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24th January, 2025

1). Supreme Court: Plaint with Multiple Reliefs Cannot Be Rejected Even if Some Reliefs Are Barred Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC

Case Background

The Supreme Court considered a case involving the SARFAESI Act where the plaintiff sought three types of reliefs before a Civil Court:

  1. Ownership and title of the suit property (used as collateral for a bank loan).
  2. Declaration related to ownership and title over the property.
  3. Restoration of possession of the property under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

While the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the first two reliefs, the third relief (restoration of possession) was barred by law. Under the SARFAESI Act, disputes related to possession must be decided by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), not the Civil Court.

Issue of the Case

Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) if one of the reliefs sought is barred by law, but the other reliefs are valid and within the Civil Court’s jurisdiction?

Court Observations

The Supreme Court made the following key observations:

  1. Partial Rejection of Plaints Not Permitted:
    • A plaint cannot be rejected partially under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
    • If at least one relief is valid and within the Civil Court's jurisdiction, the entire plaint must survive, even if another relief is barred by law.
  2. Adverse Observations Not Needed:
    • If the Civil Court concludes that one relief is barred by law, it should refrain from making adverse observations about that relief while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11.
    • The question of whether a particular relief is barred should remain undecided until the matter is properly adjudicated.
  3. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts:
    • In this case, the first two reliefs related to ownership and title of the property were not barred by law, and the Civil Court had jurisdiction over them.
    • The third relief concerning possession under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act was clearly barred, as such disputes must be addressed by the DRT.

Court Rulings/Decisions

The Supreme Court ruled:

  • A plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC merely because one of the reliefs is barred by law, as long as the other reliefs are valid and within the court's jurisdiction.
  • The Civil Court can proceed with the valid reliefs (in this case, the first two), while the relief barred by law (the third relief) will not affect the maintainability of the plaint.

Legal Provisions

  • Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC: Allows for rejection of a plaint where the suit is barred by law.
  • Section 34 of SARFAESI Act: Bars Civil Court jurisdiction for matters under the SARFAESI Act.
  • Section 17 of SARFAESI Act: Provides a remedy before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) for possession disputes.

The Supreme Court clarified that a plaint cannot be partially rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. Even if one relief is barred by law, the Civil Court must decide the other valid reliefs within its jurisdiction. This ensures fair adjudication without prejudicing valid claims.

Case Name: CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA & ANR. VERSUS SMT. PRABHA JAIN & ORS.

2). Supreme Court: DRT Cannot Restore Possession of Secured Asset to Anyone Other Than Borrower or Possessor Under SARFAESI Act

Case Background

The case revolved around Respondent No. 1, who neither borrowed nor possessed a secured asset but approached the Civil Court seeking handover of possession of the asset. The Civil Court rejected her claim, stating that only the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) could decide such matters under Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act.

The High Court, however, overturned this decision, stating that the DRT did not have the authority to grant handover of possession to Respondent No. 1, and her claim was rightly brought before the Civil Court. The Bank, dissatisfied with the High Court’s decision, appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue of the Case

  1. Can an individual who neither borrowed nor possessed a secured asset claim handover or restoration of possession under Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act?
  2. Does the Civil Court have jurisdiction over such claims, or are they barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act?

Court Observations

  1. Jurisdiction of the DRT Under Section 17(3):
    • Section 17(3) empowers the DRT only to “restore” possession, meaning it can return possession to a person who was in possession of the secured asset when the bank took over.
    • The DRT cannot “handover” possession to an individual who was never in possession of the asset.
  2. Limits of Section 17(3):
    • While Section 17(1) allows “any person aggrieved” to approach the DRT, Section 17(3) restricts the DRT’s powers to restoring possession to:
      a. The borrower, or
      b. Someone holding possession on behalf of the borrower or claiming through the borrower.
    • The DRT cannot grant possession to someone with an adverse claim to the borrower.
  3. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts:
    • The DRT lacks jurisdiction to entertain claims for handover of possession by someone who was neither the borrower nor in possession when the bank took over the asset.
    • A suit regarding title or possession of property is maintainable before a Civil Court and is not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.

Court Rulings/Decisions

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision and ruled:

  1. DRT Lacks Jurisdiction:
    • The DRT cannot grant relief for handover of possession to an individual who neither borrowed nor possessed the secured asset when the bank took over.
  2. Civil Court Has Jurisdiction:
    • Respondent No. 1’s claim for handover of possession was rightly brought before the Civil Court, as the DRT lacks authority in such matters.
  3. Relief Not Barred Under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act:
    • The Plaintiff’s suit in the Civil Court, including the third relief seeking handover of possession, was not barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.

Legal Provisions

  • Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act: Empowers the DRT to restore possession to a person in possession when the bank took over the secured asset.
  • Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act: Bars Civil Court jurisdiction for matters under the SARFAESI Act, except in cases related to title and possession of property.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the Bank’s appeal, affirming the High Court’s decision. It held that the DRT cannot hand over possession to someone who was never in possession when the bank took over the secured asset. Such claims can only be decided by the Civil Court, and the Plaintiff’s suit was valid and maintainable.

This judgment clarified the DRT’s limited authority under Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act and reinforced the jurisdiction of Civil Courts for claims involving title and possession.

Case Name: CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA & ANR. VERSUS SMT. PRABHA JAIN & ORS.

3). Allahabad HC Rules Place of Marriage Determines Jurisdiction Under Hindu Marriage Act, Not Reception Venue for Divorce Petition

Case Background

The case involved a divorce petition filed by the Appellant-Husband in the Family Court at Prayagraj. The Family Court rejected the petition, citing lack of territorial jurisdiction, as the couple’s marriage was solemnized in Pratapgarh, not Prayagraj. The appellant argued that because the couple hosted a marriage reception in Prayagraj, the Family Court there should have jurisdiction to decide the matter.

The Family Court found that the parties last resided as a couple in New Delhi, and not Prayagraj. The Appellant challenged this decision before the Allahabad High Court.

Issue of the Case

Can the place of a marriage reception be considered relevant for determining the jurisdiction of a Family Court under Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

Court Observations

  1. Jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act:
    • Clause (i) of Section 19 specifies that jurisdiction lies with the court within whose local limits the marriage was solemnized.
    • The place of reception is not mentioned as a criterion for determining jurisdiction.
  2. Facts of the Case:
    • The marriage was solemnized in Pratapgarh.
    • There was no claim that the couple last resided in Prayagraj; instead, they last resided in New Delhi.
  3. Irrelevance of the Reception Location:
    • Hosting a reception in Prayagraj after the marriage does not confer jurisdiction on the Family Court at Prayagraj, as it is unrelated to the solemnization of the marriage or the place where the couple last resided.

Court Rulings/Decisions

  1. The High Court upheld the Family Court’s decision that the Family Court at Prayagraj lacked jurisdictionbecause:
    • The marriage was solemnized in Pratapgarh, and
    • The couple last resided in New Delhi.
  2. The Court rejected the Appellant’s argument about the reception in Prayagraj being sufficient to confer jurisdiction. It clarified that only the place of marriage solemnization or last residence of the couple matters under Section 19(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
  3. The High Court stated:
    “The fact that a party was hosted later at Prayagraj, therefore, would not be relevant for the purposes of conferring jurisdiction of Family Court at Prayagraj.”

Legal Provisions

  1. Legal Provisions:
    • Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:
      Jurisdiction lies with courts within whose local limits:
      a. The marriage was solemnized.
      b. The respondent resides at the time of filing the petition.
      c. The parties last resided together as a couple.

    Conclusion

    The Allahabad High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Family Court's decision to reject the petition for divorce. It clarified that:

    • The place of marriage solemnization and the last residence of the couple are relevant factors for determining jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
    • The location of a marriage reception is irrelevant for conferring jurisdiction on a Family Court.

    This judgment reinforces the limited and specific criteria for jurisdiction under Section 19, ensuring clarity in matrimonial cases.

    Case Name: Anup Singh v. Smt. Jyoti Chandrabhan Singh [FIRST APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 29 of 2025]

    4). Muslim Wife Entitled to Maintenance Under CrPC When Living Separately Post Husband’s Second Marriage: Kerala HC

    Case Background

    The case involved a Muslim wife (first petitioner) and her two children (second and third petitioners) who sought enhancement of maintenance granted by the Family Court. The Family Court had earlier awarded a monthly maintenance of ₹4,000 to the wife and ₹1,500 each to the children.

    The petitioners approached the Kerala High Court, arguing that the maintenance was insufficient as the husband (first respondent) was earning a significant income working abroad.

    The husband contested this claim, stating he had returned to India, was earning only ₹8,000 per month working in a bakery, and had to maintain his second wife as well.

    Issue of the Case

    Can a Muslim wife residing separately because her husband contracted a second marriage claim maintenance, and can the maintenance amount be enhanced based on the husband’s alleged income?

    Court Observations

    1. Right to Maintenance of a Muslim Wife:
      • The Court reiterated that under Muslim law, a husband can contract a second marriage, but he is obligated to treat both wives equally.
      • If a Muslim wife resides separately due to the husband’s second marriage, she is not disentitled from claiming maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) or Section 144 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS).
      • The Court referred to Badruddin v. Aisha Begum (1957) to emphasize that the husband’s responsibility to maintain the first wife remains unaffected by his obligation to support a second wife.
    2. Husband's Income and Ability to Maintain Family:
      • The Court noted that the wife has no job or source of income, making her entirely dependent on the husband.
      • The husband failed to provide evidence of his claimed lower income or health issues.
    3. Legal Presumption for Able-Bodied Husbands:
      • The Court stated that an able-bodied husband is presumed to be capable of earning sufficient income to support his family. The onus was on the husband to provide proof that he could not fulfill his legal obligations, which he failed to do.
      • It relied on Rajnesh v. Neha & Another (2021), which establishes that adverse inferences can be drawn against a husband who does not provide evidence of his actual income.
    4. Husband’s Claim of Supporting Second Wife:
      • The Court clarified that the husband's obligation to maintain his second wife cannot reduce the maintenance payable to the first wife and children.

    Court Rulings/Decisions

    • The Kerala High Court enhanced the maintenance amount, recognizing the husband's presumed income and failure to disprove the claims made by the wife.
    • The maintenance was increased to ₹8,000 per month for the wife and ₹3,000 per month for each child.
    • The Court reiterated the legal principle that the responsibility to maintain the family lies with the husband, who must earn or provide sufficient income for the purpose.

    Cases Referred and Legal Provisions

    1. Legal Provisions:
      • Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC): Provides the right of maintenance to wives, children, and parents unable to maintain themselves.
      • Section 144 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS): Parallel provisions for maintenance similar to CrPC.
      • Muslim Personal Law: While permitting polygamy, it imposes an obligation on the husband to treat all wives equally.
    2. Cases Referred:
      • Badruddin v. Aisha Begum (1957): Affirmed that a Muslim wife can claim maintenance even if the husband marries again.
      • Rajnesh v. Neha & Another (2021): Highlighted the duty of the husband to disclose his income and drew adverse inferences against those who fail to do so.

    Conclusion

    The Kerala High Court upheld the right of a Muslim wife to claim maintenance even if she resides separately due to her husband’s second marriage. It emphasized the principle that an able-bodied husband is presumed capable of earning for his family and cannot escape his responsibility. The Court enhanced the maintenance amount to ensure adequate support for the wife and children, safeguarding their statutory rights.

    Case Number: RPFC NO. 334 OF 2022

    Case Name: Haseena v Suhaib

    5). Allahabad HC Rules Prosecution Withdrawal Requires Public Prosecutor’s Consideration Under Section 321 of Cr.P.C., Not Just Govt Order

    Case Background

    The Allahabad High Court dealt with a case where the applicant sought withdrawal of prosecution under Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The prosecution against the applicant involved allegations of extortion. The State Government had issued an order to withdraw the prosecution, but the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Basti, dismissed the application. The applicant challenged this decision in the High Court.

    The applicant argued that no case was made out against him based on the available material. However, the opposing counsel contended that the application filed under Section 321 CrPC did not specify reasons for withdrawal, nor did it demonstrate any public interest in doing so.

    Issue of the Case

    Can prosecution be withdrawn under Section 321 CrPC solely on the basis of a government order, without the public prosecutor providing reasons or considering public interest?

    Court Observations

    1. Role of Public Prosecutor in Section 321 CrPC:
      • The High Court emphasized that Section 321 CrPC requires the public prosecutor to independently apply their mind before seeking withdrawal of prosecution.
      • The application must include reasons indicating that the withdrawal is made in good faith, is in the interest of public policy, and promotes justice.
    2. Supreme Court Guidelines:
      • The Court referred to Abdul Wahab K. v. State of Kerala & Others (2018), which held that the public prosecutor must provide reasons or justify the withdrawal of prosecution in the application.
      • It also relied on State of Kerala v. K. Ajith & Others (2021), where the Supreme Court ruled that withdrawal of prosecution should be permitted only if it serves public justice and is in the public interest.
    3. Applicant’s Background:
      • The Court noted that the applicant had a criminal history, with 32 cases registered against him.
      • It observed that permitting withdrawal of prosecution against such an individual, based on an application lacking reasons or public interest, would undermine justice and harm public interest.
    4. Application's Deficiency:
      • The application filed under Section 321 CrPC was based solely on a government order, without any reasoning or independent opinion from the public prosecutor.
      • The Court held that such a withdrawal request is impermissible under the law.

    Court Rulings/Decisions

    • The Allahabad High Court upheld the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate's decision to reject the application for withdrawal of prosecution.
    • It ruled that withdrawal of prosecution cannot be allowed solely based on a government order.
    • The public prosecutor must independently assess the case and provide valid reasons in the application to justify withdrawal.

    Cases Referred and Legal Provisions

    1. Legal Provisions:
      • Section 321 CrPC: Allows withdrawal of prosecution with the permission of the court, provided the public prosecutor applies their mind and ensures it is in the interest of justice and public policy. (Section 360 of BNSS)
    2. Cases Referred:
      • Abdul Wahab K. v. State of Kerala & Others (2018): Highlighted the duty of the public prosecutor to provide reasons for withdrawal and ensure it is done in public interest.
      • State of Kerala v. K. Ajith & Others (2021): Stated that withdrawal of prosecution is permissible only if it aligns with public justice and public interest.

    Conclusion

    The Allahabad High Court dismissed the applicant's plea, affirming that prosecution cannot be withdrawn under Section 321 CrPC merely based on a government order. It emphasized the independent role of the public prosecutor, who must provide reasons and assess whether the withdrawal is in good faith and serves the interest of public policy and justice. The decision ensures that frivolous or arbitrary withdrawals, especially in cases involving habitual offenders, do not undermine the judicial process or public interest.

    Case Name - Dilip Singh vs. State of U.P. and Another 2025 

    23rd January, 2025