges beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Court Ruling

The Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence apart from the disclosure statement. Since the conviction was mainly based on the recovery of the knife and unreliable witness testimonies, the Court ruled that the accused could not be held guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

• The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges.

Legal Provisions Discussed

• Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Allows certain confessions to be admitted as evidence, but only to the extent that they lead to the discovery of new facts.
• Section 302 IPC – Deals with punishment for murder. (Section 103(1) of BNS)

Significance of the Judgment

• This ruling reinforces that a disclosure statement alone is not enough to convict an accused.
• Courts must rely on stronger, corroborative evidence to ensure that a conviction is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
• It prevents wrongful convictions based on weak or circumstantial evidence.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant, holding that a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of a weapon is not enough to convict someone without additional supporting evidence. The decision highlights the importance of corroborative evidence in criminal trials and ensures that convictions are based on solid and reliable proof.

Case Name: Vinobhai versus State of Kerala

4). SC: Even in Heinous Crimes, Reform Possibility Must Be Considered Before Death Sentence

Case Background

The Supreme Court heard an appeal from a man convicted of murdering his wife and four minor daughters. The trial court sentenced him to death based on circumstantial evidence, a decision later upheld by the High Court. The appellant challenged the death penalty, arguing that his case did not fall under the "rarest of rare" category that warrants capital punishment.

Issue of the Case

The key issue before the Court was whether the brutal murder of his family qualified as a "rarest of rare" case, justifying the death penalty, or whether mitigating factors, such as his lack of prior criminal record and potential for reformation, warranted a lesser sentence.

Court Observations

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol, and Sandeep Mehta examined the case in light of the principles laid down in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980). The Court reiterated that the death penalty should be imposed only in exceptionally grave circumstances, such as:

1. Extreme brutality – Crimes that are grotesque, shocking, and offend society’s conscience.
2. Inhumanity – Mass murders, heinous sexual offenses followed by murder, or killing of law enforcement officers.
3. No possibility of reform – If the convict remains a threat to society, and life imprisonment would be inadequate for justice.

The Court emphasized that before declaring a case as "rarest of rare," factors such as motive, manner of execution, severity of the crime, and the convict's rehabilitation potential must be assessed.

The Court observed that while the crime was undoubtedly brutal, the appellant's lack of a criminal history, good prison conduct, and reports suggesting he could reform tilted the case in favor of commuting his sentence. The Court noted:

"Even where multiple murders have been committed, if there is evidence or at least a reasonable possibility of reform, a lesser sentence must be preferred."

Additionally, reports from the Probation Officer and the Jail Superintendent indicated that the appellant was not a perpetual threat to society and had shown signs of reformation.

Court Rulings and Decisions

Rejecting the State’s argument that the death penalty should be upheld due to the gravity of the crime, the Court commuted the sentence to life imprisonment without remission. The Court cited previous judgments where similar cases resulted in commutation, including:

• State of Uttar Pradesh v. Krishna Master & Ors. (2010) 12 SCC 324
• Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 2 SCC 35

The Court applied the principle from Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka (2008), which allows life imprisonment without remission in cases where the death penalty is not warranted but an ordinary life sentence would be insufficient.

Legal Provisions

• Section 302 IPC – Punishment for murder. (Section 103(1) of BNS)
• Doctrine of "Rarest of Rare" from Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980).

Significance of the Judgment

This ruling reinforces the principle that the death penalty is an exception, not the rule. Even in cases of multiple murders, if reform is possible, life imprisonment without remission should be preferred over capital punishment. It also highlights the importance of considering mitigating factors such as criminal history, behavior in prison, and potential for rehabilitation before awarding the death sentence.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment without remission, recognizing the possibility of reform. This judgment aligns with established legal principles, ensuring that capital punishment is applied only in the most extreme cases where no possibility of rehabilitation exists.

Case Name: DEEN DAYAL TIWARI VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.2220-2221 OF 2022

5). Kerala HC: Mandatory Examination of Complainant and Witnesses Before Issuing Notice Under Section 223 BNSS

Case Background

The Kerala High Court was hearing a case where the petitioner challenged the Magistrate's decision to issue notice to the accused before examining the complainant and witnesses on oath. The petitioner argued that this violated Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which requires a Magistrate to first examine the complainant and witnesses before issuing notice.

The Magistrate had issued the notice directly, prompting the petitioner to seek the High Court’s intervention.

Issue of the Case

The main issue before the Court was:

1. Whether a Magistrate can issue notice to the accused before examining the complainant and witnesses on oath under Section 223(1) of BNSS.
2. Whether the accused has the right to be heard before the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence.

Court Observations

Justice V.G. Arun observed that Section 223(1) of BNSS introduces a significant change compared to its counterpart in the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), Section 200. While CrPC did not require the accused to be heard before taking cognizance, BNSS now mandates that the Magistrate must provide the accused an opportunity of hearing before taking cognizance.

The Court clarified that the correct procedure under Section 223(1) of BNSS is:

1. First, the Magistrate must examine the complainant and witnesses on oath.
2. Then, if the Magistrate decides to take cognizance, the accused must be given an opportunity to be heard.
3. Only after hearing the accused can the Magistrate decide whether to proceed with the case.

The Court referred to the Karnataka High Court decision in Basanagouda R Patil (Yatnal) and Shivananda S Patil (2025), agreeing with its interpretation of the provision.

The Court also emphasized that the purpose of this new procedural safeguard is to allow the Magistrate to assimilate correct facts before taking cognizance and ensure fairness in proceedings.

The Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. (2008) to define cognizance, stating that a Magistrate takes cognizance when they decide to apply judicial mind to a case and initiate legal proceedings.

Further, the Court noted that while Section 223(1) of BNSS makes hearing the accused mandatory before cognizance, Section 226 of BNSS does not allow the accused’s objections to be a reason for dismissing the complaint. This means that while the accused can be heard, they cannot demand that the complaint be dismissed at this stage.

Court Rulings and Decisions

• The notice issued to the accused was quashed because it was issued before the complainant and witnesses were examined on oath.
• The Court directed the Magistrate to first examine the complainant and witnesses as per Section 223(1) of BNSS before issuing notice to the accused.

Legal Provisions

• Section 223 of BNSS – Requires the Magistrate to examine the complainant and witnesses before taking cognizance and mandates hearing the accused before taking cognizance. (Section 200 of Cr.P.C.)
• Section 226 of BNSS – Specifies that the accused's objection is not a factor for dismissing a complaint at the stage of taking cognizance. (Section 203 of Cr. P.C.)

Significance of the Judgment

This judgment is important for procedural fairness in criminal cases under BNSS. It clarifies that:

• A Magistrate cannot issue notice to the accused before examining the complainant and witnesses.
• The accused now has a right to be heard before cognizance is taken, which was not the case under the previous law (CrPC).
• This change aims to ensure a fair legal process and prevent wrongful prosecution.

Conclusion

The Kerala High Court reinforced the importance of following due process under BNSS, emphasizing that a Magistrate must first examine the complainant and witnesses before issuing notice to the accused. The ruling ensures that accused persons are not summoned prematurely and get a fair opportunity to be heard before cognizance is taken.

Case Title: Suby Antony v R1 (Deleted)

Case No: CRL.MC NO. 508 OF 2025

Add-On

Kerala High Court: First Proviso of Section 479 BNSS Not Applicable Retrospectively to Convicted Prisoners

Case Background: The Kerala High Court recently addressed an application filed by a convicted person who sought the benefit of Section 479 of the BNSS for the suspension of his sentence. The applicant was convicted under Section 20(b)(ii)C of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. He claimed that, being a first-time offender, he had already served nearly four and a half years of his sentence, and under Section 479, he was eligible for release on bond.

Issue: The main issue before the Court was whether the first proviso to Section 479 of the BNSS could be applied retrospectively to convicted prisoners, particularly in cases where the alleged crime was committed before the BNSS came into effect.

Court Observations:

• The Court noted that Section 479 of the BNSS, particularly its first proviso, allows for the release of a first-time offender on bond if they have served up to one-third of the maximum sentence specified for the alleged offence.
• However, the Court pointed out that the crime in question was committed before the BNSS became effective. The Public Prosecutor argued that the provision applies only to undertrial prisoners and not to those who have already been convicted.
• The Court referred to a Supreme Court order in the case of Re-Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, where the Apex Court had extended the benefit of Section 479 to undertrial prisoners for cases registered before July 1, 2024, but had not extended this benefit to convicted prisoners.
• Justice C. S. Sudha observed that since the Supreme Court was currently monitoring the implementation of Section 479 BNSS with regard to undertrials, it would be inappropriate for the High Court to extend this benefit to convicted prisoners retrospectively at this stage.

Court Rulings:

• The Kerala High Court ruled that the benefit of Section 479 BNSS, particularly the first proviso, cannot be applied retrospectively to convicted prisoners. The Court dismissed the application seeking the suspension of the sentence based on this provision.
• The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the Supreme Court’s order regarding the retrospective application of the benefit of Section 479 to undertrials only.

Legal Provisions:

• Section 479 of BNSS: Deals with the maximum period of time an undertrial prisoner can be detained, with a provision for first-time offenders to be released on bond if they have served up to one-third of the maximum period of imprisonment for the alleged offence. (Section 436-A)
• First Proviso to Section 479: Stipulates the release of a first-time offender on bond if they have served a portion of their sentence.

Significance: This case highlights the distinction between undertrial and convicted prisoners in relation to the application of Section 479 BNSS. The Court’s decision underscores the importance of adhering to the retrospective applicability as defined by the Supreme Court for undertrials. It also reflects the Court's caution in interpreting laws where the Apex Court is already involved in monitoring their implementation.

Conclusion: The Kerala High Court dismissed the application, reinforcing the principle that the benefit of Section 479 BNSS cannot be extended to convicted prisoners, particularly when the law’s retrospective application to undertrials is under review by the Supreme Court.

Case Name: Arunkumar v State of Kerala

Case No: Crl.A 1042 of 2023