1). Supreme Court Upholds Jeweller’s Innocence in Stolen Gold Bars Case Under Section 411 IPC
Case Background
The case revolves around a financial fraud at Vijaya Bank, Nasik, in 1997, where fake Telegraphic Transfers (TTs) worth ₹6.7 crores were fraudulently deposited into a bank account opened under the fictitious name M/s. Globe International. The money was then withdrawn through bogus demand drafts and allegedly used to purchase gold bars.
During the investigation, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) traced the gold bars to various individuals, including the accused, Nandkumar Babulal Soni, a jeweler. He was charged under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for receiving stolen property.
Issues in the Case
- Whether the accused had possession of stolen property.
- Whether the prosecution could prove that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that the gold bars were acquired from fraudulent funds.
- Whether the conviction under Section 411 IPC was legally justified.
- Whether the seized gold bars should be returned to the accused.
Court Observations
Bench of Justices
The case was heard by a Supreme Court bench comprising:
- Justice BR Gavai
- Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra (who authored the judgment)
- Justice KV Viswanathan
Key Observations
- Possession Alone Does Not Prove Guilt: The Court ruled that mere possession of stolen property does not automatically make the accused guilty under Section 411 IPC. The prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that the property was stolen.
- Lack of Evidence Linking Gold Bars to Fraud: The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the gold bars as part of the fraudulently acquired assets. Without clear proof, the gold could not be considered "stolen property."
- Failure to Prove Criminal Intent: The prosecution could not complete the chain of evidence showing that the accused knowingly received stolen property. The Court emphasized that in criminal cases, guilt must be proven beyond all reasonable doubt.
- Reliance on Precedent: The Court referred to the case of Trimbak vs. State of M.P. (AIR 1954 SC 39), which set three conditions for proving an offense under Section 411 IPC:
- The accused had possession of the stolen property.
- Someone else possessed it before the accused.
- The accused knew the property was stolen.
Since these conditions were not fully satisfied, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused.
Court Rulings & Decision
- Conviction Set Aside: The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s conviction of the accused under Sections 120B (criminal conspiracy) and 411 IPC (receiving stolen property).
- Seized Gold Bars Returned: The Court ruled that since the prosecution failed to establish a link between the gold bars and the fraud, the seized gold (205 bars) should be returned to the accused.
Final Order
- The appeals (Criminal Appeal Nos. 581-583 of 2012) by Nandkumar Babulal Soni were allowed.
- His conviction and sentence under Sections 120B and 411 IPC were set aside.
- The seized gold bars were ordered to be returned to him.
Legal Provisions
- Section 411 IPC: Punishes those who receive or retain stolen property knowing or having reason to believe it was stolen. (Section 317(2) of BNS)
- Section 120B IPC: Deals with criminal conspiracy to commit an offence. (Section 61(2) of BNS)
Significance of the Judgment
- Clarifies the Scope of Section 411 IPC: This judgment reinforces that mere possession of suspected stolen property is not enough for conviction. The prosecution must prove knowledge or belief that the property was stolen.
- Sets a Strong Precedent for Future Cases: The ruling strengthens the principles of criminal law, emphasizing that courts cannot convict without conclusive evidence.
- Protects Innocent Business Owners: The judgment highlights the importance of protecting individuals from wrongful convictions, especially in financial fraud cases where assets may change hands multiple times.
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case ensures that innocent individuals are not convicted without proper evidence. It also serves as an important precedent in cases involving financial fraud, reinforcing the principle that criminal liability must be based on clear proof of guilty knowledge.
Case Title: NANDKUMAR BABULAL SONI VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. ETC. ETC.
2). Sanction Not Required to Prosecute Public Servants for Failing to Report POCSO Offences: Kerala High Court
Case Background
This case revolves around a government doctor (petitioner) who was accused of failing to report a POCSO (Protection of Children from Sexual Offences) offence, which led to a delay in the investigation of a serious crime.
According to the prosecution, a 13-year-old girl became pregnant due to penetrative sexual assault. The petitioner, who examined the victim on November 25, 2020, allegedly did not report the offence to the police. As a result, the crime was registered only on December 12, 2020, causing a three-week delay in the investigation.
The petitioner was charged under Section 19 read with Section 21 of the POCSO Act, which makes it a legal duty to report POCSO offences and provides punishment for failing to do so.
The petitioner filed an application seeking discharge from the case, arguing that under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), prior government sanction was required to prosecute a public servant. The Special Court dismissed the application, leading the petitioner to file a criminal revision petition before the Kerala High Court.
Issues in the Case
- Whether prior sanction under Section 197 of CrPC or Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) is required to prosecute a public servant under Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act.
- Whether the doctor's failure to report the POCSO offence justified criminal prosecution.
- Whether a prima facie case was made out against the petitioner.
Court Observations
Bench of Justices
- The case was heard by Justice A. Badharudeen of the Kerala High Court.
Key Observations
- No Prior Sanction Required for POCSO Offences
- The Court ruled that sanction under Section 197 CrPC or Section 218 BNSS is not required to prosecute a public servant for failing to report POCSO offences under Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act.
- Reason: Section 19 of the POCSO Act begins with a "non-obstante clause" (Notwithstanding anything contained in CrPC), which means it overrides other laws, including the requirement of sanction under CrPC or BNSS.
- Section 42A of the POCSO Act Does Not Apply
- Section 42A states that the POCSO Act is in addition to and not in derogation of other laws. However, the Court clarified that Section 42A does not apply to Section 19 because Section 19 specifically excludes other laws through its non-obstante clause.
- Therefore, no sanction is needed for prosecuting a public servant under Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act.
- Delay in Crime Registration Due to Non-Reporting
- The Court noted that the petitioner became aware of the victim’s pregnancy on November 25, 2020, but failed to report it.
- As a result, the police could register the crime only on December 12, 2020, leading to a three-week delayin the investigation.
- This delay weakened the case and hindered timely intervention.
- Prima Facie Case Exists Against the Petitioner
- The Court found that the doctor had a legal duty under Section 19 of the POCSO Act to report the offence but failed to do so.
- Since there was sufficient evidence to justify prosecution, the Court ruled that a prima facie case was made out against the petitioner.
Court Rulings & Decision
- Revision Petition Dismissed: The Court rejected the petitioner's request for discharge, stating that there was enough evidence to proceed with the trial.
- Sanction Not Required: The Court ruled that sanction under Section 197 CrPC or Section 218 BNSS is not mandatory for prosecuting a public servant under Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act.
- Trial to Continue: The petitioner will face trial for failing to report a POCSO offence, as per Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act.
Legal Provisions
- Section 19 POCSO Act: Mandates reporting of POCSO offences.
- Section 21 POCSO Act: Punishes failure to report POCSO offences.
- Section 42A POCSO Act: States that the Act is in addition to other laws but is excluded where a non-obstante clause exists.
- Section 197 CrPC: Requires government sanction for prosecuting a public servant only if the offence is committed in the discharge of official duties.
- Section 218 BNSS: Similar to Section 197 CrPC, requiring sanction for prosecuting public servants.
Significance of the Judgment
- Strengthens Mandatory Reporting of POCSO Offences
- The judgment reinforces that all individuals, including public servants, must report POCSO offenceswithout any legal exemptions.
- Public servants cannot avoid prosecution by claiming protection under Section 197 CrPC or Section 218 BNSS.
- Clarifies the Non-Obstante Clause in POCSO Act
- The ruling establishes that Section 19 of POCSO Act overrides CrPC and BNSS provisions due to its non-obstante clause.
- This ensures that reporting obligations under POCSO cannot be diluted by other legal provisions.
- Prevents Delays in Child Protection Cases
- The case highlights the negative impact of delayed reporting on victim safety and investigation effectiveness.
- The judgment sends a strong message that public servants who fail to report sexual offences against children will be held accountable.
The Kerala High Court’s ruling upholds the mandatory reporting obligation under the POCSO Act and clarifies that public servants cannot escape prosecution by citing protection under CrPC or BNSS. This decision ensures that offences against children are reported and investigated without unnecessary legal hurdles, reinforcing the importance of child protection laws in India.
Case Title: Dr Ditto Tom P. v State of Kerala
Case No: Crl.Rev.Pet No. 971 Of 2024
3). J&K High Court Rules Joinder of Charges Does Not Apply in Dishonored Cheque Cases with Consolidated Demand Notice (Section 219 CrPC)
Case Background
This case involves a dispute between the respondent (complainant) and the petitioner (accused) regarding dishonoured cheques.
- The respondent paid ₹20 lakhs to the petitioner to purchase a piece of land.
- Later, the respondent discovered that the land was mortgaged and asked for a refund.
- The petitioner issued four cheques of ₹5 lakhs each to return the money.
- However, when the respondent presented these cheques at the bank, they were dishonoured due to insufficient funds.
- The respondent then issued a single legal notice demanding payment for all four dishonoured cheques.
- When the petitioner failed to make payment within 15 days, the respondent filed a single complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
The petitioner challenged the maintainability of this single complaint, arguing that separate complaints should have been filed for each dishonoured cheque.
Issues in the Case
- Whether a single complaint is maintainable for multiple dishonoured cheques if a consolidated legal notice was issued.
- When does the cause of action arise in cheque bounce cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act?
- Whether multiple offences are committed when multiple cheques from the same transaction are dishonoured.
Court Observations
Bench of Justices
- The case was heard by Justice Sanjay Dhar of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court.
Key Observations
- Cause of Action Arises After Expiry of 15 Days from Demand Notice
- The Court clarified that the cause of action does not arise when a cheque is issued or dishonoured.
- It arises only after the accused fails to make payment within 15 days of receiving the legal demand notice.
- Single Complaint is Maintainable if a Joint Legal Notice is Issued
- Since the respondent issued a single legal notice for all four cheques, a single cause of action arose.
- Therefore, filing one complaint for all dishonoured cheques was valid.
- Only One Offence is Committed
- The Court ruled that when multiple cheques from a single transaction are dishonoured, it does not create separate offences.
- Since the petitioner failed to make the payment after the consolidated demand notice, only one offencewas committed, not four.
- Reliance on Legal Precedent
- The Court relied on the case Pawan Dhanpatrai Malhotra vs. Mahender Khari, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3951, where it was held that a single complaint is maintainable for multiple dishonoured cheques if a consolidated demand notice is issued.
Court Rulings & Decision
- Single Complaint is Legally Valid
- Since a joint demand notice was issued and the cause of action was the same, the single complaint was maintainable.
- Petition Dismissed
- The petition challenging the complaint was found to be without merit and was dismissed.
Legal Provisions
- Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881:
- Deals with cheque dishonour due to insufficient funds.
- Provides criminal liability if the accused fails to make payment within 15 days of receiving the demand notice.
- Judicial Precedents:
- Pawan Dhanpatrai Malhotra vs. Mahender Khari (2024 SCC OnLine Del 3951): A single complaint is maintainable for multiple dishonoured cheques if a consolidated demand notice is issued.
Significance of the Judgment
- Clarifies Cause of Action in Cheque Bounce Cases
- The judgment reinforces that the cause of action arises only after the accused fails to pay within 15 days of receiving the demand notice, not at the time of cheque dishonour.
- Simplifies Legal Procedure for Multiple Dishonoured Cheques
- Allows filing a single complaint instead of multiple cases if a joint demand notice is issued, reducing unnecessary litigation.
- Ensures Consistency in Cheque Bounce Cases
- The ruling aligns with legal precedents, ensuring that similar cases are treated uniformly across courts.
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court’s decision simplifies cheque dishonour proceedings by allowing a single complaint for multiple dishonoured cheques when a consolidated legal notice is issued. This ruling reduces legal complexities and ensures that cheque bounce cases are resolved efficiently.
Case Title: FAYAZ AHMAD RATHER vs TARIQ AHMAD WANI, 2025
4). NDPS Act: Rajasthan High Court Rules Judicial Custody Beyond 60 Days Without Chargesheet Is Unlawful & Directs Police to Obtain FSL Reports Within 60 Days for Legal Custody"
Case Background
- The petitioner (accused) was arrested in March 2024 in connection with an NDPS Act case.
- The seizure officer initially believed the recovered substance to be MDA based on his past experience.
- The contraband was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for testing.
- The FSL report, received in September 2024 (after 130 days), identified the substance as methamphetamineinstead of MDA.
- The recovered quantity of methamphetamine was 24.75 grams, which is below the commercial quantity limit of 50 grams under the NDPS Act.
- The charge-sheet was filed on September 12, 2024, while the FIR was registered on March 20, 2024 (the same day the petitioner was arrested).
The petitioner filed a bail application, arguing that his judicial custody beyond 60 days was illegal since the charge-sheet was not filed within the prescribed time limit.
Issues in the Case
- How long can an NDPS accused be kept in judicial custody without filing a charge-sheet?
- Does the time period for investigation depend on the FSL report?
- Is a seizure officer’s opinion sufficient to determine the nature of a contraband?
- Should FSL reports be expedited to prevent unnecessary detention?
Court Observations
Bench of Justices
- The case was heard by Justice Anil Kumar Upman of the Jaipur Bench, Rajasthan High Court.
Key Observations
- FSL Report is Critical in NDPS Cases
- The FSL report is the most important factor in an NDPS case, as the entire investigation and trial depend on it.
- In this case, the FSL report took 130 days, but the maximum period for completing the investigation was 60 days because the recovered quantity was below the commercial limit.
- Judicial Custody Cannot Exceed 60 Days Without Charge-Sheet for Non-Commercial Quantities
- As per Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., an accused can be kept in judicial custody for a maximum of 60 days if the quantity of contraband is below commercial.
- Any further remand beyond 60 days without filing a charge-sheet is illegal.
- Since the charge-sheet was filed only on September 12, 2024, the petitioner was kept in custody illegally beyond 60 days.
- FSL Reports Must Be Prioritized and Completed Within 60 Days
- The Court directed the Director General of Police (DGP), Jaipur to ensure that FSL reports in NDPS cases are obtained within 60 days.
- Proper coordination with FSL authorities should be made as life and liberty cannot be compromisedbeyond what the law allows.
- Seizure Officer’s Opinion Cannot Determine the Nature of Contraband
- The Court clarified that a seizure officer is not an expert under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act.
- A person’s liberty cannot be put at risk based on the seizure officer’s personal belief or experience.
- The FSL report is the only authoritative evidence regarding the nature of the contraband.
Court Rulings & Decision
- Bail Granted
- Since the petitioner was kept in custody beyond 60 days without a charge-sheet, the Court granted bail.
- Directions to DGP, Jaipur
- The Director General of Police, Jaipur, must ensure that FSL reports in NDPS cases are obtained within 60 days.
- Proper coordination with FSL departments should be maintained.
- The DGP must report on the steps taken to comply with this directive.
Legal Provisions
- Section 167(2), Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.): (Section 187 of BNSS)
- Allows judicial custody for up to 60 days for non-commercial NDPS cases and 90 or 180 days for commercial quantity cases.
- If no charge-sheet is filed within the prescribed time, the accused is entitled to bail.
- Section 45, Indian Evidence Act, 1872: (Section 39(1) of BSA)
- Defines who qualifies as an expert witness.
- The Court held that seizure officers are not experts in determining the nature of contraband.
- NDPS Act, 1985:
- Differentiates between small, intermediate, and commercial quantities.
- Determines the time period for filing charge-sheets based on the quantity of drugs recovered.
Significance of the Judgment
- Protects Accused from Illegal Detention
- Reinforces that judicial custody cannot be extended indefinitely without filing a charge-sheet.
- Sets a Clear Timeline for FSL Reports
- Directs that FSL reports should be completed within 60 days to prevent unnecessary delays.
- Clarifies the Role of Seizure Officers
- Ensures that only scientific evidence (FSL reports) determines the nature of contraband, not the personal belief of a seizure officer.
- Ensures Accountability of Police and FSL Authorities
- Holds police and forensic authorities responsible for ensuring timely submission of reports.
The Rajasthan High Court’s ruling reinforces the right to liberty by ensuring that NDPS accused are not kept in custody beyond 60 days without a charge-sheet if the seized quantity is below commercial limits. The Court’s direction to expedite FSL reports will help prevent unnecessary delays in investigations and protect the rights of the accused.
Case Title: Dheeraj Singh Parmar v State of Rajasthan
5). Karnataka High Court Rules Courts Cannot Extend Limitation Period on Grounds of Equity and Justice
Case Background
- The petitioner, Kailasam P, challenged the order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), which rejected his application to condone the delay in filing an appeal.
- The case relates to the sale of the petitioner's property by the bank under the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
- The petitioner filed an appeal on 24.05.2023 and also submitted an application for condonation of delay.
- The DRAT dismissed the delay application on 01.04.2024, ruling that it had no power to condone delays beyond 45 days.
- As a result, the appeal was also dismissed, leading to the present petition before the Karnataka High Court.
Issues in the Case
- Can the prescribed 45-day limitation period under Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act be extended?
- Does the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) have inherent powers to condone delay?
- Does the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to the DRT and DRAT?
Court Observations
Bench of Justices
- The case was heard by a Division Bench comprising Justice Krishna S Dixit and Justice G Basavaraja of the Karnataka High Court.
Key Observations
- No Power to Condon Delay Beyond 45 Days
- The Court referred to Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, which prescribes a 45-day limitation periodto file an appeal before the DRT.
- The Parliament has not provided any provision for condoning delays, no matter how justified the reason might be.
- Tribunals Do Not Have Inherent Powers
- The Court clarified that Tribunals, unlike conventional courts, do not have inherent powers to condone delays unless expressly provided by law.
- The Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) is not a court, and therefore, the Limitation Act, 1963 does not applyto it unless specifically mentioned.
- Limitation Period is Mandatory, Not Directory
- The petitioner argued that the 45-day period under Section 17 is directory (flexible), not mandatory.
- The Court rejected this argument, ruling that the prescribed period is strict and must be followed.
- If Parliament intended to allow condonation of delay, it would have included a provision like Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the SARFAESI Act.
- Policy Decision to Prevent Delayed Appeals
- The Court observed that law does not help those who are "sleepy & tardy" and fail to act within the given time.
- Parliament made a conscious policy decision to keep DRT and DRAT proceedings time-bound, ensuring swift resolution of recovery cases.
Court Rulings & Decision
- Petition Dismissed
- The Karnataka High Court dismissed the petition, holding that DRT and DRAT have no power to condone delay beyond the prescribed 45 days.
- Strict Interpretation of Limitation Laws
- The Court reaffirmed that laws of limitation must be applied strictly, even if they appear harsh to a particular party.
- Finality in Legal Proceedings
- The Court emphasized that while a welfare state must provide legal remedies, it cannot keep courts and tribunals open indefinitely for delayed claims.
Legal Provisions
- Section 17(1), SARFAESI Act, 2002:
- Provides a 45-day limitation period for filing an appeal before the DRT.
- No provision exists for condonation of delay beyond this period.
- Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963:
- Allows extension of limitation for sufficient cause but does not apply to tribunals unless expressly provided.
Significance of the Judgment
- Ensures Strict Compliance with Limitation Periods
- Prevents unnecessary delays in debt recovery cases.
- Clarifies the Limited Powers of Tribunals
- Reinforces that tribunals cannot exercise inherent powers like conventional courts.
- Strengthens Legal Certainty and Finality
- Prevents indefinite reopening of cases due to delayed appeals.
The Karnataka High Court upheld the strict application of limitation laws, ruling that DRT and DRAT have no power to condone delay beyond 45 days under the SARFAESI Act. This judgment reinforces timely legal action and prevents prolonged litigation in debt recovery matters.
6). Bombay High Court Rules Consent Vitiated If Promise to Marry Is Made to Deceive for Sexual Relations
Case Background
- The case involved Rupchand Shende (28), the accused, who was convicted of rape and offences under the POCSO Act by a special POCSO court in Bhandara district on September 9, 2022.
- The victim, a minor girl, filed an FIR in 2019, stating that the accused had forced her into a sexual relationshipby promising to marry her but later refused.
- The accused appealed against his conviction and 10-year sentence before the Bombay High Court.
Issues in the Case
- Was the victim’s consent obtained under a false promise of marriage?
- Does a false promise of marriage amount to a 'misconception of fact' under rape laws?
- Can the accused be convicted if the victim was a minor, even if she had consented?
Court Observations
Bench of Justice
- The case was heard by Justice Urmila Joshi-Phalke of the Bombay High Court.
Key Observations
- False Promise Led to Misconception of Fact
- The Court rejected the accused’s claim that the victim had a one-sided love affair and engaged in sexual relations on her own will.
- It held that the accused misled the victim by falsely promising marriage, which created a 'misconception of fact' in her mind.
- Such consent, obtained through deception, is not valid consent in law.
- Not a Simple Case of Breach of Promise
- The Court clarified that this was not merely a case of breach of promise but one where the accused never intended to marry the victim from the beginning.
- The promise was made solely to seduce and exploit her sexually.
- Consent of a Minor is Irrelevant
- Since the victim was below 16 years of age, her consent is legally irrelevant under the POCSO Act.
- The Court emphasized that any sexual relationship with a minor is statutory rape, regardless of consent.
- Medical & DNA Evidence Supported the Victim's Claims
- The DNA test confirmed that the accused was the father of the victim’s child.
- Medical reports further supported her claims of sexual assault.
Court Rulings & Decision
- Conviction Upheld
- The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the accused's conviction under rape laws and POCSO Act.
- It confirmed that false promises to marry, made with deceptive intent, vitiate consent.
- Consent Obtained Through Misconception is No Consent
- The Court ruled that a girl who engages in sexual relations under a false promise of marriage is not giving valid consent.
- Such a promise creates a misconception of fact, making the act non-consensual and punishable as rape.
- Strict Application of POCSO Act
- Since the victim was a minor, her consent was not legally valid, reinforcing the accused’s guilt under the POCSO Act.
Legal Provisions
- Section 375, IPC (Rape) (Section 63 of BNS)
- Defines rape and states that consent obtained through fraud or misconception is not valid.
- Section 90, IPC
- Clarifies that consent given under a misconception of fact is not true consent.
- POCSO Act, 2012
- Protects minors from sexual offences, making any sexual act with a minor punishable, regardless of consent.
Significance of the Judgment
- Reinforces Protection for Women Against Sexual Exploitation
- Clarifies that a false promise of marriage can invalidate consent, making the act punishable as rape.
- Strengthens Safeguards Under POCSO Act
- Emphasizes that consent of a minor is legally irrelevant, ensuring strict punishment for sexual offenders.
- Sets a Strong Precedent Against False Promises of Marriage
- Prevents exploitation of women under deceptive relationships, sending a clear message against abuse.
The Bombay High Court upheld the rape conviction of Rupchand Shende, ruling that his false promise of marriage led to a misconception of fact, vitiating the victim’s consent. Since the victim was a minor, her consent was legally irrelevant, making the accused guilty under the POCSO Act. This judgment reinforces the legal protection of women and minors against sexual exploitation through deception.
Case Title: Rupchand Shende vs State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal 155 of 2023)