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25th January, 2025

1). Delhi HC: Trial Courts Cannot Delegate Victim Compensation Calculation to DSLSA Under Section 357 CrPC

Case Background

The five-judge bench of the Delhi High Court dealt with the question of whether trial courts could delegate their statutory duty under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to the Delhi State Legal Services Authority (DSLSA) for determining and awarding victim compensation. This larger bench was constituted to consider modifying the guidelines issued in the earlier case of Karan v. State of NCT of Delhi, which had assigned DSLSA a role in the victim compensation process.

The earlier judgment had caused delays in passing sentencing orders, as DSLSA was directed to conduct summary inquiries before making recommendations for victim compensation. This had led to prolonged detention of convicts awaiting sentencing orders.

Issue of the Case

  1. Can trial courts delegate their statutory duty under Section 357 CrPC to the DSLSA for assessing and awarding victim compensation?
  2. Does requiring an accused to furnish an affidavit about their financial capacity violate their constitutional and statutory rights?
  3. Does the implementation of the earlier guidelines lead to unjustified delays in passing sentencing orders?

Court Observations

Bench of Justices: Justice Rekha Palli, Justice Prathiba M. Singh, Justice Subramonium Prasad, Justice Saurabh Banerjee, and Justice Manoj Jain.

  1. Role of Trial Courts and DSLSA Under Section 357 CrPC:
    • The Court observed that Section 357 CrPC vests discretion exclusively in the trial courts to compute and award victim compensation.
    • The DSLSA's role, under Section 357A CrPC, is limited to assisting with victim compensation in different circumstances, and it cannot assume powers that the legislature did not intend.
    • The earlier guidelines directing DSLSA to make recommendations for victim compensation effectively rewrote the law and violated the statutory framework.
  2. Affidavit Requirement and Violation of Rights:
    • The Court held that asking the accused to file an affidavit disclosing assets and liabilities violates their constitutional rights under Article 20(3) (protection against self-incrimination).
    • Such disclosures could be misused by investigating agencies, including for purposes unrelated to the trial, and cannot be mandated.
  3. Delays in Sentencing Orders:
    • The Court noted that the procedures introduced by the earlier guidelines caused delays in sentencing, leaving convicts detained in jail for extended periods while waiting for their sentence.
    • This delay violated the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution and statutory rights under Section 374 CrPC, ( Section 415 of BNSS) which allows convicts to file appeals.
  4. Victim-Centric Approach:
    • The Court emphasized that trial courts must take a victim-centric approach while deciding compensation, considering factors like the accused's income, assets, and other relevant circumstances.

Court Rulings/Decisions

  1. The guidelines issued in the Karan v. State of NCT of Delhi case were set aside and declared unenforceable.
  2. Trial Courts were directed to handle victim compensation directly, without delegating the task to the DSLSA, in compliance with Section 357 CrPC.
  3. While trial courts may seek assistance from the DSLSA, it cannot make recommendations or conduct summary inquiries for compensation determination.
  4. Trial courts must not require the accused to furnish affidavits disclosing financial details, but they may gather necessary information from the Investigating Officer (I.O.), the prosecution, and the accused (without requiring sworn statements).

Cases Referred

  1. Karan v. State of NCT of Delhi (2016): Earlier full-bench ruling that introduced the guidelines in question.
  2. Relevant CrPC Provisions:
    • Section 357 CrPC: Deals with victim compensation as part of sentencing. (Section 395 of BNSS)
    • Section 357A CrPC: Provides for additional compensation through DSLSA, operating separately from trial court sentencing. (Section 396 of BNSS)

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court clarified that trial courts alone have the responsibility to compute and award victim compensation under Section 357 CrPC. The DSLSA cannot be delegated this duty, as it would contradict the statutory framework. The Court also addressed the constitutional rights of accused persons, ruling that affidavits disclosing financial capacity cannot be mandated. Finally, it stressed the need for a victim-centric approach and timely sentencing orders to avoid unnecessary delays and uphold the rights of convicts and victims alike.

Case Name: SAIF ALI @ SOHAN v. THE STATE GNCT OF DELHI and other connected matters

2). Jharkhand HC Ruling: Arbitration Process Not Restricted by CPC, Amendments Allowed Anytime during Proceedings

Case Background

  • Parties: The petitioner challenged an interim order of the sole arbitrator allowing the respondent’s amendment petition.
  • Dispute: The dispute arose from a contract for constructing a bridge over the Konar River, including its approach road and railway overbridge. Arbitration proceedings had commenced, set to conclude by February 17, 2025.
  • Challenged Order: The sole arbitrator had permitted the respondent to amend its pleadings under Section 23(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC.
  • Petitioner's Argument:
    1. The amendment was filed at a late stage without due diligence or justification.
    2. The petitioner claimed it was rendered remediless due to the advanced stage of arbitration and invoked the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
    3. The petitioner relied on Serosoft Solutions Private Ltd. v. Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd. (2022), arguing for interference under exceptional circumstances.
  • Respondent's Argument:
    1. The amendment was necessary to bring crucial facts on record.
    2. The petitioner was not remediless and could challenge the arbitrator’s decision under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act after the award.

Issue of the Case

Can the High Court interfere with an interim order passed by an arbitrator under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, especially when the amendment application is challenged?

Court Observations

Bench Composition: Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary

  1. Scope of Writ Jurisdiction for Interim Arbitral Orders:
    • The Court relied on the Supreme Court ruling in Serosoft Solutions Private Ltd. v. Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd. (2022), which held that the High Court's powers under Articles 226 and 227 can only be invoked in exceptionally rare cases involving procedural errors or gross injustice.
    • Such powers should not be routinely exercised to interfere with arbitral proceedings.
  2. Amendments in Arbitral Proceedings:
    • Flexibility under Arbitration Law: Arbitral tribunals are not bound by the rigid procedural rules of the CPC and can allow amendments at any stage to resolve the real issues between the parties.
    • The amendment in question did not introduce a new cause of action or change the nature of the dispute but aimed to assist the arbitrator in resolving the case.
  3. Nature of the Amendment:
    • The amendment was necessary to bring relevant facts before the arbitrator during the proceedings and was consistent with the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy.
  4. Remedies Under Arbitration Act:
    • The petitioner was not rendered remediless, as the Arbitration Act provides a remedy under Section 34, allowing challenges to the arbitral award after its conclusion.

Court Rulings/Decisions

  1. Limited Scope for Writ Jurisdiction:
    • The Court ruled that it was unjustified to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to interfere with the arbitrator's interim order.
    • Such interference is permissible only in exceptional cases involving grave procedural irregularities or denial of justice.
  2. No Change in Cause of Action:
    • The Court held that the amendment neither altered the nature of the dispute nor introduced a new cause of action but aimed to assist the arbitrator in determining the core issues.
  3. Dismissal of Petition:
    • The writ petition was dismissed, with the Court emphasizing that arbitral tribunals operate with procedural flexibility to ensure justice.

Cases Referred

  • Serosoft Solutions Private Ltd. v. Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd. (2022): Established the principle that writ jurisdiction for arbitral orders is limited to rare and exceptional circumstances.

Legal Provisions

  1. Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution: High Court's powers to issue writs and supervise lower courts/tribunals.
  2. Section 23(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Permits parties to amend or supplement pleadings at any stage with the arbitrator's approval.
  3. Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC: Governs the amendment of pleadings to ensure all necessary issues are adjudicated.

Conclusion

The High Court reaffirmed that its interference in interim arbitral orders is restricted to exceptional cases of procedural irregularities or injustice. It highlighted the flexibility of arbitral tribunals in procedural matters, such as allowing amendments to determine real controversies. The Court dismissed the petition, reiterating the limited scope of Articles 226 and 227 and emphasizing the remedies available under the Arbitration Act.

Case Name: Rites Ltd v. M/s Supreme BKB DECO JV

Case Number: W. P. (C) No. 311 of 2025

3). Allahabad HC: Insulting a Political Party Not Linked to Religion Doesn’t Violate Section 295-A IPC

Case Background

  • Petitioner: Faraheem Qureshi
  • Respondent: State of U.P.
  • Charge: The petitioner was booked under Section 295-A IPC for allegedly posting a message on social media related to the 2019 Pulwama attack, which indirectly criticized the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
  • Dispute: The petitioner argued that the post was not intended to insult any religion or its beliefs but was a political comment. The case was filed, and the petitioner sought to quash the criminal proceedings, asserting that there was no intention to outrage religious feelings.
  • Settlement: The parties had settled their dispute amicably, and the petitioner sought the quashing of the case on these grounds as well as on merits.

Issue of the Case

Whether the posting of a message attacking a political party (BJP) indirectly in relation to the Pulwama attack could attract the provisions of Section 295-A IPC, which punishes acts intended to outrage religious feelings or beliefs of a class of citizens.

Court Observations

Bench: Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal

  1. Section 295-A IPC:
    The court referred to Section 295-A IPC, which makes it an offense to insult or attempt to insult the religion or religious beliefs of a class of citizens with deliberate and malicious intention to outrage their religious feelings.
  2. No Religious Connection:
    • The bench emphasized that merely insulting a political party or group not associated with any particular religion does not fall under the scope of Section 295-A IPC.
    • The court further observed that insulting a religion unintentionally, carelessly, or without any deliberate malicious intent would not attract the provisions of this section.
  3. Intent Matters:
    The court stressed that intent plays a crucial role in determining whether an offense under Section 295-A IPC is made out. For the section to be invoked, there must be an intention to outrage the religious feelings or beliefs of a class of citizens.
    • If the intention was to criticize or attack a political party or a group not associated with any religion, then it would not be a case under Section 295-A IPC.
  4. Analysis of the Alleged Post:
    • Upon reviewing the alleged post, the bench found that it did not contain anything that could be considered as insulting any religion or its beliefs.
    • The court further observed that the petitioner had posted no other message on social media that could attract the ingredients of an offense under Section 295-A IPC.

Court Rulings/Decisions

  • No Offense Under Section 295-A IPC: The court concluded that the impugned criminal proceedings should be quashed as no offense under Section 295-A IPC was committed.
  • The court held that the post in question was related to a political attack, not an attempt to insult religious feelings, and therefore the case was without merit.

Legal Provisions

  • Section 295-A IPC: This section penalizes deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage the religious feelings or beliefs of any class of citizens, either by words, signs, or representations. (Section 299 of BNS)
  • Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution: The right to freedom of speech and expression, which could also be considered in cases of political criticism, unless it involves incitement or outrage of religious sentiments.

Conclusion

The Allahabad High Court ruled that insulting a political party or group, which is not directly related to any religion or religious belief, does not attract Section 295-A IPC. The court quashed the criminal proceedings against Faraheem Qureshi, finding that there was no malicious intention to outrage any religious feelings. The case emphasizes the importance of intent in determining whether an offense under this section is committed.

Case NameFaraheem Qureshi vs. State of U.P. and Another (2025)

4). Punjab and Haryana HC Rules Appeal Under Section 37 of Arbitration Act Not Maintainable Against Order Under O.VII R.10 CPC

Case Background

  • Appellant: M/s Parsvnath Developers Limited
  • Respondents: Owners of land in Village Dharuhera, District Rewari
  • Contract: The appellant entered into a collaboration agreement on 27.10.2005 for the development of land into a residential colony.
  • Dispute: Disputes arose between the parties, leading the respondents to file a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for appointment of an arbitrator. On 05.02.2016, Justice R.M. Lodha was appointed as the sole arbitrator.
  • Arbitration Award: The award was passed on 21.09.2020.
  • Section 34 Petition: The appellant filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act in the court at Rewari, arguing that the jurisdiction to hear the petition should be with the courts in Delhi, as the arbitration proceedings took place there.
  • Order Challenged: The District Judge, Rewari passed an order on 06.08.2022 under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC, directing that the Section 34 petition be returned for presentation to the competent court in Delhi. The appellant appealed against this decision.

Issue of the Case

The main issue was whether an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, read with Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, is maintainable against an order passed under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC, directing the return of a Section 34 petition for presentation to the appropriate court.

Court Observations

Bench: Justice Arun Palli and Justice Vikram Aggarwal

  1. Jurisdiction Clause:
    The appellant contended that the jurisdiction to hear the Section 34 petition lies with the courts in Rewari, based on the jurisdiction clause in the collaboration agreement, which the appellant argued was separate from the 'venue' of arbitration. The appellant’s argument was that Rewari was the jurisdictional seat of arbitration, and therefore, the Section 34 petition should be filed there, not in Delhi.
  2. Interpretation of Venue and Seat of Arbitration:
    • The court noted that Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act allows a party to file a petition in the court that has jurisdiction over the seat of the arbitration.
    • The court discussed the difference between the venue and the seat of arbitration, stating that the venue of arbitration could be different from the jurisdictional seat.
    • The venue of arbitration does not automatically determine the seat, and the jurisdictional seat must be decided based on where the arbitration proceedings take place, which in this case, was Delhi.
  3. Section 37 of the Arbitration Act:
    The court referred to the judgment in BGS SGS Soma JV vs. NHPC Limited (as mentioned by the appellant), where the Supreme Court held that an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not maintainable against an order passed under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC (returning a petition for presentation to the appropriate court).
    The court emphasized that such an order is procedural in nature, and an appeal is not allowed at this stage.
  4. Maintainability of Appeal:
    The court dismissed the appeal, ruling that it was not maintainable. It was held that the order to return the Section 34 petition for filing in the appropriate court is procedural, and no appeal can be made against it under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Court Rulings/Decisions

  • The court relied on the BGS SGS Soma JV case, where the Supreme Court had already held that an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not maintainable against an order passed under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC.
  • Appeal Dismissed: The court concluded that the appeal was not maintainable and dismissed it.

Legal Provisions

  • Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Provides for filing a petition to challenge an arbitral award. The jurisdiction for filing this petition is determined by the seat of the arbitration.
  • Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Deals with appeals against orders passed under Section 34, except where the order is procedural in nature (e.g., return of a petition).
  • Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC: Deals with the return of a plaint when the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case.

Conclusion

The Punjab and Haryana High Court ruled that an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, read with Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, is not maintainable against an order passed under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC, which directed the return of the Section 34 petition for presentation to the appropriate court. The appeal was dismissed, and the court clarified the procedural nature of such an order.

Case Name: Parsvnath Developers Limited vs. Brig. Devendra Singh Yadav and others

Case Number: FAO-CARB-28-2022(O&M)

5). State Has Obligation to Provide Healthcare Facilities as Right to Health Is Fundamental: Karnataka HC

Case Background

  • News Report: A news article in The New Indian Express reported a shortfall of around 16,500 medical personnel in the state of Karnataka, which raised concerns about the state’s medical infrastructure.
  • Action Taken by Court: The Karnataka High Court initiated suo-motu Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in response to the article to address the shortage of medical personnel and infrastructure in the state.
  • Court’s Concern: The court highlighted the importance of healthcare as a fundamental right and the state's constitutional responsibility to ensure medical facilities are available at all levels—city, district, and rural areas.

Issue of the Case

The issue before the court was the shortfall of medical personnel and inadequate medical infrastructure in Karnataka, which was negatively impacting the state's ability to provide proper medical care, particularly in rural areas. The court aimed to ensure that the state government takes necessary steps to address these issues and strengthen medical facilities across the state.

Court Observations

Bench: Chief Justice N V Anjaria and Justice K V Aravind

  1. Right to Health as a Fundamental Right:
    The court emphasized that healthcare is a fundamental right under the Constitution, and the state has an obligation to ensure proper medical facilities for citizens. The court explained that to fulfill this right, the state must provide adequate medical personnel, infrastructure, medicines, and Primary Health Centres (PHCs) in rural areas.
  2. Medical Personnel Shortage:
    According to a report published in The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) in September 2023, there is a significant shortfall in medical personnel across the state, including:
    • 723 MBBS Doctors
    • 7,492 Nurses
    • 1,517 Lab Technicians
    • 1,512 Pharmacists
    • 1,752 Assistants
    • 3,253 Group D Employees
    • Additionally, there is a shortfall of 454 Primary Health Centres (245 urban and 209 rural) across Karnataka.
  3. Need for Effective Implementation:
    The court expressed its expectation that the State Government and the Department of Health and Family Welfare remain attentive and active in addressing the healthcare needs of citizens, especially in rural areas. The court emphasized that medical infrastructure and medical facilities should be made available at the doorstep of rural inhabitants.

Court Rulings/Decisions

  1. Formation of a Committee:
    The court directed the Department of Health and Family Welfare, Karnataka, to set up a three-member committee to:
    • Continuously oversee the implementation of medical facilities and infrastructure across the state.
    • Ensure the provision of medical personnel (both medical and para-medical) at all levels (city, district, and rural).
    • The committee will be headed by the Secretary of the Department of Health, and it shall meet every six months to review and assess the medical infrastructure and vacancies in various districts.
  2. Filling Vacant Posts:
    The court instructed the committee to:
    • Gather information on the number of vacant medical staff positions in Government Hospitals and Primary Health Centres.
    • Take steps to fill vacant positions and submit a timeline for filling the vacancies.
    • This process should be carried out every six months to ensure medical services are adequately staffed.
  3. Periodic Surveys and Upgradation of PHCs:
    The court directed the state government to conduct periodic surveys, especially of Primary Health Centres (PHCs) in rural areas, to:
    • Assess their upgradation needs in terms of medical facilities.
    • Decide on the establishment of additional PHCs based on the needs of villages.
  4. Coordination and Supervision of Health Schemes:
    The court instructed the Department to:
    • Coordinate and supervise the implementation of health schemes from both the Central Government (e.g., Ayushman Bharat) and the State Government (e.g., Karnataka State Integrated Health Policy).
    • Ensure proper budgeting and spending of funds allocated for medical schemes and infrastructure.

Legal Provisions

  • Article 21 of the Indian Constitution: Guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, which includes right to health and medical care.
  • Directive Principles of State Policy (Article 47): The State should raise the level of nutrition and standard of living and improve public health.

Conclusion

The Karnataka High Court took proactive measures to address the shortage of medical personnel and infrastructure in the state. It directed the formation of a committee to oversee the provision of medical facilities and staffing at all levels. The court also emphasized the state’s responsibility to ensure that rural areas are not neglected in terms of healthcare access and that the vacancy of medical posts is resolved promptly. The state's budgeting and execution of health schemes will also be closely monitored to ensure effective implementation.

Case Name: The Registrar General AND Union of India & Others


Add-On

Ex-CJI JS Khehar Awarded Padma Vibhushan; Senior Adv CS Vaidyanathan Awarded Padma Shri

The Padma Awards are among the highest civilian honors given by the President of India. These awards recognize exceptional and distinguished service in various fields like art, social work, public affairs, science, medicine, sports, literature, and education. The awards are announced annually on Republic Day.

There are three categories of Padma Awards:

  1. Padma Vibhushan – For exceptional and distinguished service.
  2. Padma Bhushan – For distinguished service of high order.
  3. Padma Shri – For distinguished service in any field.

Key Awardees:

  1. Justice JS Khehar:
    • Justice JS Khehar, former Chief Justice of India, has been awarded the Padma Vibhushan.
    • He served as the 44th Chief Justice of India from January 4, 2017, to August 27, 2017.
    • Justice Khehar was part of major legal decisions, including:
      • The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) case.
      • The Right to Privacy ruling.
      • The Triple Talaq case (where he dissented).
      • The Nabam Rebia case (restoring the Congress government in Arunachal Pradesh).
    • His contributions to public affairs and constitutional law were acknowledged with the Padma Vibhushan.
  2. Senior Advocate CS Vaidyanathan:
    • CS Vaidyanathan, a prominent Senior Advocate, has been awarded the Padma Shri.
    • He was recognized for his distinguished service in the field of public affairs.

Summary:

  • Padma Vibhushan is awarded for exceptional servicePadma Bhushan for high order service, and Padma Shrifor distinguished service in any field.
  • These awards were conferred on individuals who have made significant contributions in various sectors, including law, public affairs, and social work.

The announcement of these prestigious awards highlights the dedication and impact of individuals like Justice Khehar and Senior Advocate Vaidyanathan in their respective fields.

24th January, 2025