1). Section 141 NI Act | SC Clarifies Distinction Between 'In Charge' and 'Responsible' Directors 

Case Background

A complaint was filed against a company and its directors under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, for cheque dishonour. The complainant alleged that the company and its directors were responsible for issuing a dishonoured cheque. The appellant (one of the directors) argued that he was not involved in the company's daily affairsand had not signed the cheque.

The appellant approached the High Court seeking to quash the complaint. However, the High Court dismissed the petition and even imposed a cost of ₹20,000 on him. Dissatisfied with the ruling, he filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issue of the Case

The main issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether a director who is not in charge of the company's day-to-day affairs and has not signed the dishonoured cheque can be held liable under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?

Court Observations

The Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan analyzed Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which deals with offences committed by a company.

The Court highlighted two essential requirements under Section 141(1) for vicarious liability:

• The accused person must be in charge of the company at the time of the offence.
• The accused must be responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.

The Court noted that these two conditions are separate and must be explicitly stated in the complaint. It emphasized that merely being a director does not automatically make a person liable unless it is alleged and proved that they were responsible for the company’s operations.

The Bench also stated that only the person who signs the cheque can be held liable for cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Act. Since the complaint did not allege that the appellant was in charge of the company’s business, the Court held that he could not be prosecuted under Section 141.

Court Rulings and Decision

1. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and allowed the appeal.
2. The Court quashed the proceedings against the appellant since the complaint failed to mention his role in the company’s business.
3. It clarified that this ruling only applied to the appellant, and the trial against other accused persons would continue.

Legal Provisions 

• Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Punishes dishonour of cheques due to insufficient funds or other reasons.
• Section 141, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Holds companies and their responsible officials liable for offences under Section 138.

Significance of the Judgment

• This ruling reinforces the principle that directors cannot be held liable solely based on their position in the company.
• The decision protects individuals from wrongful prosecution if they are not directly involved in the company’s business operations.
• It sets a clear precedent that complaints must specifically allege and prove that a director was responsible for the company’s actions.

The Supreme Court has reiterated that only those actively managing the company's business can be held liable under Section 141. This judgment is significant in ensuring that directors are not wrongly implicated in cheque dishonour cases unless there is clear evidence of their involvement.

Case Name: HITESH VERMA vs. M/S HEALTH CARE AT HOME INDIA PVT. LTD.,Diary No. - 29293/2019

2). Supreme Court on Evidence Law: FIR Statements Inadmissible If Informant Dies of Natural Causes

Case Background

The case involved the suicide of a woman who was allegedly harassed by her husband, in-laws, and her husband's first wife. The deceased’s father had filed an FIR against the accused, alleging cruelty and abetment of suicide. However, before the trial began, the father passed away.

The Trial Court convicted all the accused, relying on the FIR filed by the deceased’s father. It allowed the investigating officer to prove the contents of the FIR, despite the father’s absence as a witness. However, the High Court reversed the decision after re-evaluating the evidence.

Dissatisfied with the acquittal, the deceased's mother appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue of the Case

The Supreme Court had to decide:

1. Can the contents of an FIR lodged by a deceased person be treated as evidence in a criminal trial?
2. Can an investigating officer prove the FIR’s contents if the informant dies before trial?
3. Does the evidence establish abetment of suicide in this case?

Court Observations

The case was heard by a Bench comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan.

1. FIR is Not Substantive Evidence Unless Corroborated

The Court clarified that an FIR is not considered strong evidence by itself. It is merely the first step in an investigation and can only be used:

• To corroborate the complainant’s testimony under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
• To contradict the complainant’s statements if they are inconsistent, under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Thus, if the informant dies before trial, the FIR’s contents must be independently proved and cannot be admitted as evidence through the investigating officer.

2. FIR Can Be Evidence If It Qualifies as a Dying Declaration

The Supreme Court explained that an FIR lodged by a deceased can be used as evidence only if it falls under the category of a "dying declaration" under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.

However, for this to apply:

• The informant’s death must be related to the incident mentioned in the FIR (e.g., if the informant later dies from injuries caused by the accused).
• If the informant dies of unrelated causes, then the FIR cannot be treated as substantive evidence.

In this case, the deceased’s father’s death was unrelated to the FIR he had lodged, meaning it did not qualify as a dying declaration.

3. Investigating Officer Cannot Prove FIR’s Contents

The Court ruled that an investigating officer cannot prove the statements made in an FIR if the informant is dead. The officer can:

• Confirm the registration of the FIR and identify signatures.
• Depose about when and where the FIR was recorded.

However, he cannot prove the truthfulness of the FIR’s contents on behalf of a deceased informant.

4. No Evidence of Abetment of Suicide

The Court also examined the charge of abetment of suicide. It ruled that:

• There was insufficient evidence to prove that the accused forced the deceased to take her own life.
• The prosecution failed to show that the deceased had no alternative but to die by suicide.

Since the evidence did not meet the legal standard for abetment, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

Court Rulings and Decision

1. The Court set aside the Trial Court’s ruling and upheld the High Court’s acquittal of the accused.
2. It held that the Trial Court and High Court were wrong in allowing the police officer to prove the FIR’s contents.
3. The FIR filed by the deceased’s father could not be used as substantive evidence because his death was unrelated to the case.
4. The charge of abetment of suicide was dismissed due to lack of evidence.

The Court also cited Harkirat Singh v. State of Punjab [(1997) 11 SCC 215 : AIR 1997 SC 3231] to support its reasoning.

Legal Provisions 

• Section 32, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Statements by a person who has died may be considered as evidence if related to the cause of death (dying declaration). (Section 26 of BSA)
• Section 145, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Allows cross-examination of a witness to contradict earlier statements. (Section 148 of BSA)
• Section 157, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Allows prior statements to be used to corroborate testimony in court. (Section 160 of BSA)

Significance of the Judgment

• The ruling clarifies the evidentiary value of an FIR when the informant is deceased.
• It prevents misuse of FIR contents when the original informant cannot be cross-examined.
• It reinforces that abetment of suicide must be proven with strong evidence and that mere allegations of cruelty are not enough.

The Supreme Court set an important precedent by ruling that an FIR by a deceased person cannot be used as evidence unless it qualifies as a dying declaration. The judgment also highlights the importance of strong evidence in abetment of suicide cases, ensuring that wrongful convictions do not occur based on unverified complaints.

Case Name: LALITA VERSUS VISHWANATH & ORS., Criminal Appeal No.1086 of 2017

3). Kerala High Court: Article 227 Cannot Be Invoked as an Appellate or Revisional Power

Case Background

The case originated from a specific performance suit filed by the plaintiffs. They sought the execution of a sale deed for a property. However, instead of proceeding with the trial, the Trial Court referred the case to the Lok Adalat for settlement.

At the Lok Adalat, both parties agreed on a settlement, and an award was passed based on their joint statement. According to this settlement:

• If the defendants failed to perform their obligation, the plaintiffs could deposit the sale consideration in the court and apply for registration of the sale deed.

Later, the defendants defaulted on their part of the agreement. As a result, the plaintiffs applied before the Trial Court for permission to deposit the sale consideration. The Trial Court allowed their request.

Unhappy with this order, the defendants approached the Kerala High Court, challenging the Trial Court's decision under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Issues in the Case

1. Can the Kerala High Court interfere with the Trial Court’s decision under Article 227 of the Constitution?
2. Did the defendants fulfill their obligations under the settlement agreement?
3. What is the scope of the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227?

Court Observations

The case was heard by a Single-Judge Bench of Justice K. Babu.

1. Limited Scope of Article 227 Powers

The High Court made it clear that Article 227 does not grant appellate or revisional power to the High Court. Instead, it can only be exercised in cases where:

• There is a grave error in the proceedings, such as a blatant disregard for legal provisions.
• A serious miscarriage of justice has taken place.

The Court stated:

“The power under Article 227 is restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of lawand must be exercised sparingly.”

Thus, mere errors in fact or law are not sufficient grounds for the High Court to interfere.

2. Defendants’ Failure to Perform Their Obligations

The Court examined the terms of the settlement and found that:

• The defendants were supposed to hand over important property documents within three weeks.
• However, they failed to produce any evidence proving that they had handed over these documents to the plaintiffs.
• Under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court could presume that the missing evidence would be unfavorable to the defendants.

The Court ruled:

“The defendants failed to show that they discharged their first obligation—handing over the documents within three weeks. The plaintiffs were expected to tender the balance sale consideration only after receiving these documents.”

Since the defendants defaulted, the plaintiffs had the right to deposit the sale consideration and proceed with the registration, as per the settlement terms.

3. Dismissal of the Defendants’ Petition

Since the Trial Court's decision was legally sound, the High Court refused to interfere and dismissed the defendants’ petition.

Court Rulings and Decision

1. The High Court upheld the Trial Court’s decision allowing the plaintiffs to deposit the sale consideration.
2. The Court reaffirmed that Article 227 powers should not be used to correct mere errors of law or fact.
3. The defendants were found to have defaulted on their obligations, which justified the Trial Court’s order in favor of the plaintiffs.

Legal Provisions 

• Article 227 of the Constitution of India – Grants the High Court supervisory jurisdiction over lower courts and tribunals. This power is not equivalent to appellate or revisional jurisdiction.
• Section 114(g), Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Allows courts to presume that missing evidence would be unfavorable to the party withholding it. (Section 119(g)of BSA)

Significance of the Judgment

• Clarifies the limited scope of Article 227 powers – The High Court cannot interfere in every case and must only intervene in cases of grave injustice.
• Reinforces the importance of Lok Adalat settlements – If parties agree to a compromise, they must follow through on their obligations.
• Strengthens evidentiary rules – Courts can draw negative inferences when a party withholds important evidence.

The Kerala High Court dismissed the defendants’ petition, reinforcing that Article 227 cannot be used as an appeal or revision tool. The defendants failed to meet their obligations, and the Trial Court’s order was justified. This ruling emphasises the binding nature of Lok Adalat settlements and limits unnecessary High Court interference in lower court proceedings.

Case Name: T.M.Leela and another V. P.K.Vasu and another., OP(C) NO. 683 OF 2021

4). Madras High Court: Rule Against Arresting Women at Night is Directory, Not Mandatory 

Case Background

The case involved a legal question about whether Section 46(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) and Section 43(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) Act—which prohibit the arrest of women after sunset and before sunrise—are mandatory or directory in nature.

The case arose when a woman was arrested at 8:00 PM by the police. She alleged that she was forcibly taken to the police station, abused, beaten, and injured with a knife. A Single-Judge Bench ruled that:

1. The arrest was illegal.
2. Departmental action should be taken against the police officers.
3. The woman should be compensated with ₹50,000.

The police officers, including an Inspector, a Sub-Inspector, and a Head Constable, challenged this order before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court.

Issues in the Case

1. Are the provisions preventing the arrest of women at night (Section 46(4) CrPC & Section 43(5) BNSS) mandatory or directory?
2. Can police officers be punished for non-compliance with these provisions?
3. Was the disciplinary action against the Inspector, Sub-Inspector, and Head Constable justified?
4. Was the appeal against the Single-Judge order maintainable?

Court Observations

The case was heard by a Division Bench of Justice G.R. Swaminathan and Justice M. Jothiraman.

1. Section 46(4) of CrPC & Section 43(5) of BNSS Are Directory, Not Mandatory

The Court ruled that these provisions are directory, not mandatory, because:

• No specific consequences are mentioned in the law for non-compliance.
• If the legislature intended for the provisions to be mandatory, it would have included penalties for violation.

The Court observed:

“Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C does not specify the consequence of non-compliance. If it were mandatory, the legislature would have provided for such consequences.”

The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dattatraya Moreshwar vs. State of Bombay, which stated that:

• Laws imposing public duties are directory.
• Laws granting private rights are mandatory.
• Declaring acts of public officials null due to procedural errors could cause inconvenience and injustice.

2. Arresting Women at Night Without Magistrate’s Permission May Be Justified in Certain Cases

The Court recognized that mechanically following this rule could cause practical difficulties in law enforcement. For example:

• If a woman commits a crime at midnight, waiting for the Magistrate’s approval before arresting her could allow her to escape.
• In such cases, the Magistrate may not be immediately available.

The Court stated:

“A strict requirement to get a Magistrate’s permission before arresting a woman at night could disable police officers from performing their duty and maintaining law and order.”

However, the Court cautioned that the police cannot ignore the rule completely. If a police officer fails to comply, they must provide a valid explanation.

3. Disciplinary Action Against Police Officers

Head Constable – Appeal Allowed

• The Court noted that the Head Constable was only following orders and was also injured during the incident.
• It was unreasonable to expect a Head Constable to check if Magistrate’s permission was obtained.
• Verdict: Departmental proceedings against the Head Constable were quashed.

Inspector – Appeal Allowed

• The Inspector was not present at the scene of the arrest.
• There was no evidence that the Inspector ordered the Sub-Inspector to arrest the woman.
• Verdict: Appeal allowed, and disciplinary proceedings against the Inspector were quashed.

Sub-Inspector – Appeal Dismissed

• The Sub-Inspector claimed she arrested the woman because she attacked the Head Constable.
• However, the remand report showed that the woman was arrested for different charges under:
  • Section 448 IPC – House trespass (Section 329(4) of BNS)
  • Section 294(b) IPC – Obscene acts (Section 296(b) of BNS)
  • Section 323 IPC – Causing hurt (Section 115 of BNS)
  • Section 506(i) IPC – Criminal intimidation (Section 351(2)/(3) of BNS)
• These offenses did not require immediate arrest, proving that the Sub-Inspector did not disclose all facts truthfully.
• Verdict: Appeal dismissed, and departmental action against the Sub-Inspector was upheld.

4. Appeal Against Single-Judge Order Was Maintainable

• The Court rejected the argument that the appeal was not maintainable because it involved criminal jurisdiction.
• The Court clarified that since the case did not involve bail or criminal trial, the appeal was valid.

Court Rulings and Decision

1. Section 46(4) of CrPC & Section 43(5) of BNSS Act are directory, not mandatory – meaning arresting a woman at night is not automatically illegal, but police must justify their actions.
2. Departmental proceedings against the Head Constable and Inspector were quashed because they were not directly responsible for the arrest.
3. The appeal of the Sub-Inspector was dismissed, and disciplinary action against her was upheld because she failed to provide full and fair disclosure.
4. The appeal against the Single-Judge order was valid and maintainable.

Legal Provisions 

• Section 46(4), CrPC & Section 43(5), BNSS Act – Prohibit arrest of women at night without Magistrate’s permission.
• Dattatraya Moreshwar vs. State of Bombay – Distinguishes between public duty laws (directory) and private rights laws (mandatory).
• Indian Penal Code (IPC)
  • Section 448 – House trespass (Section 329(4) of BNS)
  • Section 294(b) – Obscene acts (Section 296(b) of BNS)
  • Section 323 – Causing hurt (Section 115 of BNS)
  • Section 506(i) – Criminal intimidation (Section 351(2)/(3) of BNS)

Significance of the Judgment

• Clarifies that laws restricting nighttime arrests of women are not absolute – Officers must provide justification for non-compliance.
• Protects police officers from punishment if they are merely following orders.
• Ensures accountability of police officers who misuse their powers or fail to report full facts.
• Balances public interest and individual rights – Ensuring law enforcement is not obstructed while preventing arbitrary arrests.

The Madras High Court ruled that Section 46(4) of CrPC & Section 43(5) of BNSS are directory—police officers should generally follow them, but failure to comply does not automatically make an arrest illegal. The Inspector and Head Constable were cleared, but the Sub-Inspector faced disciplinary action for not making a fair disclosure. This case sets an important precedent for balancing legal procedure with effective policing while safeguarding women's rights.

Case Title: Deepa v. S Vijayalakshmi

Case No: W.A.(MD)Nos.1155 of 2020, 1200 & 1216 of 2019

5). Delhi High Court Denies Bail, Says Consent Has No Role in POCSO Cases 

Case Background

This case involves an accused, Mohd. Rafayat Ali, who was charged under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. He sought bail on the grounds that his relationship with the prosecutrix (victim) was consensualand that she was 18 years old at the time of the incident.

However, the prosecutrix’s school records stated that she was born on August 3, 2008, making her 16 years old at the time of the alleged offence.

The victim’s mother filed the complaint against the accused. The prosecutrix stated that:

1. She had a physical relationship with the accused, believing he would marry her.
2. When she became pregnant, the accused gave her medication, which resumed her menstrual cycle but caused severe abdominal pain.
3. Her parents discovered the pregnancy after a medical ultrasound.

During her statement before the Child Welfare Committee, the victim maintained that her relationship was consensual. The accused also claimed that she was 18 years old at the time.

Issues in the Case

1. Does the "consensual" nature of the relationship matter under the POCSO Act?
2. Is the victim's school record the primary evidence for determining her age?
3. Should bail be granted to the accused given the circumstances of the case?

Court Observations

The case was heard by a Single Judge Bench of Justice Sanjeev Narula in the Delhi High Court.

1. Consent Is Legally Irrelevant Under the POCSO Act

The Court rejected the accused's argument that the victim consented to the relationship. It ruled that:

• Under the POCSO Act, if the victim is under 18 years old, she cannot give valid consent.
• The law presumes that a minor is incapable of consenting, making any sexual act with a minor punishableregardless of consent.

The Court stated:

“The plea of consensual relationship is legally immaterial. If the victim is below 18 years, the law presumes she is incapable of giving valid consent.”

2. Age Determination: School Records Are Decisive

The accused argued that the victim was 18 years old, but the Court relied on her school records, which clearly stated her date of birth as August 3, 2008.

• The Court refused to rely on oral statements claiming she was 18.
• It noted that unless there is strong evidence contradicting school records, the official records must be followed.

The Court observed:

“At the stage of bail, it cannot disregard school records categorically mentioning the Prosecutrix’s date of birth.”

3. Bail Denied Due to Seriousness of the Offence

The Court refused to grant bail, considering:

• The seriousness of the offence under POCSO.
• The age gap between the accused and the victim (the accused was married with children).
• The ongoing trial, with key witnesses yet to be examined.
• The risk of the accused influencing the victim or other witnesses.

The Court ruled:

“Considering the gravity of the offence, the potential for influencing the witness, and the stage of the trial, the Court is not inclined to grant bail.”

Court Rulings and Decision

1. Consent is irrelevant in POCSO cases if the victim is below 18.
2. School records are the primary evidence for determining age.
3. Bail was denied, as the accused could influence witnesses and the trial was still ongoing.

Legal Provisions

• Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act – Protects minors from sexual exploitation and abuse.
• Section 375, Indian Penal Code (IPC) – Defines rape, where consent of a minor is not legally valid. (Section 63 of BNS)
• Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act – Specifies age determination rules, prioritising school records.

Significance of the Judgment

• Reinforces that consent is irrelevant in cases involving minors under the POCSO Act.
• Confirms that school records are the primary evidence for age determination, preventing accused persons from falsely claiming the victim was an adult.
• Ensures protection of minor victims by denying bail in cases where there is a risk of witness tampering.
• Strengthens child protection laws by emphasizing that minors cannot be held responsible for giving consent in sexual relationships.

The Delhi High Court denied bail to the accused, emphasizing that consent is irrelevant in POCSO cases and that school records determine the age of a minor victim. The Court’s decision highlights the strict application of child protection laws and ensures that minors are safeguarded from sexual exploitation.

Case Name: MOHD. RAFAYAT ALI v. STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ANR.

6). Gujarat High Court: Joint Petition for Nullity and Divorce Maintainable Under Hindu Marriage Act 

Case Background

A husband filed a composite suit in the Family Court under Sections 12(1) and 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Actseeking:

1. Nullity of marriage (on the ground of fraud and concealment of illness).
2. Divorce (on the ground of cruelty).

The wife challenged this suit by filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, arguing that:

• A composite suit for nullity and divorce is not legally permissible.
• The husband’s petition for nullity was time-barred (as it was filed after 18 years of marriage).
• The petition did not disclose a valid cause of action.

The Family Court rejected the wife's application, ruling that:

• Filing a composite suit is not prohibited, as it prevents multiple cases.
• The prayer for divorce will always survive, even if nullity is not granted.

The wife appealed to the Gujarat High Court, challenging the Family Court’s decision.

Issues in the Case

1. Is a composite suit for nullity of marriage and divorce legally permissible?
2. Should the husband's suit be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC?
3. Did the husband's suit disclose a valid cause of action?

Court Observations

The case was heard by Justice Sanjeev J. Thaker in the Gujarat High Court.

1. A Composite Suit for Nullity and Divorce Is Permissible

The Court held that:

• There is no legal bar on filing a joint petition seeking both nullity and divorce.
• Such petitions help avoid multiple proceedings and save judicial time.
• The prayer for divorce will always survive, even if nullity is not granted.

The Court ruled:

“Not permitting the husband to file a composite suit will lead to multiplicity of proceedings. Therefore, there cannot be any bar in a joint petition under Sections 12 and 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act.”

2. Order VII Rule 11 CPC Does Not Apply in This Case

The wife had filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which allows a court to reject a plaint if:

• It does not disclose a valid cause of action.
• The suit is barred by law.

The High Court ruled that:

• Order VII Rule 11 CPC applies only to the plaintiff’s case, not the defendant’s defense.
• The Family Court was only required to see if a cause of action existed, not to examine the merits of the case at this stage.
• Since the husband's petition disclosed allegations of cruelty and fraud, the suit could not be rejected outright.

The Court stated:

“While deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the court only looks at the plaint and supporting documents, not the defense of the defendant.”

3. The Husband's Suit Discloses a Cause of Action

The husband alleged cruelty on the following grounds:

• The wife frequently fought with him, used offensive language, and engaged in physical violence.
• She threatened to kill their daughter and ran towards her with a knife.
• She made false allegations against him at his workplace (Income Tax Department).
• She brainwashed their children against him.
• She accused his mother of performing black magic ("kala jadu").
• She concealed a medical condition before marriage, which allegedly led to no physical relationship.

The Court ruled that these allegations:

• Provided a valid cause of action.
• Could only be tested after leading evidence.
• Made it improper to reject the suit at this early stage.

The Court stated:

“Whether the plaint discloses a cause of action is a question of fact, to be determined from the plaint itself.”

4. The Family Court Rightly Rejected the Wife’s Application

The High Court upheld the Family Court’s decision, ruling that:

• The husband had the right to file a composite suit.
• The wife failed to show why the divorce petition was invalid.
• The suit could not be rejected in part—it had to be tried as a whole.

The Court concluded:

“As the relief of divorce will survive, the petition cannot be rejected in part, and the suit must proceed to trial.”

Court Rulings and Decision

1. A composite suit for nullity and divorce is legally valid under the Hindu Marriage Act.
2. Order VII Rule 11 CPC does not apply, as the suit disclosed a valid cause of action.
3. The petition could not be rejected without trial, as it involved factual disputes.
4. The wife’s revision application was dismissed, and the Family Court's order was upheld.

Legal Provisions

• Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:
  • Section 12(1) – Annulment of marriage on specific grounds (e.g., fraud, concealment).
  • Section 13(1)(ia) – Divorce on the ground of cruelty.
• Order VII Rule 11 CPC, 1908 – Grounds for rejecting a suit (lack of cause of action, barred by law, etc.).

Significance of the Judgment

• Clarifies that composite suits for nullity and divorce are valid, avoiding multiple cases.
• Reiterates that Order VII Rule 11 CPC applies only to the plaint, not the defendant’s defense.
• Ensures that matrimonial disputes proceed to trial rather than being dismissed prematurely.
• Strengthens the right of parties to seek alternative reliefs under the Hindu Marriage Act.

The Gujarat High Court upheld the Family Court’s decision, ruling that the husband’s suit for nullity and divorce was legally valid and that Order VII Rule 11 CPC did not apply. The judgment emphasises that matrimonial disputes should be decided based on evidence, ensuring fairness for both parties.

Case Name: X vs Y

Case Number: CRA/ 351 of 2024