1). Supreme Court: Permanent Alimony & Interim Maintenance Allowed Even in Void Marriages Under Hindu Marriage Act & SC Slams Misogynistic Language in Judgments: Terms Like ‘Illegitimate Wife’ & ‘Faithful Mistress’ Violate Women's Rights

Case Background

The Supreme Court was answering a reference regarding whether a spouse can claim permanent alimony and interim maintenance under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) even if their marriage has been declared void under Section 11 of the Act.

During the hearing, the Court came across a 2004 judgment of the Bombay High Court in Bhausaheb @ Sandhu S/o Raguji Magar vs. Leelabai W/o Bhausaheb Magar (AIR Bom. 283 (FB)) which had referred to a woman in a void marriage as a “faithful mistress” and “illegitimate wife”.

The Supreme Court strongly disapproved of such language, calling it misogynistic and unconstitutional.

This issue arose due to conflicting Supreme Court decisions on whether Section 25 (permanent alimony) and Section 24 (interim maintenance) apply in cases where the marriage itself is legally invalid.

A 2-judge bench led by Justice Vikram Nath had referred the matter to a larger bench for clarity.

Issues in the Case

1. Can a spouse claim permanent alimony under Section 25 of HMA if their marriage has been declared void?
2. Can interim maintenance be granted under Section 24 of HMA if a marriage is void or voidable?
3. Is the use of terms like “faithful mistress” and “illegitimate wife” in judicial orders appropriate and constitutional?

Court Observations

Bench Composition:

The case was decided by a 3-judge bench comprising:

• Justice Abhay S. Oka
• Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
• Justice Augustine George Masih

Regarding Permanent Alimony (Section 25, HMA)

The Supreme Court ruled that:

• A spouse whose marriage is declared void under Section 11 can still claim permanent alimony or maintenanceunder Section 25.
• Whether alimony should be granted depends on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties.
• The relief under Section 25 is discretionary, meaning the court decides based on fairness and circumstances.

Rejecting the argument that Section 25 does not apply to void marriages, the Court clarified:

• A decree of nullity (declaring a marriage void) is still a "decree" under Section 25, so it does not prevent a spouse from seeking alimony.
• The legislature made no distinction between a divorce decree and a decree declaring a marriage null and void.

Regarding Interim Maintenance (Section 24, HMA)

The Court also ruled that:

• Even if the court prima facie (at first glance) finds a marriage void or voidable, it can still grant interim maintenance under Section 24 while the case is pending.
• The conduct of the party seeking maintenance will be considered before granting relief.
• Like Section 25, relief under Section 24 is also discretionary.

Regarding Misogynistic Language in Judgments

The Supreme Court criticized the Bombay High Court for using disrespectful terms for a woman in a void marriage, stating:

• Every person has a fundamental right to dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution.
• Referring to a woman as a “faithful mistress” or “illegitimate wife” is a violation of her fundamental rights and goes against the values of the Constitution.
• The Court noted that such adjectives were not used for men in similar situations, highlighting gender bias in judicial language.
• The Full Bench ruling of the Bombay High Court was legally incorrect, and its language was misogynistic.

Court Rulings & Decisions

• The Supreme Court rejected the argument that a spouse in a void marriage cannot seek maintenance.
• It held that permanent alimony and interim maintenance can be granted even if a marriage is declared void.
• The reference was answered accordingly, confirming that courts have the discretion to grant maintenance in such cases.
• Held that courts must use gender-sensitive language in judgments.

Legal Provisions 

• Section 11, HMA – Declares a marriage void if it involves bigamy, prohibited relationships, or sapinda relationships.
• Section 25, HMA – Allows a court to grant permanent alimony after passing "any decree" under the Act.
• Section 24, HMA – Provides for interim maintenance during pending matrimonial proceedings.

Significance of the Judgment

• This ruling clarifies an important legal question and settles conflicting views in previous judgments.
• It ensures financial protection for spouses even if their marriage is later declared void.
• The judgment reinforces the discretionary powers of courts in granting maintenance based on justice and fairness.

The Supreme Court has confirmed that a spouse in a void marriage can claim maintenance under Sections 25 and 24 of HMA, provided the facts justify it. Courts will have the discretion to decide such cases based on the conduct of parties and circumstances.

Case Name: SUKHDEV SINGH v SUKHBIR KAUR

2). Supreme Court Clarifies CPC Order XXII Rule 4: No Need for Separate Application to Set Aside Abatement If Legal Heirs Are Substituted

Case Background

The Supreme Court addressed a case where a second appeal had abated because the legal heirs of a deceased litigant were not substituted in time. The High Court refused to restore the appeal, stating that a separate application to set aside the abatement was necessary, even though the legal heirs had already filed an application for substitution.

The legal representatives (LRs) of the deceased party challenged this decision, arguing that their substitution application itself implied a request to set aside the abatement.

Issues in the Case

1. Is a separate application required to set aside abatement when a substitution application for legal heirs has already been filed?
2. Can the prayer for substitution be interpreted as an implied request to set aside the abatement?

Court Observations

Bench Composition:

The case was decided by a bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and P.K. Mishra.

Key Observations by the Court:

• If a party dies during litigation, their legal heirs must be substituted within the prescribed time under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
• The High Court wrongly insisted that a separate application was necessary to set aside the abatement.
• The Supreme Court emphasized a justice-oriented approach, stating that when legal heirs apply for substitution, their request should also be treated as an implied request to set aside abatement.

The Court referred to its earlier ruling in Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini (2003) 10 SCC 691, which held that:

“A simple prayer for bringing the legal representatives on record, even without explicitly asking for setting aside abatement, can be construed as an implicit prayer for setting aside abatement.”

Based on this principle, the Court ruled that:

• Filing a substitution application is enough—a separate application to set aside the abatement is not required.
• If substitution is allowed, abatement is automatically set aside since the effect of setting aside the abatement is inherently included in the substitution request.

Court Rulings & Decisions

• The High Court’s decision was set aside.
• The appeal was restored, and the abatement was declared void.
• The Court reiterated that technical objections should not prevent justice, and procedural requirements must be interpreted in a fair and just manner.

Legal Provisions 

• Order XXII Rule 4, CPC – Governs substitution of legal heirs in ongoing litigation when a party dies.
• Principle from Mithailal Dalsangar Singh case (2003) – Substitution applications inherently include a request to set aside abatement.

Significance of the Judgment

• Prevents unnecessary delays and procedural hurdles in cases where litigants fail to file a separate abatement application.
• Reinforces a justice-oriented approach, ensuring that genuine claims are not dismissed on technical grounds.
• Provides clarity on how courts should handle substitution applications when a litigant dies during proceedings.

The Supreme Court has made it clear that courts should focus on substantive justice rather than technicalities. If legal heirs apply for substitution, their request should automatically be considered as a request to set aside abatement, preventing unnecessary litigation delays.

Case Name: OM PRAKASH GUPTA ALIAS LALLOOWA (NOW DECEASED) & ORS. VERSUS SATISH CHANDRA (NOW DECEASED) & Connected Matter

3). Supreme Court: Article 226|Writ Court Can Decline Action Against Illegality to Ensure Substantial Justice

Case Background

This case involved a property auction conducted by a bank after the borrower defaulted on a loan. The appellant was the successful bidder in the auction held in 2007. The bank issued a sale certificate, and the appellant took possession of the property.

However, in 2008, the guarantor of the loan (respondent) filed a challenge against the auction, arguing that the bank did not issue a 15-day auction notice as required by law. The borrower himself did not challenge the auction, but the guarantor approached the High Court through a writ petition.

The High Court ruled in favor of the guarantor, declaring the auction illegal due to the procedural defect. Aggrieved by this decision, the auction purchaser (appellant) approached the Supreme Court.

Issues in the Case

1. Can a writ court interfere in cases where a statutory violation has occurred, even if no actual injustice is caused?
2. Should the High Court have considered the practical implications of setting aside an auction that had been finalized long ago?

Court Observations

Bench Composition:

The case was decided by a bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan.

Key Observations by the Court:

• Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary. The High Court is not required to interfere in every case of technical or procedural violation.
• The High Court should have considered the practical impact of its decision, as the auction had already attained finality in 2007, and the appellant had invested significantly in the property.
• The Court placed reliance on Shiv Shanker Dal Mills v. State of Haryana (1980) 2 SCC 437, stating that:

  “Legal formulations cannot be enforced in isolation from the realities of a case. The High Court must consider equitable factors when exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction.”

• The Court noted that the guarantor waited until 2008 to challenge the auction, even though the borrower himself never questioned its validity.
• The appellant had already spent Rs. 1.5 crore on developing the property, making it unfair to cancel the auction on a mere procedural lapse.

Court Rulings & Decisions

• The High Court’s decision was set aside, and the auction was upheld.
• The Court held the respondent responsible for dragging the appellant into unnecessary litigation but refrained from imposing costs.
• The Supreme Court reiterated that writ courts should focus on delivering substantial justice rather than strictly enforcing technical legal violations.

Legal Provisions 

• Article 226 of the Constitution – Gives High Courts discretionary power to issue writs for enforcement of rights and laws.
• Principle from Shiv Shanker Dal Mills case (1980) – Writ courts must balance legality with practical and equitable considerations.

Significance of the Judgment

• Reinforces that writ courts should not interfere in cases of mere technical violations unless real injustice is caused.
• Protects bona fide auction purchasers from frivolous litigation, ensuring that finalized transactions are not disturbed after long delays.
• Encourages a practical approach in judicial review, preventing courts from acting as mere appellate bodies for every procedural error.

The Supreme Court upheld the auction and criticized the High Court for failing to consider the practical realities of the case. It emphasized that writ jurisdiction should be exercised judiciously and equitably, rather than mechanically invalidating actions based on minor technical lapses.

Case Name: M.S. SANJAY v. INDIAN BANK & ORS., CIVIL APPEAL NO.1188/2025

4). Bombay High Court: No Fundamental Rights Violation If Grounds of Arrest Given Within Four Minutes

Case Background

This case involved a rape accused challenging the legality of his arrest. The accused was arrested on November 21, 2024, at 10:56 PM by Mumbai Police and was given a written copy of the grounds of his arrest at 11:00 PM—a delay of four minutes.

The accused argued that this delay violated his fundamental rights under the Constitution, as he was not informed of the grounds of arrest "at the time of arrest," as required by law.

A Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) ruled in favor of the accused, citing the Supreme Court judgment in Prabir Purkayastha v. State, which mandates that grounds of arrest must be given in writing at the time of arrest. The JMFC held that the four-minute delay was a breach of the accused’s fundamental rights.

However, the Dindoshi Sessions Court overturned this ruling on December 24, 2024. It held that a four-minute delay was reasonable and did not violate fundamental rights. The Sessions Court then ordered the immediate re-arrest of the accused.

The accused challenged this order before the Bombay High Court.

Issues in the Case

1. Does a four-minute delay in providing written grounds of arrest violate fundamental rights?
2. Should the courts strictly interpret "at the time of arrest" to mean simultaneous provision of written grounds?

Court Observations

Bench Composition:

The case was decided by a single-judge bench of Justice Dr. Neela Gokhale.

Key Observations by the High Court:

• The police followed the legally required procedure by serving the grounds of arrest within four minutes.
• The diary entry and contemporaneous records showed no intentional delay or attempt to suppress information.
• The four-minute gap is not unreasonable and does not amount to a violation of fundamental rights.
• The court distinguished the case from the Prabir Purkayastha ruling, emphasizing that the law should be applied practically, considering real-world factors.

Court Rulings & Decisions

• The Dindoshi Sessions Court’s order was upheld.
• The High Court ruled that a four-minute delay is reasonable and does not violate fundamental rights.
• The challenge by the accused was dismissed, and the police action was found to be lawful.

Legal Provisions 

• Article 21 of the Constitution – Right to life and personal liberty, which includes protection from unlawful detention.
• Prabir Purkayastha v. State – Supreme Court ruling stating that grounds of arrest must be given at the time of arrest.
• Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) Section 50 – Requires that a person arrested must be informed of the reasons for their arrest immediately. (Section 47 of BNSS)

Significance of the Judgment

• Clarifies that minor procedural delays (like four minutes) do not automatically violate fundamental rights.
• Prevents misuse of procedural technicalities to challenge valid arrests.
• Ensures law enforcement officers are given practical flexibility while following legal mandates.
• Sets a precedent for interpreting procedural requirements in a reasonable manner rather than rigidly.

The Bombay High Court ruled that a four-minute delay in providing written grounds of arrest is reasonable and does not violate the fundamental rights of the accused. The decision emphasises a practical approach to procedural compliance and upholds the legality of the arrest.

Case Name: Gunwant Tarachand Jain @ Nikesh Madhani vs State of Maharashtra (Criminal Writ Petition 393 of 2025)

5). Chhattisgarh High Court: Husband Cannot Be Prosecuted Under Section 377 IPC for Unnatural Sex with Wife|No Offence Under Section 377 IPC If Exception 2 to Section 375 Applies

Case Background

The case involved a husband accused of committing unnatural sex with his wife against her will. On December 11, 2017, the husband allegedly inserted his hand into the victim's anus, causing severe pain. The victim was hospitalizedand later died due to peritonitis and rectal perforation, as confirmed by the post-mortem report.

A First Information Report (FIR) was registered under Section 377 IPC (unnatural offences). Before her death, the victim gave a dying declaration stating that her husband had forced her into unnatural sex, leading to her medical condition.

The Trial Court convicted the husband under the following sections:

• Section 377 IPC (unnatural offences)
• Section 376 IPC (rape) (Section 64 of BNS)
• Section 304 IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) (Section 105 of BNS)

The trial court sentenced him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. The husband appealed to the Chhattisgarh High Court against this conviction.

Issues in the Case

1. Can a husband be convicted for unnatural sex with his wife under Section 377 IPC?
2. Does Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC (which exempts husbands from rape charges) override Section 377 IPC?

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by a single-judge bench of Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas.

Key Observations

• Section 375 IPC (rape law) states that a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife (if she is over 18 years old).
• Since penetration into the vagina, urethra, or anus is already included in Section 375 IPC, unnatural sex between husband and wife cannot be separately punished under Section 377 IPC.
• There is a contradiction ("repugnancy") between Section 375 IPC (which grants immunity to husbands) and Section 377 IPC (which criminalizes unnatural sex).
• The Court questioned, "If every sexual act between a husband and wife is exempted from being called 'rape,' then how can unnatural sex be punished under Section 377 IPC?"
• The principle of repeal by inconsistency applies—if two laws contradict each other, the later provision (Exception 2 to Section 375) overrides the earlier one (Section 377 IPC).

Court Rulings & Decisions

• The High Court acquitted the husband of charges under Section 377 and Section 376 IPC.
• The Court held that unnatural sex between a husband and wife is not punishable under Section 377 IPC due to Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC.

Legal Provisions 

• Section 375 IPC (Rape) – Defines rape but grants immunity to husbands under Exception 2 if the wife is above 18 years. (Section 63 of BNS)
• Section 377 IPC (Unnatural Offences) – Criminalizes unnatural sex, but the Court ruled that it does not apply between husband and wife.
• Section 304 IPC (Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder) – The husband was not acquitted under this section as it relates to the victim’s death. (Section 105 of BNS)
• Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017) – Supreme Court raised the age limit in Exception 2 to Section 375 from 15 to 18 years, meaning husbands can be prosecuted for rape if the wife is under 18.
• Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) – Supreme Court partially struck down Section 377 IPC, decriminalizing consensual homosexual relations.

Significance of the Judgment

• Raises questions on marital rape laws – The judgment favors the immunity granted to husbands under Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC.
• Interprets Section 377 narrowly – The Court restricts the scope of unnatural offences when committed within marriage.
• Contradicts Supreme Court rulings – The judgment ignores the legal position established in Independent Thought (2017), which raised the wife’s minimum age for marital immunity to 18 years.
• Highlights conflict in Indian Penal Code (IPC) – The decision exposes contradictions between different sections of the IPC, particularly regarding marital rape and unnatural sex.

The Chhattisgarh High Court ruled that unnatural sex between a husband and wife is not punishable under Section 377 IPC, citing the exception granted to husbands under Section 375 IPC. However, this contradicts Supreme Court rulings and raises important questions about the legal treatment of marital rape and sexual violence in marriage.

Case Name: Gorakhnath Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case No: CRA No. 891 of 2019

6). Delhi High Court: Award Cannot Be Set Aside If No Objections Were Raised Under Section 12(5) of Arbitration Act

Case Background

The case arose from a license agreement between Bhadra International India Pvt. Ltd. (Appellant) and the Airport Authority of India (AAI) (Respondent) on November 29, 2010. Under this agreement, AAI granted the appellant a license to provide ground handling services.

The agreement also included an arbitration clause, allowing AAI to appoint the arbitrator. The appellant did not object to this appointment and actively participated in the arbitration process.

Later, during the arbitration proceedings, Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Arbitration Act") was introduced. This section prohibited the unilateral appointment of arbitrators. However, the appellant did not challenge the arbitrator's appointment at that time.

After the arbitral award was passed, the appellant challenged it under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, arguing that the appointment of the arbitrator was illegal due to Section 12(5). The Single Judge rejected this argument, leading to the present appeal before the Delhi High Court.

Issues in the Case

1. Can an arbitral award be set aside solely because the arbitrator’s appointment was illegal under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act?
2. Did the appellant waive its right to object by participating in the arbitration proceedings without raising objections?

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by a division bench of Justices C. Hari Shankar and Ajay Digpaul.

Key Observations

• The court noted that even if the arbitrator was incompetent under Section 12(5), the appellant’s failure to object during arbitration or under Section 34 meant that the award could not be set aside solely on this ground.
• The arbitration process continued for two years after the introduction of Section 12(5), and the appellant never objected to the arbitrator’s appointment.
• Even in the initial Section 34 petition, the appellant did not raise the issue of the arbitrator’s incompetence. The objection was raised only later in a Miscellaneous Application seeking an amendment to the Section 34 petition.
• The court emphasized that arbitration law aims to promote arbitration as the preferred mode of dispute resolution and discourages technical objections that are raised late in the process.
• Since the appellant remained silent for a long time, the court concluded that this case was different from cases where objections were raised at the right stage.

Court Rulings & Decisions

• The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal.
• It held that since no objections were raised during arbitration or in the original Section 34 petition, the award could not be set aside solely based on the illegal appointment of the arbitrator.

Legal Provisions 

• Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act – Prohibits the unilateral appointment of arbitrators.
• Section 34 of the Arbitration Act – Provides grounds for challenging an arbitral award.
• Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. (2019) – Supreme Court held that a party cannot unilaterally appoint an arbitrator.
• Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. (2020) – Reinforced that a party interested in the dispute cannot appoint the arbitrator.
• TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. (2017) – Clarified that if a person is ineligible to be an arbitrator, they cannot appoint another arbitrator either.

Significance of the Judgment

• Prevents misuse of technical objections – Parties cannot remain silent during arbitration and then later challenge the award based on an arbitrator’s appointment.
• Encourages parties to raise objections at the right stage – If a party believes an arbitrator was appointed illegally, they should object immediately, not after the award is passed.
• Strengthens arbitration as an effective dispute resolution method – The ruling aligns with the pro-arbitration approach of Indian courts, ensuring finality in arbitral awards.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that an arbitral award cannot be set aside solely because the arbitrator’s appointment was illegal if no objections were raised during arbitration or in the initial challenge under Section 34. This judgment reinforces the importance of raising objections at the proper stage and supports arbitration as a reliable and efficient dispute resolution mechanism.

Case Name: BHADRA INTERNATIONAL INDIA PVT LTD AND ORS. versus AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 23/2025, CM APPLs. 7934/2025 & 7935/2025