18th January, 2025

1).Supreme Court: Severity of Injuries Doesn’t Justify Lesser Punishment When Common Intention Is Proven

The Supreme Court bench comprising Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra ruled that the severity of injuries inflicted by individuals acting with a common intention cannot be a valid reason to reduce the punishment for one of the accused.

The Court was hearing THE STATE OF KARNATAKA VERSUS BATTEGOWDA & ORS., where the State appealed against the Karnataka High Court’s decision to modify the conviction of Accused No. 2 (K.B. Vijayakumar) from Section 326 IPC (voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons) to Section 324 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons).

Key Facts of the Case:

1. The incident involved Accused Nos. 2 and 3 (K.B. Vijayakumar and K.B. Jayakumar @ Suresh), who assaulted two victims (PW1 and PW7, father and son).
2. Both were armed with deadly weapons—Accused No. 3 carried a knife, while Accused No. 2 had a chopper.
3. The High Court reduced Accused No. 2's conviction to Section 324 IPC, stating that the injuries he inflicted were less severe compared to those inflicted by Accused No. 3.

Supreme Court’s Observations:

1. Common Intention and Section 34 IPC:
   The Court held that Section 34 IPC (acts done with common intention) applied since Accused Nos. 2 and 3 acted together. The less severe injury caused by Accused No. 2 does not absolve him of his equal role in the crime.
2. Pre-Meeting of Minds Not Required:
   Rejecting the defence's argument that the accused had no prior intention to cause such injuries, the Court explained that common intention can arise spontaneously during the incident.
3. Error in Reducing Conviction:
   The Court found the High Court’s decision to reduce the conviction of Accused No. 2 from Section 326 IPC (maximum punishment: 10 years) to Section 324 IPC (maximum punishment: 3 years) to be legally incorrect. It emphasized that the severity of individual injuries is irrelevant when common intention is proven.

Judgment:

The Court allowed the State's appeal and reinstated the conviction of Accused No. 2 under Section 326 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, sentencing him to two years of rigorous imprisonment (RI) and imposing a fine of ₹75,000, the same as Accused No. 3.

Accused No. 2 was directed to surrender within four weeks to serve the remaining sentence.

Relevant Sections:

• Section 326 IPC: Voluntarily causing grievous hurt using dangerous weapons or means (punishment up to 10 years). (Replaced by Section 118(2) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)
• Section 324 IPC: Voluntarily causing hurt using dangerous weapons or means (punishment up to 3 years). (Replaced by Section 118(1) of BNS)
• Section 34 IPC: Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. (Replaced by Section 3(5) of BNS)

This judgment highlights that when common intention is established, all participants in the act share equal liability, regardless of the degree of injury caused by each.

Case Title: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA VERSUS BATTEGOWDA & ORS.

2). "Rajasthan High Court: Police Privacy Cannot Block Accused’s Request for Call Records for Fair Trial in Trap Case"  

In a case concerning trap proceedings, the Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court ruled that the right of the accused to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution takes precedence over the right to privacy of police officials. This was in relation to seeking the call details and tower location information of mobile numbers under Section 91 of the CrPC.

Key Points:

1. Accused's Right to Fair Trial:
   The Court emphasized that the right of the accused to a fair investigation and trial is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. To ensure fairness, the accused can seek call details and tower location information of witnesses involved in the case.
2. Section 91 CrPC:
   Section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) allows a court to direct the production of documents or other items that are essential to the investigation or trial. The Court noted that this section is used to ensure that no material evidence is left undiscovered during legal proceedings.
3. Right to Privacy:
   While the right to privacy of police officials was a concern, the Court ruled that this right can be breached to some extent when it is necessary to uncover the truth and ensure a fair trial. The right to privacy does not outweigh the accused's right to a fair trial in this case.
4. Relevance of Call Details:
   The petitioner in this case argued that he was falsely implicated in an anti-corruption case, and the presence of certain witnesses was fabricated. To prove his innocence, the petitioner requested the preservation of call details and tower location records of two witnesses involved in the case. The trial court initially rejected this request, prompting the petitioner to approach the High Court.
5. Court's Ruling:
   The Rajasthan High Court allowed the petition, stating that tower location records were crucial for proving the facts in the case. Denying the accused access to this information would be a miscarriage of justice. However, the Court also emphasized that the accused must first demonstrate the necessity and relevance of the evidence before requesting such details.
6. Reference to Supreme Court Judgment:
   The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Suresh Kumar v. Union of India, where the Apex Court held that while call details can be accessed, irrelevant information should be blacked out to protect privacy. The Supreme Court also noted that only necessary information about the location of the numbers should be provided, excluding other sensitive data such as the contents of calls.

Conclusion:

In this case, the Rajasthan High Court ruled in favor of the accused’s right to seek relevant evidence for his defense, despite concerns over police privacy. The Court directed the trial court to summon the tower location details of the two witnesses, while ensuring that incoming and outgoing calls from those numbers were blacked out to protect privacy.

Relevant Sections and Articles:

• Section 91, CrPC: Allows a court to request documents or items that are necessary for the investigation or trial. (Replaced by Section 94 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023)
• Article 21, Constitution of India: Provides the right to life and personal liberty, including the right to a fair trial.
• Suresh Kumar v. Union of India (Supreme Court): Reference case regarding access to call details while protecting privacy.

Case Name: Narendra Kumar Soni v. State of Rajasthan

3). "Possession Under Agreement to Sell Does Not Confer Ownership Without Registration: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of India has clarified that mere possession of an immovable property under an agreement to sell does not grant the ownership of the property. The sale deed must be duly registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 for the transfer of ownership to occur.

Key Points:

1. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
   The Court reaffirmed that according to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act (TPA), an agreement to sell does not transfer the title or ownership of an immovable property. It only creates a contractual obligation to transfer ownership. The actual transfer of ownership only occurs when a sale deed is duly registered.
2. Registration Requirement:
   Under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, a sale deed must be registered for it to be legally binding, especially for immovable properties worth more than Rs. 100. This is essential for the transfer of ownership.
3. The Case Facts:
   • The dispute was over a property where there was an agreement to sell the property to a company. The company had possession of the property as part performance of the contract.
   • However, after the property owner’s death, his legal heirs executed the sale deed in favor of another person, not the company.
   • The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) had ruled that the sale deed was not binding on the company since the company had possession of the property under the agreement.
4. Supreme Court’s Ruling:
   The Supreme Court (bench comprising Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan ) disagreed with the NCLAT's decision. The Court stated that even though the company had possession of the property, it did not automatically lead to ownership because the property owner had not executed a duly registered sale deed in favor of the company. The company did not take legal action to enforce the agreement through a suit for specific performance of the contract with the legal heirs.
5. Court's Observation:
   The Court emphasized that until the owner executed a registered sale deed, he remained the legal owner of the property. As the original owner had not completed the transfer by registering the sale deed, the NCLAT could not have ruled that the sale deed executed by the legal heirs was not binding on the company.

Relevant Sections and Acts:

• Section 54, Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Defines the nature of an agreement to sell and emphasizes that it does not transfer ownership.
• Indian Registration Act, 1908: Requires that a sale deed for immovable property be duly registered for the transfer of ownership to be valid.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, emphasizing that possession under an agreement to sell does not grant ownership without a duly registered sale deed. The Court clarified that the company was not entitled to ownership simply because it had possession of the property, as the sale deed was not executed and registered by the original owner.

Case Name: INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK Vs. M.A.S SUBRAMANIAN & ORS.

4). Section 100 CPC: Supreme Court Asserts High Courts Can't Pass Interim Orders Without Framing Substantial Question of Law

The Supreme Court recently ruled that a second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) cannot proceed without first framing a substantial question of law. This decision came while the Court was hearing an appeal regarding an interim relief granted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in favor of the plaintiff.

The case was brought before the Court because the High Court granted an interim order to maintain the status quo (i.e., no change to the situation) without first framing any substantial questions of law. The High Court also extended the order without ensuring that all the respondents were properly served with notices.

The Supreme Court, comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, stated that, under Section 100 CPC, the High Court must first identify a substantial question of law before proceeding with the second appeal. Only after identifying such a question can the Court hear the appeal on its merits and decide on any interim relief. The Court emphasized that the High Court cannot grant interim orders in a second appeal without first framing the substantial question(s) of law.

The Court also referenced the case of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal (1962), where it was established that even in situations where the High Court might grant interim orders in exercising its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC, it cannot do so if it hasn't framed the required substantial question of law.

The Court clarified that the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal is triggered only when it has framed a substantial question of law. If no such question exists, the appeal should not be entertained and should be dismissed.

As a result, the Supreme Court set aside the interim order passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

Relevant Sections and Provisions:

• Section 100 CPC: Deals with second appeals and requires the framing of substantial questions of law before the appeal is heard.
• Section 151 CPC: Grants inherent powers to the court to make orders for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the court process.

Reference Case:

• Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal (1962): This case discusses the High Court's powers to grant interim orders under Section 151 CPC and the need to frame substantial questions of law.

Case Name: U. SUDHEERA & OTHERS VERSUS C. YASHODA & OTHERS

5). No Bar Under Order II Rule 2 CPC for Filing Second Suit When Relief Was Not Obtainable in First Suit Due to Exceptional Circumstances: Supreme Court

In this case, the Supreme Court examined the application of Order II Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which deals with the rule requiring a plaintiff to include all possible claims related to a cause of action in a single suit. The question at hand was whether a subsequent suit could be filed when the plaintiff had not claimed certain reliefs in the first suit due to circumstances beyond their control, such as a government order that prevented the plaintiff from seeking specific reliefs.

Facts of the Case:

• Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) had agreed to sell a property to Respondent No. 2 (defendant). However, Respondent No. 2 sold the same property to the appellant.
• Respondent No. 1 filed a first suit seeking a permanent injunction to prevent alienation of the property. However, due to a government ban on executing sale deeds in the village, Respondent No. 1 could not claim relief for specific performance of the agreement or recovery of possession at that time.
• After the government ban was lifted, Respondent No. 1 filed a second suit seeking these reliefs, which had not been claimed in the first suit.
• The trial court initially dismissed the second suit under Order II Rule 2 CPC, arguing that all claims should have been included in the first suit.
• The plaintiff appealed to the Madras High Court, which ruled in favor of the plaintiff, allowing the second suit to proceed.
• The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court's Ruling:

The Supreme Court, comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, upheld the High Court's decision and allowed the second suit to proceed. The Court observed that Order II Rule 2 would not bar the filing of a subsequent suit when the relief sought in the second suit became available only after a subsequent event (i.e., the lifting of the government ban).

Key Points:

1. Order II Rule 2 CPC mandates that a plaintiff must seek all claims arising from the same cause of action in one suit. However, if a particular relief was not available to the plaintiff due to circumstances at the time of the first suit (like a government ban), the plaintiff is not barred from seeking that relief in a subsequent suit once the circumstances change.
2. The Court found that when a subsequent event (like the lifting of the ban) gives rise to a new cause of action, the plaintiff can file a new suit for the relief that became possible only after the event.
3. The Court referenced the Rajasthan High Court's decision in Ramjilal v. Board of Revenue (AIR 1964 Raj 114) and the Allahabad High Court's decision in National Security Assurance Company Ltd. v. S.N. Jaggi (AIR 1971 All 421), both of which held that Order II Rule 2 does not prevent filing a subsequent suit when the cause of action arises later due to a new event.
4. In this case, the Court ruled that it was not possible for Respondent No. 1 to seek relief in the first suit because of the government ban. When the ban was lifted, it provided a fresh cause of action, allowing the second suit to be filed.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court concluded that the second suit was valid and could proceed, as the relief sought was only made available after the lifting of the ban. The Court emphasized that Order II Rule 2 CPC should not be applied rigidly when a new cause of action arises due to a subsequent event, and courts should interpret this rule in a way that ensures justice and fairness.

Relevant Sections and Cases:

• Order II Rule 2 CPC (Civil Procedure Code) – Requires a plaintiff to combine all claims arising from the same cause of action in a single suit.
• Ramjilal v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan (AIR 1964 Raj 114) – Held that subsequent suits are not barred if a new cause of action arises due to an event occurring after the first suit.
• National Security Assurance Company Ltd. v. S.N. Jaggi (AIR 1971 All 421) – Held that a subsequent suit filed after a new cause of action arises due to a change in circumstances would not be barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC.

The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's decision allowing the second suit was upheld.

Case Name: CUDDALORE POWERGEN CORPORATION LTD VERSUS M/S CHEMPLAST CUDDALORE VINYLS LIMITED AND ANR.