1). Supreme Court: S.161 CrPC Statement Must Be Proved Through Investigating Officer to Contradict Witness

Case Background

On February 13, the Supreme Court overturned a man's conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) because the trial court did not follow the correct procedure for contradicting prosecution witnesses during cross-examination. The case involved the use of witness statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which were not properly introduced as evidence.

Issues in the Case

The main issue was whether the trial court correctly handled contradictions between witness testimonies and their previous statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC. The defense had challenged the trial court's method of including these contradictions in witness depositions without proper verification.

Court Observations

A Supreme Court bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan found that the trial court made a critical error. The trial court had merely reproduced parts of the Section 161 CrPC statements in brackets within witness depositions without properly proving them through the investigating officer. The Supreme Court clarified that:

1. Proper Procedure for Contradictions: If a witness is contradicted using their previous statement (under Section 161 CrPC), the specific portion must first be introduced as evidence through the investigating officer before it can be considered.
2. Trial Court’s Error: The trial judge wrongly inserted contradicting statements into the deposition records without verifying them. Instead, the court should have marked these portions separately (e.g., as AA, BB) and ensured they were properly proven before including them in the deposition.
3. Legal Requirement: A statement made to the police (under Section 161 CrPC) cannot be directly treated as evidence unless it is formally presented through the investigating officer.

Court Ruling

Based on these findings, the Supreme Court quashed the previous judgments and acquitted the appellant of all charges. The Court emphasized that failure to follow the correct procedure had led to an unfair trial, warranting the conviction’s reversal.

Legal Provisions 

• Section 302 IPC: Deals with punishment for murder.(Section 103(1) of BNS)
• Section 161 CrPC: Covers statements made to police during investigation, which cannot be used as substantive evidence unless properly proved. (Section 180 of BNSS)

Significance of the Judgment

This ruling reinforces the importance of procedural fairness in criminal trials. It highlights that:

• Courts must strictly adhere to rules when using prior witness statements to challenge testimonies.
• Investigating officers play a key role in proving such statements before they can be relied upon.
• Any failure in procedural compliance can lead to wrongful convictions being overturned.

The Supreme Court’s decision ensures that criminal trials uphold due process. It serves as a reminder to trial courts to follow the correct legal procedures when handling contradictions in witness statements. This case sets a precedent for maintaining fairness and accuracy in judicial proceedings.

Case Name: Vinod Kumar versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

2). Supreme Court: BNSS Permits Free Supply of Chargesheet & Case Documents to Victims

Case Background

A petition was filed in the Supreme Court seeking directions to provide free copies of the chargesheet to complainants/victims and to ensure that they receive notice at the pre-trial stage. The petitioner argued that victims should have access to these documents to ensure fairness in criminal proceedings.

The Delhi High Court had earlier dismissed a similar petition, noting that some existing rules and standard procedures already allowed victims to obtain copies of chargesheets in specific cases, particularly those involving sexual offences against women and children. The petitioner then approached the Supreme Court, claiming that the issue was still unresolved, especially for cases where the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) was yet to come into effect.

Issues in the Case

1. Should victims/complainants receive free copies of the chargesheet?
2. Should victims/complainants be notified at the pre-trial stage when the court takes cognizance of the case?

Court Observations

A Supreme Court bench comprising Justices B.R. Gavai and A.G. Masih heard the case. During the hearing, Additional Solicitor General (ASG) Archana Pathak Dave informed the Court that Section 230 of BNSS already mandates that a free copy of the chargesheet must be provided to victims/complainants if they are represented by an advocate. Since this provision addresses the first issue, the Court found that this part of the petition had become irrelevant (infructuous).

Regarding the second issue of issuing notices to victims/complainants at the pre-trial stage, the Court ruled that under writ jurisdiction, it cannot direct the legislature to make or change laws. It reaffirmed the established principle that courts cannot interfere in legislative functions.

The Court also noted Section 360 of BNSS, which provides that before a prosecution is withdrawn, the concerned court must give an opportunity of hearing to the victim. This provision further strengthens victim participation in the criminal justice process.

Court Rulings/Decisions

• The Court disposed of the petition since BNSS already provides free copies of the chargesheet to victims, resolving the first issue.
• On the demand for pre-trial notice to victims, the Court declined to intervene, stating that it cannot direct the legislature to enact a law in a specific way.
• The Court also rejected a last-minute request to issue directions for cases that still fall under the old CrPC framework, stating that the matter did not warrant further consideration.

Legal Provisions 

• Section 230 BNSS (2023): Ensures free supply of chargesheet copies to victims/complainants if they are represented by an advocate.
• Section 360 BNSS (2023): Requires the court to hear the victim before allowing the withdrawal of prosecution. (Section 321 of CrPC)
• Section 207 CrPC: Previously only provided free chargesheet copies to the accused, not to victims.

Significance of the Judgment

This decision has clarified the legal rights of victims regarding access to chargesheets:

• BNSS has strengthened victim rights, eliminating the need for court intervention.
• Courts cannot legislate—they can interpret laws but not create new legal requirements.
• The ruling ensures that criminal trials remain efficient and are not delayed by unnecessary procedural requirements.

The Supreme Court’s decision upholds the principle that laws must be changed by the legislature, not the judiciary. It also reassures victims that free chargesheet copies will now be provided under BNSS, bringing greater transparency to the legal process. However, the demand for pre-trial notices remains unaddressed, meaning that victims will still not be formally notified when courts take cognizance of cases.

Case Name: Vivek Kumar Gaurav v. Union of India, SLP(C) No.7446/2024

3). Defence Counsel Has Right to Cross-Examine Child Witness Unless Liberty Is Abused: Kerala High Court

Case Background

The Kerala High Court was hearing a petition filed by an accused who sought permission to directly question a child witness during cross-examination. The accused also requested the removal of a screen placed between the child witness and the defense counsel by the Special Court.

The accused faced charges under:

• Section 452 IPC (House trespass)(Section 333 of BNS)
• Section 354A(i) IPC (Sexual harassment)(Section 75 of BNS)
• Section 10 POCSO Act (Punishment for aggravated sexual assault) read with Section 9(m) POCSO Act(Aggravated sexual assault on a child below twelve years).

The petitioner argued that:

• The POCSO Act does not mandate putting questions through the Special Court.
• Screening the defense counsel from the child witness is not provided under any law or guidelines.
• A fair trial requires the defense counsel to observe the child's demeanor to conduct effective cross-examination.

Issues in the Case

1. Can a child witness be screened from the defense counsel during cross-examination?
2. Does the POCSO Act allow the defense counsel to directly question the child witness?
3. Does screening the defense counsel from the child witness affect the accused's right to a fair trial?

Court Observations

A single-judge bench of Justice C. Jayachandran ruled that there is no legal provision in the new criminal laws, the POCSO Act, or the 2024 Guidelines for Recording of Evidence of Vulnerable Witnesses that allows the child witness to be screened from the defense counsel.

The Court emphasized that the legislature has not provided for such screening, meaning that it cannot be implemented as a general rule. However, the Court clarified that in exceptional cases, if a defense counsel misuses their liberty by making gestures or facial expressions that make the witness uncomfortable, the Special Court has the power to intervene.

The Court stated:

• If the defense counsel intimidates or discomforts the child witness, the Special Court should first issue a warning.
• If the defense counsel continues such behavior, then the Special Court can screen the witness as a preventive measure.
• This is not due to any statutory provision, but because the counsel has misused their rights in the trial process.

Court Rulings/Decisions

• Defense counsel cannot be screened from the child witness unless there is misconduct.
• The accused cannot directly question the child witness, as Section 33(2) of the POCSO Act prohibits it.
• The Special Court was directed to remove the screen between the child witness and the defense counsel to ensure a fair trial.

Legal Provisions 

• Section 33(2) POCSO Act: Mandates that defense counsel cannot directly question the child witness—questions must be put through the Special Court.
• Section 36 POCSO Act: Allows screening the accused from the child witness but not the defense counsel.
• Guidelines for Recording of Evidence of Vulnerable Witnesses, 2024: Do not provide for screening of the defense counsel.

Significance of the Judgment

• Ensures a balance between protecting child witnesses and safeguarding the accused’s right to a fair trial.
• Confirms that screening a child witness from the defense counsel is not legally permitted unless necessary due to misconduct.
• Reaffirms that cross-examination is essential and that defence counsel must be able to observe the witness’s demeanour.

The Kerala High Court ruled that child witnesses cannot be screened from defense counsel as a general rule. However, if a defense lawyer misuses their liberty by intimidating the witness, the Special Court has the power to take action. The Court upheld the accused’s right to a fair trial, ensuring that defense counsel can properly cross-examine the witness while still protecting vulnerable individuals in legal proceedings.

Case Name: Abdul Azeez v State of Kerala 

Case No: OP(CRL.) NO.630 OF 2024

4). Business Efficacy Test Can Be Used to Determine Arbitration Intent in Case of Ambiguity: Bombay High Court

Case Background

The Bombay High Court was hearing a petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The petition was filed by Lords Inn Hotels and Developers Private Ltd. (Petitioner) seeking the appointment of an arbitrator.

The dispute arose from a Hotel Franchisee and Management Agreement ("Resort Management Agreement") between the petitioner (Lords Inn) and Pushpam Resorts LLP (Respondent No. 1).

• The agreement was signed on February 10, 2021.
• Disputes emerged, and Pushpam sent a termination notice on October 8, 2024, ending the contract effective December 15, 2024.
• Lords Inn responded on October 26, 2024, claiming breaches by Pushpam and demanding withdrawal of the termination notice.
• Pushpam rejected this demand on November 26, 2024, and insisted that Lords Inn vacate the premises by December 15, 2024.

On December 7, 2024, Lords Inn invoked arbitration under Article XXIV of the agreement. Pushpam, in response on December 12, 2024, argued that there was no valid arbitration agreement as per Section 7 of the Arbitration Act.

Issues in the Case

1. Is there a valid arbitration agreement between the parties?
2. Can arbitration be implied even if the agreement does not explicitly provide for it?
3. Can the business efficacy test be applied to determine the parties’ intent to arbitrate?

Court Observations

A single-judge bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan examined the case and observed the following:

1. Arbitration Agreement Under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act

• Section 7(4) of the Arbitration Act states that an arbitration agreement is valid if it is in writing, signed by the parties, or found in email exchanges or other communication.
• Section 7(5) states that a reference to another document containing an arbitration clause can be treated as an arbitration agreement, provided it is clear that arbitration is intended.

The court analyzed Article XXIV of the agreement and found that it was ambiguous about arbitration.

2. Application of Business Efficacy Test

The business efficacy test helps courts determine the real intent of parties when an agreement is ambiguous. The test includes:

• Whether the implied term is reasonable and fair.
• Whether it is necessary for business efficacy (i.e., making the contract workable).
• Whether it was implicitly agreed upon (officious bystander test).
• Whether it is clearly expressed.
• Whether it is consistent with the contract’s express terms.

The court stated that it cannot rewrite contracts but can infer terms that are necessary to make business sense.

3. Intent to Arbitrate – Examination of Emails & Negotiations

• The court found that earlier drafts and email exchanges between the parties contained arbitration clauses.
• In the final version, the arbitration clause was omitted, but references to arbitration remained in three different provisions.
• This suggested that the omission was an oversight rather than a deliberate exclusion of arbitration.

The court held that ignoring these references would make the contract commercially absurd. Applying the business efficacy test, the court concluded that the parties had indeed intended to arbitrate disputes.

Court Rulings/Decisions

• The court held that arbitration was intended despite the ambiguous drafting.
• It ruled that the business efficacy test supported the existence of an arbitration agreement.
• The court appointed an arbitrator, allowing the petition.

Legal Provisions 

• Section 7(4) Arbitration Act: Recognizes arbitration agreements in writing, including those in emails.
• Section 7(5) Arbitration Act: Allows arbitration clauses to be implied through references in a contract.
• Nabha Power Ltd. v. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. (2018): Courts cannot override express contract terms, but must interpret them in a commercially logical way.

Significance of the Judgment

• Clarifies the role of the business efficacy test in arbitration agreements.
• Recognizes implied arbitration agreements based on negotiation history and correspondence.
• Prevents unfair outcomes where arbitration clauses are omitted due to oversight.
• Strengthens arbitration law by upholding party autonomy in dispute resolution.

The Bombay High Court ruled that arbitration was the intended dispute resolution mechanism, even though the agreement lacked a clear arbitration clause. The court applied the business efficacy test and appointed an arbitrator, ensuring that the dispute resolution process remained efficient and fair.

Case Name: Lords Inn Hotels and Resorts Versus Pushpam Resorts LLP and 3 Ors.

5). Mere Demand for Dowry Not an Offence Under Section 498A IPC and Simple Allegation of Intimidation Does Not Constitute Harassment: Delhi High Court

Case Background

The Delhi High Court was hearing a case where a wife had filed an FIR in 2019 against her husband, his parents, and some of his relatives, alleging cruelty under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The FIR included claims of dowry demands and intimidation by the husband's relatives.

The relatives of the husband (petitioners in this case) approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR, arguing that:

1. They were not immediate family members of the husband.
2. They never lived with the wife and had no reason to demand dowry from her.
3. The allegations against them were vague and lacked supporting evidence.

Issues in the Case

1. Can a mere demand for dowry be considered an offence under Section 498A IPC?
2. Does an allegation of intimidation automatically amount to harassment under Section 498A?
3. Can distant relatives, who never lived with the wife, be implicated in a case of dowry harassment?

Court Observations

A single-judge bench of Justice Amit Mahajan reviewed the case and made the following observations:

1. FIR Allegations Against Relatives Were Vague

• The wife’s FIR was detailed and ran into several pages, but it lacked specific evidence against the husband's relatives.
• The petitioners were not living with the wife, making it unlikely that they directly harassed her.
• The allegations seemed exaggerated, and the relatives appeared to be dragged into the case unnecessarily.

2. Mere Demand for Dowry is Not an Offence Under Section 498A

• The Court clarified that Section 498A IPC punishes cruelty, not just the demand for dowry.
• For an offence under Section 498A, the demand must be coupled with harassment or cruelty.

3. Intimidation Allegations Did Not Amount to Cruelty

• The wife claimed that the husband's relatives intimidated her by threatening to break the marriage if she did not fulfill the dowry demands.
• However, the Court ruled that this alone does not meet the legal standard for ‘cruelty’ under Section 498A IPC.
• The Court noted that the relatives were justifying the demand as an investment, rather than being aggressive towards the wife.

4. Tendency to Implicate All Relatives in Dowry Cases

• The Court observed a common trend where litigants include the husband’s entire family in dowry cases, even if they were not involved in the dispute.
• In this case, the relatives were not aggressors, and the wife’s parents even approached them for mediation.

Court Rulings/Decisions

• The FIR against the husband's relatives was quashed due to lack of specific evidence.
• The Court ruled that:
  • Mere demand for dowry does not amount to cruelty under Section 498A IPC.
  • A simple allegation of intimidation does not constitute harassment under the law.

Legal Provisions 

• Section 498A IPC (Cruelty by Husband or Relatives): Punishes a husband or his relatives for cruelty towards a wife, which includes harassment for dowry. (Section 85 and 86 of BNS)
• Quashing of FIR: The court has the power to quash an FIR if it finds the allegations vague or without legal merit.

Significance of the Judgment

• Clarifies that not all dowry demands amount to a criminal offence under Section 498A IPC.
• Protects innocent relatives from being falsely implicated in dowry harassment cases.
• Emphasizes that vague allegations without evidence should not lead to prosecution.
• Recognizes the misuse of dowry laws by some litigants to drag in extended family members.

The Delhi High Court quashed the FIR against the husband’s relatives, ruling that mere demand for dowry does not constitute cruelty under Section 498A IPC, and vague allegations of intimidation do not amount to harassment. The judgment reinforces the principle that criminal prosecution must be based on clear and specific evidence.

Case Name: VANEETA GUPTA & ANR v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR

6). No Need for Registered Deed to Adopt Hindu Child in Hindu Family: Punjab & Haryana High Court

Case Background

The Punjab & Haryana High Court was hearing a case related to compassionate appointment in the Railways. The case involved Sukhpreet Kaur, an adopted daughter, whose application for a government job was rejected because her Class 10th certificate mentioned the names of her biological parents instead of her adoptive parents.

The Union Government challenged an earlier decision by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), which had directed the government to consider Sukhpreet Kaur’s case for compassionate appointment. The Union argued that her adoption was not valid under law since the adoption deed was registered in 2017 when she was already an adult(above 18 years), even though it stated that the adoption actually took place in 2010.

Issues in the Case

1. Can a Hindu child be legally adopted without a registered adoption deed under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956?
2. Does the lack of an adoptive parent’s name in the Class 10th certificate invalidate the adoption?
3. Can an adopted child be denied compassionate appointment on the ground that her adoption was not legally recognized?

Court Observations

A division bench of Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma and Justice Meenakshi I. Mehta reviewed the case and made the following key observations:

1. Adoption Can Be Valid Even Without a Registered Deed

• The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, allows adoption through a formal adoption deed or even without a deed, as long as the legal process of giving and taking in adoption has been followed.
• An adoption that takes place through customary methods or through a simple act of giving and taking between the biological and adoptive parents can later be documented in writing and registered.

2. Lack of Adoptive Parents' Names in Class 10th Certificate Does Not Invalidate Adoption

• Since Sukhpreet Kaur’s adoption was not registered when she was in Class 10, it was natural for her school records to reflect the names of her biological parents.
• The Punjab School Education Board and similar authorities require a registered adoption deed to update records.
• The absence of her adoptive parents’ names in her school certificate does not mean that the adoption was not legally valid.

3. Presumption of Validity of a Registered Adoption Deed

• The Court referred to Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, which states that once an adoption deed is registered, it is presumed to be valid unless proven otherwise.
• Therefore, Sukhpreet Kaur’s adoption was legally valid, and she had the right to be considered for compassionate appointment.

4. Age of the Adopted Child at the Time of Deed Registration is Not the Key Factor

• The Court clarified that although Sukhpreet Kaur’s adoption deed was registered in 2017 when she was over 20 years old, the document clearly stated that the actual adoption took place in 2010, when she was still a minor.
• A delay in registering the adoption deed does not invalidate the adoption.

Court Rulings/Decisions

• The Union Government’s argument that the adoption was invalid because the deed was registered after Kaur became an adult was rejected.
• The Court ruled that a compassionate appointment cannot be denied solely on the basis of school records that do not mention the adoptive parents.
• The Union Government’s petition was dismissed, upholding the CAT's order directing the government to consider Sukhpreet Kaur for compassionate appointment.

Legal Provisions 

• Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956: Governs the rules and procedures for adoption among Hindus.
• Section 16 of the Act: Presumes an adoption to be valid if an adoption deed is registered.
• Compassionate Appointment Rules: Allow dependents of deceased government employees to seek jobs under special provisions.

Significance of the Judgment

• Reinforces that adoption under Hindu law can be valid even without a registered deed.
• Protects the rights of adopted children, ensuring they are not denied government benefits or employment opportunities based on technicalities.
• Clarifies that school records do not determine the legality of an adoption.
• Prevents misuse of procedural delays to deny legal rights to adopted children.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court ruled that a Hindu child can be legally adopted even without a registered adoption deed, as long as the legal process of adoption is followed. The Court dismissed the Union Government’s plea and directed that Sukhpreet Kaur should be considered for compassionate appointment, affirming that delayed registration of adoption does not make it invalid.

Case Name: Union of India and another v. Sukhpreet Kaur and another