1). Supreme Court Ruling: Offender to Be Sentenced Under Higher Punishment Provision When Conviction is Under Both POCSO Act and IPC

Case Background

In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of sentencing in cases where a person is convicted under both the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, and the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The case involved a man convicted of sexually assaulting his minor daughter.

The trial court convicted the accused under:

• Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC (rape by a relative/person in a position of trust and rape of a woman incapable of giving consent), which provide for life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life.
• Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act (penetrative sexual assault and punishment), which provide for a minimum of 10 years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

The trial court imposed life imprisonment under the IPC, following Section 42 of the POCSO Act, which states that if a person is convicted under both laws, the punishment under the law providing the higher sentence should apply.

The accused appealed to the High Court, which upheld the conviction but clarified that “life imprisonment” means imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that:

1. The sentence under the POCSO Act should apply instead of the IPC because Section 42A of the POCSO Act overrides the IPC.
2. The High Court could not enhance his sentence in an appeal filed by him when the State had not filed an appeal seeking an increased punishment.

Issues of the Case

1. Should the accused be punished under the IPC or the POCSO Act?
   • Does Section 42A of the POCSO Act override the IPC, allowing a lower punishment under the POCSO Act?
2. Did the High Court err in modifying the sentence to life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life?
   • Can a court increase the severity of a sentence in an appeal filed by the accused, when the State has not requested an enhancement?

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta.

Key Observations by the Supreme Court

• Section 42 of the POCSO Act mandates that when an offence is punishable under both the IPC and the POCSO Act, the law with the stricter punishment applies.
• Section 42A of the POCSO Act only provides an overriding effect for procedural matters, not punishment.
• The High Court erred by enhancing the sentence from "life imprisonment" to "life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life" when no appeal for enhancement was filed by the State.

Court Rulings & Decisions

1. Punishment Under IPC Prevails Over POCSO Act

• The Supreme Court ruled that the accused was rightly punished under the IPC, as Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) provide a higher punishment than the POCSO Act.
• The argument that Section 42A overrides the IPC was rejected, as Section 42A only applies when there is a conflict between procedural laws, not punishment laws.

2. High Court Erred in Enhancing the Sentence

• The High Court was wrong in clarifying that "life imprisonment" means imprisonment for the remainder of the convict's natural life.
• Courts cannot enhance a sentence in an appeal filed by the accused unless the State has specifically appealed for an increased punishment.
• The Supreme Court modified the sentence back to simple life imprisonment, without the restriction of the remainder of natural life.

3. Compensation to the Victim

• The Supreme Court imposed a fine of ₹5,00,000 on the accused, to be paid as compensation to the victim.

Final Decision

• Conviction under IPC and POCSO Act upheld.
• Life imprisonment remains but without the condition that it lasts for the remainder of natural life.
• Appeal was partly allowed.

Legal Provisions 

1. Section 42 of POCSO Act – States that if an offence is punishable under both the IPC and POCSO Act, the higher punishment must be applied.
2. Section 42A of POCSO Act – Gives overriding effect to POCSO Act in case of inconsistency with other laws, but does not override Section 42 regarding punishment.
3. Sections 376(2)(f) & 376(2)(i) of IPC – Rape by a relative/person in a position of trust and rape of a woman incapable of giving consent, both carrying life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life.
4. Sections 3 & 4 of POCSO Act – Penetrative sexual assault and punishment, with a minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Clarifies the Relationship Between POCSO Act and IPC
   • Section 42 of POCSO Act mandates applying the harsher punishment, whether in IPC or POCSO Act.
   • Section 42A does not override IPC punishments; it only applies to procedural conflicts.
2. Limits Judicial Overreach in Appeals Against Conviction
   • Courts cannot increase the severity of a sentence in an appeal filed by the accused unless the State appeals for an enhanced punishment.
3. Ensures Compensation for Victims
   • The Supreme Court ordered a fine of ₹5,00,000 to be paid to the victim, reinforcing the principle of victim compensation in sexual offence cases.

The Supreme Court ruled that when a person is convicted under both the IPC and the POCSO Act, the law prescribing the harsher punishment must be applied. In this case, the accused was rightly sentenced under IPC Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), which provide for stricter punishment than the POCSO Act.

However, the Court corrected the High Court's mistake in modifying the sentence and ruled that life imprisonment does not automatically mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life unless specified by law.

This judgment clarifies the relationship between the POCSO Act and IPC, limits judicial overreach in sentencing, and ensures victim compensation in sexual offence cases.

Case Title: GYANENDRA SINGH @ RAJA SINGH VERSUS STATE OF U.P.

2). Supreme Court Ruling: Preventive Detention Orders to Be Quashed if Bail Granted by Magistrate is Ignored

Case Background

The Supreme Court recently set aside a preventive detention order against a man accused of being a key member of a gold smuggling syndicate. The detention was ordered under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA), 1974.

The accused was arrested on March 5, 2024, for allegedly smuggling foreign gold into India. After his arrest, he was granted bail by the jurisdictional Magistrate with specific conditions to prevent him from continuing smuggling activities.

Despite the bail conditions, the detaining authority passed a preventive detention order, arguing that his activities endangered national security and the economy. The accused's wife challenged this detention order before the Delhi High Court, but the High Court upheld it. She then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues of the Case

1. Did the detaining authority fail to consider the bail conditions imposed by the Magistrate before ordering preventive detention?
2. Was the preventive detention order justified despite the accused being granted bail with strict conditions?
3. Did the detaining authority properly assess whether the bail conditions were enough to prevent the accused from engaging in further smuggling activities?
4. Was the reference to the accused’s past narcotics conviction relevant to the preventive detention order?

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice K. Vinod Chandran.

Key Observations by the Supreme Court

1. Failure to Consider Bail Conditions
   • The Court noted that while the detaining authority mentioned the bail conditions in its order, it failed to assess whether these conditions were sufficient to prevent the accused from continuing smuggling activities.
   • The detention order was silent on whether these bail conditions could effectively restrict the accused from indulging in similar offenses.
2. Legal Requirement to Examine Bail Conditions
   • The Court clarified that it was not deciding whether the bail conditions were sufficient, but rather that the detaining authority should have considered their adequacy before ordering detention.
   • The ruling emphasized that preventive detention should not be used casually, especially when a court has already granted bail with conditions.
3. Confessional Statement & Intelligence Reports
   • The Court observed that the accused had retracted his confessional statement when he was produced before the Magistrate.
   • The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) had raised concerns that the accused would continue smuggling activities, but the detaining authority did not explain why the bail conditions were inadequateto prevent this.
4. Reference to Prior Conviction
   • The appellant argued that the detaining authority unfairly referenced the accused’s past narcotics conviction to justify detention.
   • The Court clarified that this reference was only made to highlight the accused’s criminal tendencies, not as the main reason for detention.
5. Bail Cancellation Application Irrelevant
   • The appellant also argued that the detaining authority should have considered the pending bail cancellation application filed by the prosecution.
   • The Court rejected this argument, stating that the detaining authority could not be expected to predict the outcome of the bail cancellation application.

Court Rulings & Decisions

1. Preventive Detention Order Set Aside

• The Supreme Court set aside the preventive detention order on the ground that the detaining authority failed to consider the bail conditions before passing the order.
• The Court directed the immediate release of the accused, if still in custody.

2. Importance of Considering Bail Conditions

• The Court ruled that when an accused is granted bail with specific conditions, the detaining authority must evaluate whether these conditions are sufficient to prevent further offenses.
• Failure to do so invalidates the preventive detention order.

3. Previous Conviction Not a Decisive Factor

• The Court clarified that while the accused’s past conviction was mentioned, it was not the basis for the detention order, and therefore, this argument was dismissed.

Legal Provisions 

1. Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA Act, 1974 – Allows preventive detention of a person involved in smuggling activitiesto prevent them from engaging in future offenses.
2. Bail Conditions & Preventive Detention – The Court reaffirmed that when a person is already on bail with conditions, the detaining authority must assess whether those conditions are sufficient before imposing preventive detention.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Prevents Misuse of Preventive Detention
   • This ruling reinforces that preventive detention should not be used arbitrarily, especially when a person has already been granted bail with restrictions.
2. Strengthens Judicial Oversight
   • The Court’s decision ensures that detaining authorities must properly assess bail conditions before ordering preventive detention.
3. Protects Personal Liberty
   • The ruling upholds the constitutional right to personal liberty and ensures that preventive detention orders are not passed without proper justification.

The Supreme Court quashed the preventive detention order because the detaining authority failed to consider whether the bail conditions were sufficient to prevent further smuggling activities.

The ruling protects individuals from arbitrary detention and ensures that preventive detention orders are passed only after a thorough evaluation of bail conditions. This decision strengthens judicial oversight and reinforces the principle that preventive detention should only be used when absolutely necessary.

Case Title – Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India & Ors.

Case no. – Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.16893 of 2024

3). J&K HC Ruling: Omission by Trial Court in Framing Issue on Maintainability Does Not Limit Appellate Court's Power to Decide Suit’s Maintainability 

Case Background

The case involved a Punjab National Bank manager who was terminated from service. The trial court granted him damages for wrongful termination but did not explicitly declare his termination as wrongful.

The defendant (Punjab National Bank) did not initially challenge the maintainability of the suit as a preliminary objection in the trial court. However, the issue of whether the trial court could grant relief without addressing the maintainability of the suit became a key question on appeal.

The appellate court had to decide:

1. Whether it could determine the maintainability of the suit even though the trial court had not framed an issue on it.
2. Whether the termination without an inquiry was valid in private employment cases.

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by Justice Vinod Chatterji Koul of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court.

1. Appellate Court Can Decide Maintainability of Suit

• The trial court failed to frame an issue on the maintainability of the suit under the law.
• The High Court ruled that this omission does not limit the powers of the appellate court.
• The only requirement is that no new facts need to be pleaded and no new evidence is required.
• If the existing evidence is sufficient, the appellate court can decide the maintainability of the suit.

2. Reliance on Supreme Court Precedent

The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in R. Kandasamy v. T.R.K. Sarawathy (2024), which held that:

• A trial court’s failure to frame an issue on maintainability does not prevent an appellate court from deciding it.
• The higher court can examine whether a suit was maintainable, as long as no additional pleadings or evidence are needed.

3. Applicability of Order 41 Rule 24 of CPC

• Order 41 Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) allows an appellate court to determine a suit finally if the evidence on record is sufficient.
• This provision also allows the appellate court to reframe issues and give a final judgment.
• The High Court exercised this power to decide the maintainability of the suit, even though the trial court had not framed the issue.

4. Termination Without Inquiry in Private Employment

• The court also addressed whether an inquiry was required before termination in private employment cases.
• It ruled that in private employment, the burden is on the terminated employee to prove that an inquiry was required.
• In this case, the respondent (terminated employee) failed to prove this requirement.
• Therefore, the court ruled against the respondent on this issue.

Court Rulings & Decisions

1. Appellate Court Can Decide Maintainability
   • The trial court’s failure to frame an issue on maintainability does not prevent the appellate court from deciding it.
   • Since no new evidence or pleadings were needed, the High Court had the power to determine the case finally under Order 41 Rule 24 CPC.
2. Termination Without Inquiry in Private Employment
   • In private employment cases, an inquiry is not automatically required before termination.
   • The terminated employee must prove that an inquiry was necessary, which the respondent failed to do.
   • The court ruled in favor of the employer (Punjab National Bank) on this issue.

Legal Provisions 

1. Order 41 Rule 24 of CPC – Allows an appellate court to determine a suit finally if there is enough evidence on record, even if the trial court did not frame a specific issue.
2. R. Kandasamy v. T.R.K. Sarawathy (2024) – Supreme Court ruling confirming that higher courts can decide on maintainability if no new facts or evidence are needed.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Strengthens Powers of Appellate Courts
   • Ensures that important legal issues are not ignored just because a trial court omitted them.
2. Clarifies Maintainability of Suits
   • Confirms that appellate courts can determine maintainability even if the trial court did not raise the issue.
3. Guidance for Private Employment Disputes
   • Reinforces that private employers do not always need to conduct an inquiry before termination.
   • Employees must prove the requirement of an inquiry, rather than assuming it applies.

The Jammu and Kashmir High Court ruled that an appellate court can decide the maintainability of a suit even if the trial court did not frame an issue on it, as long as no new evidence or pleadings are needed.

The court also ruled against the terminated employee, holding that in private employment, the burden is on the employee to prove that an inquiry was necessary before termination. Since the respondent failed to do so, the court ruled in favor of the employer.

This decision strengthens appellate court powers and clarifies legal principles in private employment disputes.

Case-title Punjab National Bank vs V K Gandotra, 2025, LiveLaw, (JKL)

4). Kerala High Court: Releasing Convict on Probation for Crimes Under S. 377 IPC Sends Wrong Message Amid Rising Crimes Against Women & Children

Case Background

A 19-year-old man was accused of attempting to commit an offence under Section 377 IPC (unnatural offences) against a minor boy and threatening him under Section 506 IPC (criminal intimidation). The prosecution claimed that the accused had engaged in carnal intercourse against the order of nature with the minor and threatened to kill the victim’s sister if he disclosed the incident.

The Trial Court convicted the accused, sentencing him to four years rigorous imprisonment under Section 377 IPCand one year rigorous imprisonment under Section 506 IPC, with the sentences running concurrently.

The accused appealed, arguing that:

1. No offence under Section 377 IPC was made out, as there was no case of penetration.
2. He was only 19 years old at the time of the alleged incident and should be acquitted under Section 360 of CrPC or the Probation of Offenders Act (PO Act).

Issues Before the Court

1. Whether the offence committed falls under Section 377 IPC or only as an attempt under Section 511 IPC.
2. Whether the accused should be granted the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act.
3. Whether the sentence should be reduced considering the accused’s young age at the time of the offence.

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by Justice C.S. Sudha of the Kerala High Court.

1. No Full Offence Under Section 377 IPC, Only Attempt Under Section 511 IPC

• The Court carefully examined the First Information Statement and found that the victim only stated that the accused pulled at his private part, causing pain.
• There was no penetration or insertion, which is required to constitute an offence under Section 377 IPC.
• Therefore, the Court modified the conviction from Section 377 IPC to an attempt to commit the offence under Section 511 IPC.

2. No Probation Under the Probation of Offenders Act (PO Act)

• The accused argued that since he was 19 years old at the time of the offence, he should be released under the Probation of Offenders Act (PO Act).
• The Court noted that under Section 6 of the PO Act, an offender under 21 years of age should generally not be sentenced to imprisonment unless the court believes probation is not possible.
• However, by the time of his conviction, the accused was above 21 years old.
• More importantly, the Court refused to invoke the PO Act, stating that sexual offences against children and women are increasing, and giving probation in such cases would send the wrong message to society.

3. Sentence Reduced Considering Accused’s Young Age

• Even though the Court refused to grant probation, it considered the accused’s young age (19 years at the time of offence) and the fact that no full offence under Section 377 IPC was committed.
• Instead of the original four-year sentence, the Court reduced his punishment to one day, till the rising of the Court.
• The accused was also ordered to pay ₹25,000 as compensation to the victim.

Court Rulings & Decisions

1. Conviction Modified
   • The accused was not guilty under Section 377 IPC but was guilty of attempting the offence under Section 511 IPC.
2. No Probation Under PO Act
   • The Court refused to invoke the Probation of Offenders Act, stating that such offences must be treated seriously to deter sexual crimes.
3. Sentence Reduced
   • The Court reduced the accused’s punishment to one day, till the rising of the Court, considering his young age and the nature of the offence.
4. Compensation to the Victim
   • The accused was ordered to pay ₹25,000 as compensation to the victim.

Legal Provisions 

1. Section 377 IPC – Punishes unnatural offences with imprisonment for life or up to 10 years and a fine.
2. Section 506 IPC – Punishes criminal intimidation.
3. Section 511 IPC – Provides punishment for attempting to commit an offence.
4. Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act (PO Act) – Restricts imprisonment of offenders below 21 years of age, unless the court finds probation unsuitable.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Clear Distinction Between Attempt and Commission of Sexual Offences
   • The judgment clarifies that an attempt to commit an offence under Section 377 IPC does not attract the same punishment as actual commission.
2. Strict Approach Towards Sexual Offences
   • The Court emphasized that sexual crimes against children and women are rising, and leniency in sentencing could send the wrong message to society.
3. Balanced Consideration of Young Age of Offenders
   • While rejecting probation, the Court still considered the young age of the accused and imposed only a one-day sentence instead of four years.

The Kerala High Court modified the conviction of a 25-year-old man from Section 377 IPC to an attempt under Section 511 IPC. It refused to grant probation, stating that sexual offences against minors require serious treatment. However, considering the accused’s young age at the time of offence, the Court reduced the sentence to one day, till the rising of the Court, and ordered ₹25,000 compensation to the victim.

This decision strikes a balance between punishing sexual offences and considering the young age of first-time offenders while ensuring that such crimes are not taken lightly.

Case Title: Ajeesh @ Ajeeshkumar v State of Kerala

Case No: CRL.A NO. 96 OF 2014

5).Allahabad High Court: Companies Not 'State' Under Article 12 of the Constitution, Even if They Follow Government Regulations

Case Background

The case involved a dispute between M/S Manoj Petroleum & Another (Petitioners) and Nayara Energy Limited (Respondent No. 3) regarding the termination of a franchise agreement.

The Petitioners had been granted a franchise to sell petroleum and diesel products at a retail outlet in Bulandshahr, Uttar Pradesh.

However, following an inspection on August 18, 2021, Nayara Energy found irregularities in the product samples, as confirmed by BPCL’s report. This led to a show-cause notice on August 26, 2021, and later, termination of the franchise agreement on December 28, 2021.

The Petitioners challenged the termination through a writ petition, arguing that Nayara Energy, being involved in the sale of essential commodities, functions as an "extended hand" of the Union Government and should be treated as a "State" under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution.

Nayara Energy objected to the maintainability of the writ petition, arguing that it is a private company, not controlled by the Government, and therefore not subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Issues Before the Court

1. Whether Nayara Energy qualifies as "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution?
2. Whether the dispute regarding the franchise agreement termination falls within the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution?

Court Observations

Bench Composition

The case was heard by Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Vipin Chandra Dixit of the Allahabad High Court.

1. Nayara Energy Does Not Qualify as "State" Under Article 12

• The Court distinguished Nayara Energy from government-owned oil companies like IOCL, BPCL, and HPCL, which are under significant government control.
• Unlike these public sector oil companies, Nayara Energy operates independently and is not financially, administratively, or functionally controlled by the Government of India.
• Just because Nayara Energy complies with government regulations does not automatically make it a "State"under Article 12.

The Court explained this by drawing comparisons with other industries:

1. Banking Sector: Public banks (SBI, PNB) and private banks (HDFC, ICICI, Axis, etc.) operate under RBI regulations, but private banks are not "State" under Article 12.
2. Telecom Sector: BSNL is a government-controlled company and considered "State", but private telecom operators like Vodafone, Airtel, and Jio are not.
3. Similarly, Nayara Energy is a private entity, even though it operates in a regulated industry.

2. No Public Law Element in the Dispute

• The Court observed that the dispute between the Petitioners and Nayara Energy was purely contractual in nature.
• Termination of a private franchise agreement does not involve public law and cannot be challenged under writ jurisdiction.
• Since no public duty was involved, the petition was not maintainable under Article 226.

Four Principles Given by the Court

The Court referred to several Supreme Court judgments to extract the following principles regarding the applicability of Article 12 and writ jurisdiction:

1. Test of Financial, Functional, and Administrative Control

To determine whether a body qualifies as a "State" under Article 12, it must be assessed based on financial, functional, and administrative control by the Government. If the Government exercises pervasive control, the entity may be classified as a "State" under Article 12.

2. Mere Performance of Public Duty is Not Sufficient

Just because a private company performs a public function does not mean it automatically qualifies as "State" under Article 12. Even if a private entity is engaged in an essential service like petroleum distribution, it does not become a State unless the Government has extensive control over its functioning.

3. Writ Jurisdiction Applies Only When Public Law Elements Are Involved

A writ petition can be filed against an entity only if it involves the enforcement of public duties. If a dispute arises solely from a private contract, the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not applicable.

4. Private Contractual Disputes Cannot Be Challenged Under Article 226

When two private entities enter into a commercial agreement, any dispute arising out of that contract falls within private law. Such disputes must be resolved through civil courts or arbitration, and not through writ jurisdiction.

Court Rulings & Decisions

1. Nayara Energy is Not a "State" Under Article 12
   • The Court ruled that Nayara Energy operates independently and does not fall under the definition of "State".
   • It rejected the argument that simply because Nayara Energy deals in petroleum products (an essential commodity), it becomes a State entity.
2. Writ Petition Dismissed as Not Maintainable
   • The Court held that the dispute was purely contractual, with no public duty element.
   • Since Nayara Energy is a private entity, the franchise termination cannot be challenged through a writ petition.
   • The proper remedy for the Petitioners would be to approach a civil court or arbitration for breach of contract.

Legal Provisions 

1. Article 12 of the Indian Constitution – Defines "State" to include the Government, Parliament, local authorities, and other bodies under government control.
2. Article 226 of the Indian Constitution – Empowers High Courts to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and other legal rights.

Significance of the Judgment

1. Clarifies the Scope of Article 12
   • The ruling reiterates that private companies are not "State" under Article 12 unless they are under pervasive government control.
2. Limits Writ Jurisdiction in Private Contractual Matters
   • The judgment prevents misuse of writ petitions in purely private disputes.
3. Guidance for Regulated Private Industries
   • The ruling confirms that private companies in regulated sectors (banking, telecom, petroleum, etc.) remain private entities, even if they follow government rules.

The Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition, ruling that Nayara Energy is not a "State" under Article 12and that a private contractual dispute cannot be challenged under writ jurisdiction.

The Court emphasized that:

1. Simply following government regulations does not make a private company a "State".
2. A writ petition cannot be used to settle private contractual disputes.
3. The proper remedy for the Petitioners lies in civil courts or arbitration.

This decision provides important clarity on the applicability of Article 12 and the limits of writ jurisdiction in private disputes.

Case title - M/S MANOJ PETROLEUM AND ANOTHER vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 83